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This thesis offers a critical reinterpretation of the reasons why Western 
European states promote International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The 
argument is built on contributions from critical legal scholars and the English 
School of International Relations, and it is presented as an alternative to both 
normative cosmopolitanism and realist disbelief. The research looks at the 
systemic or structural constraints inherent to the international legal system, 
and argues that order trumps justice in Western European states’ promotion 
of international human rights norms. 
In essence, IHRL has evolved as a result of a tension between two forces: On 
the one hand, a European understanding of international society, based on 
order, the centrality of the state and a minimalist conception of human rights; 
on the other hand, a civil society and UN-promoted, mostly Western, 
particularly European and broader conception of human rights, based on 
justice. Human rights norms emerge and develop when some states’ idea of 
order meets with advocates’ idea of justice. 
The thesis is theoretically situated in the milieu between solidarism and 
pluralism, and claims that when it comes to explaining Western European 
states’ promotion of IHRL, second-wave English Scholars are right to point 
out that the world society is not only made out of nation-states. However, 
these authors are too hasty in raising the profile of global justice as a policy 
driver in the international system. 
Methodologically speaking, the thesis applies a critical interpretation of state 
practice (discourse and action), with a particular focus on Spain and the UK, 
in relation to four norms at different degrees of settlement: a) the prohibition 
of torture, b) ecocide, c) justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY DO WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES PROMOTE 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS? 
 
“Query: How did you know that substantial justice was done? 
Theodore Roosevelt: Because I did, because... I was doing my best. 
Query: You mean to say that, when you do a thing, thereby substantial justice is 
done. 
Roosevelt: I do. When I do a thing, I do it so as to do substantial justice. I mean 
just that.”1 
 
Leaders are prone to speak of justice in international forums, and the 
recognition of human rights is the most conspicuous example.  
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the treaties 
and mechanisms originated from it did in fact introduce a fundamental 
change in international law. The UDHR compiled a fairly comprehensive list 
of the rights drafters could possibly think of at the time, and marked the 
beginning of international human rights law (IHRL), with international 
treaties that have been ratified by the vast majority of countries.2 Their 
actions are now limited within their national boundaries vis-à-vis not only 
their citizens but all people under their jurisdiction. With the UDHR, IHRL 
and the mechanisms that followed, the individual became a subject in 
international law.  
                                                 
1 From E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001[1939]), 73. 
2 Status of ratification of human rights treaties: http://indicators.ohchr.org/ All websites were last 
checked on 1 September 2017. The core treaties are the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (178 State parties), the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (169 parties), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (165 parties), the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (189 parties), the 1984 Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) (162 parties), the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (196 parties), the 1990 International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CRMW) (51 
parties), the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (174 parties), and 
the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(57 parties). 
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Western European countries played a significant role in making this happen.3 
The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1950, less than 
two years after the UDHR. It entered into force in 1953 and currently all 
members of the Council of Europe are party to it. Its judicial body, the 
European Court of Human Rights, began to work in 1959, becoming the first 
international human rights judicial mechanism. After “a long and difficult 
infancy”, the European human rights system experienced a “turning point” in 
the 1970s, when France ratified the Convention, Italy accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction on individual petitions, and the first British cases started to reach 
the Court.4 To this day, the European Court of Human Rights enjoys a high 
reputation,5 which is possibly related to its large workload, the exclusive 
dedication of the judges and the high level of state compliance.6 In spite of the 
noisy political debate, especially in the UK, about the alleged legitimacy 
deficit of the Court, empirical studies confirm the support among key 
stakeholders, including politicians, lawyers and judges.7 No less important is 
the fact that European countries have ratified most of the core human rights 
treaties.8 Latin American and African countries have done so too, but the gap 
between “rights in principle” (commitment in the form of ratification of 
human rights treaties) and “rights in practice” (implementation, actual 
protection of rights) tends to be smaller in Europe.9 
Small non-Western states did also make important contributions in the 
                                                 
3 For Western Europe I understand the fifteen members of the European Union up to the 
Enlargement of 2004, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, and the other small states in the 
subregion. 
4 Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From Its Inception to the 
Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 14. 
5 Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe, International Organization, 54:2 (2000), 218. 
6 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 9th Annual Report (2015): Supervision of the 
execution of judgements and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe, 2016). 
7 Başak Çali, Anne Koch and Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts: A 
Grounded Interpretivist Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 35:4 (2013). 
8 Exceptions must be noted. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are the only European country 
that have ratified the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families. 
9 Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2005). 
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drafting process of the UDHR and in the first steps of the UN human rights 
regime.10 Decolonised countries were in the forefront of the fight against 
apartheid and pushed for the adoption of the 1965 Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination,11 and a number of non-European 
countries have resorted to human rights to define their foreign policies.12 
Some authors suggest that other Western countries must also be credited for 
this. The 1975 Helsinki Accords between the East and the West made explicit 
references to human rights,13 and President Carter’s use of the human rights 
frame of US foreign policy in the late 1970s constituted a key milestone for 
human rights in the international arena.14 However, historically the US has 
not supported the cause of the legalisation of human rights,15 and it is 
actually at least questionable whether the US has overall been a promoter of 
human rights internationally. 
Be that as it may, at least to this day, no norm has reached an advanced level 
of development or settlement in IHRL without the support of Western 
European states. Notwithstanding the differences between Western 
European countries, the subcontinent as a whole has played a significant role 
in the legal internationalisation of human rights. Most authors agree that the 
cultural and institutional origins of IHRL are located in Western Europe, or at 
least in the West.16 This is hardly surprising considering the nearly total 
                                                 
10 Susan Waltz, Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly, 23:1 (2001); Universal Human 
Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States, Human Rights Quarterly, 26: 4 (2004); Micheline 
Ishay, The Socialist Contributions to Human Rights: An Overlooked Legacy, International 
Journal of Human Rights, 9:2 (2005). 
11 Ronald Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Pennsylvania: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010); Steven L. B. Jensen, The Making of International 
Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
12 David Forsythe, Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 2000); Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
13 Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the cold War: A Translational History 
of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
14 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (London: Belknap, 2010). 
15 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42. 
16 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, International Organization, 
40:3 (1986); Antonio Cassese, “The General Assembly: historical perspective 1945-1989”, in 
Alston, P. (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights: a critical appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon 
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domination by Western countries in the first two decades of existence of the 
UN. 
Geographically and temporarily speaking, the international 
institutionalisation of human rights is rooted in Europe, but this does not 
mean that human rights are necessarily a Western idea. One can accept as a 
fact the European influence in the making of IHRL, but “genealogy is no 
substitute for moral argument”. 17  More importantly, the genealogical 
argument does not imply that Western countries have an impeccable record 
on human rights either. NGOs' reports and the case-law from Strasbourg give 
a persuasive account of the opposite. Regardless of the intellectual origins of 
human rights and of the extent to which Western European countries act 
according to their promises, we must acknowledge that the decisions taken 
by their political leaders since the late 1940s made a difference so human 
rights could find a place in international law.  
If so, why do Western European countries promote international human rights 
norms? 
One might feel tempted to predicate that the preceding observations would 
confirm a genuine European commitment to global justice. This thesis will 
question this assumption. 
The question that drives this thesis deals with the politics of international 
human rights law promotion. As eloquently put by Michael Freeman, “it is 
politically important that human rights have been codified in international 
and national law, but it is a mistake to believe that the legalization of human 
rights takes the concept out of politics” (italics in the original).18 The question 
is particularly important at this historical juncture of shifting tectonic plates 
                                                                                                                                     
Press, 1992); Makau Mutua, “Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis”, in Byers, 
Michael (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Human Rights: A Political and 
Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Michael Freeman, 
Human Rights: An interdisciplinary approach (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Moyn, The Last Utopia: 
Human Rights in History. 
17 Jack Donnelly, Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?, International Affairs, 74:1 
(1998), 20. 
18 Freeman, Human Rights, 10. 
 14 
with rising nationalism and a declining European presence in global affairs. 
The conditions under which IHRL grew up have fundamentally changed. 
Unpacking the politics behind IHRL is therefore essential if we want to 
maintain and raise the profile of the individual in future global politics. 
A number of scholars in law and political science have worked on 
international norm acceptance and compliance, both from qualitative19 and 
quantitative perspectives.20 These studies have helped make sense of the 
“decoupling”21 or “compliance gap”,22 or in other words, the conditions under 
which states promise to abide by international human rights norms, but then 
only respect them sometimes and to some extent.23 
                                                 
19 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1979[1968]); Jeffrey Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the 
Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, European Journal of International Relations, 3:4 (1997); 
Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Vaughn Shannon, Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm 
Violation, International Studies Quarterly, 44:2 (2000); Jeffrey Checkel, International Institutions 
and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, International Organization, 59:4 (2005); 
Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights; Emlie M. Hafner-Burton, Making Human Rights a 
Reality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn 
Sikkink (eds.), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
20 Linda Keith, The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a 
Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, Journal of Peace Research, 36:1 (1999); Oona Hathaway, 
Do Treaties Make a Difference? Human Rights Treaties and the Problem of Compliance, Yale Law 
Journal, 111 (2002); Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 
University of Chicago Law Review, 72:2 (2005); Landman, Protecting Human Rights; Emilie 
Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsi, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty 
Promises, American Journal of Sociology, 110:5 (2005); Emilie Hafner-Burton and James Ron, 
Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, World Politics, 
61:2 (2009); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, International Regimes for Human Rights, Annual Review 
of Political Science, 15 (2012); Christopher J. Fariss, Respect for Human Rights has Improved 
Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability, American Political Science 
Review, 108:2 (2014). Sikkink and Simmons would probably see themselves as on both the 
quantitative and qualitative sides of the spectrum. 
21 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsi, Human Rights in a Globalizing World; Nitza Berkovitch and Neve 
Gordon, Differentiated Decoupling and Human Rights, Social Problems, 63:4 (2016). 
22 James Harrison and Sharifah Sekalala, Addressing the compliance gap? UN initiatives to 
benchmark the human rights performance of states and corporations, Review of International 
Studies, 41:S-5 (2015). 
23 Henkin famously said that “it is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time” (How 
Nations Behave, 47), but he also acknowledged that “international human rights law has been less 
successful” (The Age of Rights, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, 200). This is so 
because, unlike other realms of international law, IHRL “serves idealistic ends, not particular 
national interests” (How Nations Behave, 228). The gap between ratification and compliance is 
noticeable, and so must be the underlying motivation to do one thing and the other. 
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However, scholars have not explored sufficiently why states promote 
international human rights norms, that is, why they become advocates of the 
recognition of certain rights in international law.24 This thesis intends to 
make a contribution in this regard by exploring qualitatively why Western 
European states promote some human rights norms more than others. 
I contend that the lack of critical scrutiny of the reasons why countries 
promote IHRL is due to the widespread assumption that this area of law 
represents a genuine normative accomplishment, a globalised zenith of the 
Enlightenment project. The recognition of human rights would have made 
international law more humane, less state-centric and more inclined to 
justice. Insofar as this was made possible only because states agreed to it in 
the first place, the reason why some states promote IHRL must be that, after 
the horrors of World War II, governments in Europe and beyond came to 
believe that humanity needed international law to protect human dignity and 
freedom. 
This assumption is sometimes unambiguous and sometimes hidden between 
the lines. Steiner, for example, implies that human rights law promotion is 
the result of constructed identities, and this must be so because the human 
rights regime does not fit the rational choice model since “these treaties 
declare ideals of State conduct that no State can fully match, and that tower 
above most States' conduct”.25 For Morris, norm innovation by great powers 
must be “motivated by a belief that benefit will accrue to the state and 
because the values embodied in the norm in question are of intrinsic value” 
(italics in the original).26 In a recent article, Hannum writes that, while 
human rights can potentially be understood in different ways in different 
contexts, “the contemporary content of human rights is defined most clearly 
and most powerfully as law”; the meaning of IHRL therefore must be 
                                                 
24 Exceptionally, Mark Pollack, Who supports international law, and why?: The United States, the 
European Union, and the international legal order, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
13:4 (2015), 877. 
25 Henry Steiner, “International Protection of Human Rights”, in Evans, Malcolm (ed.), 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 778. 
26 Justin Morris, “Normative Innovation and the Great Powers”, in Bellamy, Alex J. (ed.), 
International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 269. 
 16 
univocal.27 
The assumption that states promote IHRL because they believe in human 
rights is particularly present in parts of the constructivist literature. 
Constructivist scholars start from the principle that national identities and 
interests are constructed over time through interaction, social meaning and 
shared ideas.28 States promote certain norms because they identify with 
them. Endorsing IHRL would be a way of articulating their “cosmopolitan 
creed”.29 From this perspective, human rights researchers have attempted to 
explain the prohibition of use of chemical weapons,30 the West's policy 
change in relation to the South African apartheid,31 or the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court totally or partially as a matter of shared and 
constructed legitimacy. 32  In constructivist terms, legitimacy can be 
understood as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.33 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink's famous model of international norm 
diffusion, states play a key role when they choose to embrace and promote 
certain standards of adequate behaviour before other states internalise 
them.34 However, their model does not explain why a given state makes the 
decision to take a step forward and join norm entrepreneurs campaigning for 
the acceptance of the norm by more reluctant states. Finnemore and Sikkink 
are of the opinion that states promote human rights norms “for reasons that 
                                                 
27 Hurst Hannum, Reinvigorating Human Rights for the Twenty-First Century, Human Rights Law 
Review, 16:3 (2016), 411. 
28 Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, International Security, 20:1 (1995), 71-72; 
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 
29 Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 36. 
30 Richard Price, A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, International Organization, 49:1 
(1995). 
31 Audie Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against 
South Africa, International Organization, 49:3 (1995). 
32 Caroline Fehl, Explaining the International Criminal Court: A 'Practice Test' for Rationalist and 
Constructivist Approaches, European Journal of International Relations, 10:3 (2004). 
33 Mark Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, The Academy of 
Management Review, 20:3 (1995), 574. 
34 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 
International Organization, 52:4 (1998).  
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relate to their identities as members of the international society”.35 In other 
words, states promote norms internationally because they consider them 
legitimate. This point is taken for granted in later works by the same authors 
and their colleagues.36 This thesis offers a different view.37 
A question from the historian Mark Mazower gives me the opportunity to 
announce the argument I will develop in the next chapter. He asks: “Given 
that the protection of human rights implies a curtailing of the state’s power 
over its citizens or subjects, how do we explain why the states grouped 
together in the United Nations Organization came to commit themselves to 
the defence of human rights?”.38 Against conventional views that focus on the 
repulse towards the Nazi crimes and on the influential role played by people 
like Eleanor Roosevelt, René Cassin or Raphaël Lemkin, Mazower argues that, 
far more important, there was a general sense that the Central and Eastern 
European minority rights regime of the League of Nations had been totally 
ineffective in preventing World War II. As a result, states established a new 
system, this one based on universal and individual rights.39 European 
                                                 
35 Id, 902. 
36 In 1999, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights. For a reflection on the 
process, conditions and mechanisms by which actors contribute to move from commitment to 
compliance, see Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (eds.), The Persistent Power of Human Rights, of 2013. 
37 I must render account of other critiques of Finnemore and Sikkink’s model. Bob (The Marketing 
of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) and Berkovitch and Gordon (The Political Economy of Transnational Regimes: The 
Case of Human Rights, International Studies Quarterly, 52:4, 2008) denounce the undue political 
and economic pressure of Northern NGOs over advocates in the Global South. Acharya (How 
Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian 
Regionalism, International Organization, 58:2, 2004) has also talked about the need to examine 
carefully how global norms get “localised”. Gordon and Berkovitch (Human Rights Discourse in 
Domestic Settings: How Does it Emerge?, Political Studies, 55:1, 2007) also addressed the 
problem of “domestic resistance” to global norms in certain contexts (in particular, they write 
about Israel). Warning about norm regression, McKeown (Norm Regress: US Revisionism and the 
Slow Death of the Torture Norm, International Relations, 23:1, 2009) questioned the positive 
linear progression underpinning the model of Finnemore and Sikkink. Bloomfield (Norm 
antipreneurs and theorising resistance to normative change, Review of International Studies, 42:2, 
2016) argued that, just as we may have norm entrepreneurs, there may also be “norm antipreneurs” 
that favour the status quo, or “rival entrepreneurs” from what Bob (The Global Rights Wing and 
the Clash of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) calls the “global right 
wing”. 
38 Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950, The Historical Journal, 
47:2 (2004), 380. 
39 This could partly explain why the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
protects “persons belonging to (…) minorities” (Article 27), and not minorities themselves as 
groups. With an entirely different history, African countries adopted a more collectivist approach 
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governments felt protected by the prohibition of intervention in domestic 
affairs, solemnly proclaimed in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.40 In spite of 
initial expectations,41 this principle was soon to be interpreted in a rather 
flexible way by UN bodies and regional human rights institutions.42 Yet, 
states did not know this in the 1940s. For Mazower, “it seems they were 
happy enough to accept the appearance of a lofty-sounding Universal 
Declaration which committed them, in truth, to very little”.43 
The argument defended in this thesis trails Mazower's line of thought. As 
opposed to those constructivists who assume that countries promote human 
rights norms because they identify with them and want to encourage others 
to follow their example, and those realists who dismiss human rights as a 
manifestation of the power of the West over the rest, in this thesis I will argue 
that IHRL has evolved as a result of a tension between two forces: On the one 
hand, a European understanding of international society, based on order, the 
centrality of the state and a minimalist conception of human rights; on the 
other hand, a civil society and UN-promoted, mostly Western, particularly 
European and slightly broader conception of human rights. Analytically 
speaking, I believe this tension is best understood in the continuum between 
the dichotomies of the English School of International Relations: 
order/justice, pluralism/solidarism and international society/world society. 
The English School also offers the opportunity to study the IHRL regime as a 
component of the international system in its own right, and to develop 
certain theoretical propositions in an analytical model based on a system-
                                                                                                                                     
when they agreed upon the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981. 
40 “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.” 
41 Goodrich wrote this in the first article ever published in International Organization: “The point 
upon which attention needs to be focused for the serious student of international affairs is that the 
United Nations does not represent a break with the past, but rather the continued application of old 
ideas and methods with some changes deemed necessary in the light of past experience. If people 
would only recognize this simple truth, they might be more intelligent in their evaluation of past 
efforts and more tolerant in their appraisal of present efforts.” (Leland Goodrich, From League of 
Nations to United Nations, International Organization, 1:1, 1947, 5). 
42 Antonio Cançado Trindade, The Domestic Jurisdiction of States in the Practice of the United 
Nations and Regional Organisations, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 25:4 (1976). 
43 Mazower, Strange Triumph, 396. 
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focused “level of analysis”.44 
Based on a systemic reflection, I will claim that IHRL is not purely the 
product of Europe's self-interested wishes or liberal dreams. It is not an 
identity-based humanitarian project either. The promotion of IHRL by 
Western European countries is based on an order-based idea of international 
society. However, even though the international institutionalisation of human 
rights owes much to the European input, other actors have also had an 
influence: Apart from non-European countries with different agendas, there 
are NGOs, UN bodies, academics and like-minded government officials. 
The theoretical argument, which I call Order-over-Justice, is set out in 
chapter 2. The thesis is theoretically situated in the milieu between 
solidarism and pluralism. It claims that, when explaining Western European 
states’ promotion of IHRL, second-wave English Scholars are right to point 
out that the world society is not only made out of nation-states, but these 
authors were too hasty in raising the profile of global justice as a policy 
driver in the international system. The last section of this chapter advances 
six propositions derived from Order-over-Justice. The first two propositions 
are time-dependent, and concern the intensity with which Western European 
states are likely to promote or to resist a human rights norm at earlier and 
later stages of the norm’s life. The remaining four propositions look at the 
nature of the norm itself, and in particular, its clarity, its burden in terms of 
requirements from the state, its fitness within liberalism, and the support 
received from norm entrepreneurs. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the research method: A critical interpretivist 
perspective based on a hierarchical structure of legal tools and a five-level 
categorisation of human rights norms in light of their degree of settlement in 
international law. To keep the project manageable regarding only the two 
time-dependent propositions, I will focus on two relatively large countries 
within the Western European context: Spain and the United Kingdom. The 
                                                 
44 David Singer, The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, World Politics, 14:1 
(1961). 
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grounds for the choice will be elaborated in chapter 3. At this point it is 
sufficient to say that these two countries were chosen from the pre-selection 
of the five relatively large Western European countries, namely Germany, 
France, Italy and the mentioned two. Despite the differences, Order-over-
Justice anticipates that Western European countries would follow similar 
paths in the international promotion of human rights law. 
The empirical chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 explore why Western European states 
promoted or did not promote four human rights norms, and how their 
attitudes towards these norms have evolved over time. The answers to these 
questions are sought in the hermeneutics of the relevant treaties and in their 
travaux préparatoires, as well as the opinions expressed by international 
courts, independent international bodies and legal and political 
commentators. All six propositions will be examined in relation to four norms 
at different stages of development: a) The prohibition of torture, as an 
example of a globally settled norm that emerged in the 1970s; b) Ecocide, a 
failed norm that lived from the early 1970s up to the mid 1990s; c) 
Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, a norm at an advanced 
stage of development that emerged in the 1990s; and d) Responsibility to 
Protect, a proto-norm that was born in the early 2000s. 
Chapter 8 carries out a comparative exercise of the findings from the four 
cases. It also presents the theoretical contribution of this thesis: Order and 
pluralism can still be drivers in our world society, and both the English 
School and the study of IHRL would benefit from more critical and self-
critical approaches. Besides, this chapter offers insight into what this may 
mean in practical terms for IHRL and human rights advocacy in the 
foreseeable future. At a time of rising nationalism in the Global North and 
ever growing power from the Global South, identifying the factors that lie 
beneath the legal recognition of human rights is key to ensure that these ideal 
goals of humanity inspire policy decisions in the coming years.  
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2. ORDER-OVER-JUSTICE: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS NORM PROMOTION 
 
“It is better to recognise that we are in darkness than to pretend that we can 
see light” (Hedley Bull, 1977)45 
 “It is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness” (claimed to be a 
Chinese proverb, Amnesty International’s traditional motto) 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis. The chapter 
begins with a critical review of the literature on international human rights 
promotion between normative cosmopolitanism and realist disbelief (2.1). As 
an alternative explanation, the second part presents Order-over-Justice, a 
systemic approach built on the dichotomous vantage point from which the 
English School interprets international law (2.2). This section includes six 
propositions that one expects to see if, as the theory suggests, Western 
European states promote international human rights legal norms as a matter 
of international order more than as part of a global justice project. 
 
2.1. International Human Rights Law between normative 
cosmopolitanism and realist disbelief 
 
Cosmopolitanism is based on the moral unity of humankind and equal 
deservedness of all human beings. In normative terms, cosmopolitanism 
advocates that morality cannot be contained to communities separated by 
national boundaries. The cosmopolitan way of thinking stresses that 
universal morality is of such importance that most if not all other 
considerations must give way, including national interests and territorial 
integrity, if required. 
                                                 
45 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Palgrave, 
2002[1977]), 308. 
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As we will see later, cosmopolitanism is popular in the English School 
(subsection 2.2.2) and it is particularly present in segments of the 
constructivist tradition in International Relations. As advanced in chapter 1, 
generally for constructivists states promote certain norms because they 
identify with them. According to Finnemore and Sikkink's model, states 
promote human rights norms “for reasons that relate to their identities as 
members of the international society”. 46  Another telling example of 
normative cosmopolitanism in constructivism is Adler’s famous quote: 
“human rights have become a central factor in the interests of democratic 
nations because they increasingly define social identities”, and “it would be 
very difficult for a European state to consistently abuse human rights and still 
be deemed to belong to contemporary ‘Europe’”.47 
Ian Manners is worth mentioning here as well. Manners’ referred to the 
European Union as a “normative power”: The central component of the EU’s 
power is that it “exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and 
that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way”.48 For 
him, “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not 
what it does or what it says, but what it is”.49 Manners' analysis has been 
critiqued by a number of authors,50 who are at the very least hesitant about 
the normative place of EU's place in the world. Part of the problem lies in the 
case chosen by Manners to exemplify his argument: The abolition of the 
death penalty. Oddly enough, it is the same example chosen by Moravcsik to 
illustrate some of the differences between the United States and European 
                                                 
46 Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 902. 
47 Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, European 
Journal of International Relations, 3:3 (1997), 340 and 345. 
48 Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40:2 (2002), 242. 
49 Id, 252. 
50 Richard Youngs, Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 42:2 (2004); Marika Lerch and Guido Schwellnus, Normative 
by nature? The role of coherence in justifying the EU’s external human rights policy, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 13:2 (2006); Helene Sjursen, What kind of power?, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13:2 (2006); The EU as a 'normative' power: how can this be?, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13:2 (2006); Adrian Hyde-Price, 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 13:2 (2006); Tuomas Forsberg, Normative Power Europe, 
Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49:6 
(2011). 
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political leaders in their views about human rights.51 Manners’ selection is 
slightly biased, because the death penalty is quite a unique case. With the 
exception of Belarus, the death penalty has disappeared from Europe entirely, 
and Western Europe has not seen an execution in decades. It is probably safe 
to say that political leaders' opposition to the death penalty in Europe is a 
matter of principles, but it is also true that no other human rights norm 
resembles the prohibition of the death penalty either in its radical clarity (the 
opposition must be absolute regardless of the crime) or in its consequences 
(other rights are more costly or have unexpected consequences, while the 
death penalty affects a relatively small number of inmates). If Manners had 
chosen another human right, such as the prohibition of torture or the right to 
health, he would have struggled to argue persuasively that the power of 
Europe is of “normative” nature. 52  In fact, Manners himself later 
acknowledged the limitations of his approach at the practical level: “It is one 
thing to say that the EU is a normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity 
consisting of supranational and international forms of governance; it is 
another to argue that the EU acts in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way” 
(italics in the original).53  
Cosmopolitan readings of states’ declared intentions and motivations risk 
assuming “a relatively high degree of sincerity on the part of the creators, the 
internalization of a moral obligation by the leadership and relative 
consistency in practice”. 54  My disagreement with the assumption of 
normative cosmopolitanism lies essentially in the expectations towards state 
behaviour. Human rights legalism and diplomatic talking are full of 
references to justice, equality, freedom and solidarity, but if the promotion of 
human rights law by states were a cosmopolitan project, we would expect 
                                                 
51 Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Right Regimes: Liberal Theory and 
Western Europe, European Journal of International Relations, 1:2 (1995); “The Paradox of US 
Human Rights Policy”, in Ignatieff, Michael (ed.), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press (2005). 
52 Similarly, Lerch and Schwellnus, Normative by nature? 
53 Ian Manners, The normative ethics of the European Union, International Affairs, 84:1 (2008), 
65. 
54 Bruce Cronin, Institutions for the Common Good: International Protection Regimes in 
International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 192. 
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states to behave in line with human rights as a matter of principle. However, 
a reality-check proves otherwise.  
First, in general, countries have been much quicker at proclaiming rights than 
at providing the necessary tools to ensure their implementation and 
enforcement. Initially, the UN Commission on Human Rights, a political body 
conformed by Member States, interpreted its mandate in a highly restrictive 
way. In its first session in early 1947, the Commission resolved that it had “no 
power to take any action in regard to any complaints concerning human 
rights”.55 At least for the first two decades, states were reluctant to establish 
independent monitoring bodies, and when they eventually did agree to set up 
the mechanisms, they created artificial distinctions between rights. As shown 
in chapter 6, this is the case of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which was not accompanied by any 
independent monitoring body, unlike the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted the very same day (16 December 1966), 
which was born with its own Human Rights Committee.56 
Secondly, the assessment is not very different when we look at the European 
human rights regime. In Sikkink’s opinion, after World War II, unlike their US 
counterparts, European leaders agreed to a regional institutional framework 
on human rights to prevent the repetition of the experience of repression and 
war in the continent.57 For Moravcsik, post-War European leaders were 
trying to protect future generations from possible authoritarian temptations 
from their successors.58 However, at that time, Europe was still far from 
having strong monitoring bodies. Individuals had to request the European 
Commission of Human Rights to submit their complaints to the European 
Court on their behalf, and for years the Commission “acted primarily as a 
                                                 
55 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the 1st Session, 27 January-10 February 1947, UN doc: 
E/259, para. 22. 
56 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was only set up in 1985 by 
ECOSOC, and since the entry into force of the Optional Protocol in 2013 it also has the mandate 
to deal with individual complaints. 
57 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States 
and Western Europe”, in Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert O. (eds.), Ideas and Foreign 
Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
58 Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes. 
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political body limiting the types of cases heard” by the Court.59 It was only in 
1998, with the entry into force of the 11th Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, that individuals gained direct access to 
Strasbourg. To this day, the European Court of Human Rights remains the 
only international court of its kind where individuals can lodge a complaint 
for the breach of their rights.60 
And thirdly, if states promoted human rights as a matter of justice, one would 
expect to see them using available resources to enhance the protection of 
human rights beyond borders. Nonetheless, states have hardly ever used the 
interstate complaint mechanisms at their disposal. Although the ICCPR 
regulates this possibility in great detail (Articles 41-43), so far not even a 
single case has ever been brought to the attention of the Human Rights 
Committee. Since the 1950s, only 20 cases have been lodged at the European 
Court of Human Rights by one or more countries, more than half of which 
affect territorial disputes between them.61 For Krasner, “states have been 
reluctant to accuse other states of human rights violations because of the 
danger that their own sovereign control would be undermined”.62 In fact, a 
cynic could even argue that states have agreed to a set of independent human 
rights mechanisms at the UN and the Council of Europe so they can have a 
valid excuse not to use the interstate mechanisms, which are much more 
uncomfortable in diplomatic terms. It is true that the Western European and 
Others Group is the most active at the Universal Periodic Review,63 which is 
                                                 
59 Karen Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary, Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, 7 
(2011), 398; Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, 140-142. 
60 With the entry into force of the 14th Protocol in 2010, cases can be declared inadmissible if the 
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based on state-to-state recommendations, but it is also true that bringing a 
case to the European Court of Human Rights and making a recommendation 
at the Human Rights Council are just not comparable in their legal effects and 
political consequences. 
Having talked about normative cosmopolitanism, we can find realist disbelief, 
or “the scepticism of the realists” as Beitz put it, on the opposite corner of the 
mat.64 Realists are sceptical about international law in general,65 and about 
the international recognition of human rights in particular.66 For realists, it is 
unwise to judge other states' actions from a moral perspective.67 Norms do 
not matter much,68 or they are simply “reflections of the distribution of 
power in the world”,69 and get subsumed “in the material structure of the 
international system”.70 With the prisoner’s dilemma in mind, Krasner 
skilfully captures the distress that international law provokes in many 
                                                                                                                                     
First Cycle of the New UPR Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council (Berlin: 
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69 John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security, 19:3 
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70 John Mearsheimer, A Realist Reply, International Security, 20:1 (1995), 91. 
 27 
realists: “If no one obeys the law, it hardly matters. If everyone obeyed the 
law, the world might be a better place. But if some states assume that 
everyone will honor the law, while others cheat, the world could be a worse 
place than it would have been with no law at all”.71 From a realist perspective, 
it is also possible that Western European states promote IHRL as one of their 
“milieu goals”, which “aim at shaping conditions beyond [states'] national 
boundaries”.72 The fact that milieu goals can be shared with other countries 
does not make them any less self-centred. It only confirms that states can 
have common interests. Applied to our case, the promotion of IHRL would 
not be a matter of values and principles, but an entirely rational and self-
interested decision. From this perspective, promoting human rights would be 
one way for Europeans to have a say in the world.  
Realism is also present among legal scholars. Some have argued that, in spite 
of their discursive salience, the proclamation of human rights in international 
law has very little connection with the actual improvement of human rights 
around the world, which in their opinion has to do with more interdependent 
trade relations and with the end of the Cold War. However, liberal 
democracies keep drafting, signing and ratifying human rights treaties 
because they can do it at a very little cost, and not doing so would make them 
look like ugly outliers.73 
Prudence often associated with realist foreign policy can actually have a 
positive impact on human rights beyond national borders.74 However, IHRL 
is not just the reflection of the combination of Western national powers and 
interests, as realists would expect. The argument put forward in this thesis 
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differs directly from realism in three ways. 
Firstly, I argued earlier that the delay in the establishment of independent 
monitoring bodies and their relative weakness constitute arguments against 
a cosmopolitan value-based explanation of the existence of IHRL. On the 
other hand, the existence of these bodies, as late and weak as they can be, 
contradicts the realist expectation. Realism would find it very hard to explain 
the high degree of state compliance with the judgements of the European 
Court of Human Rights. More generally, realists cannot account for the 
existence of an international system that is not based on reciprocity. In fact, 
realists would probably say that reciprocity is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition; for an international regime to emerge and endure, it would also 
have to represent accurately the pre-existing power distribution between 
states. Be that as it may, with IHRL, states impose obligations on themselves 
irrespective of state-to-state conditional obligations. The logic of reciprocity 
in interstate relationships is therefore by definition inconsistent with IHRL.75 
It is certainly different in the case of International Humanitarian Law, which 
emerged in the 19th century as a field of cooperation between sovereign 
countries. Morrow illustrates this point very well in relation to prisoners of 
war, an area in which even countries in conflict with each other may find 
good rational reasons to cooperate reciprocally.76 Mazower shows that the 
1899 Martens clause77 was the result of very rational and reciprocity-based 
interstate arguments.78 In fact, Alexander has made the persuasive argument 
that the humanitarian dimension of the international law of armed conflict is 
a rather new phenomenon that began approximately in the 1970s, with the 
                                                 
75 Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International Relations, 
American Society of International Law Proceedings, 26 (1963), 31. For a contrary view, Stephen 
Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), ch. 8. 
76 James Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, International 
Organization, 55:4 (2001). 
77 “Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it 
right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they 
result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the 
requirements of the public conscience.” (Preamble of the 1899 Convention with respect to the laws 
of war on land, Hague II). 
78 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 75. 
 29 
effective lobbying of NGOs and key individuals.79 
A second point of disagreement with realism is that IHRL cannot represent 
the will of the European West because IHRL has its own life. The human 
rights regime does not simply reflect the will of Western European 
governments within the hegemonic structures of power. Although the 
international institutionalisation of human rights owes much to the European 
input, other actors have also had an influence. Apart from non-European 
countries with different purposes, there are NGOs, think-tanks, journalists, 
UN bodies and even like-minded government officials and diplomats. Forces 
connected to non-univocal ideals of global justice may motivate these actors. 
Because of the number of independent advocacy actors within the 
international human rights regime, Western European states cannot be 
certain about the future meaning of the norm they are helping to bring to life. 
At times, the paths of states and advocates may meld for strategic or tactical 
reasons and a new human rights norm may emerge out of that momentum, 
but the motivations beneath each actors' decision are different. The fate of 
the new-born norm will depend upon the power distribution between the 
states and the advocates. Once the norm enters the realm of the global, states 
will not keep all the power over its meaning any more.  
This connects with the third fundamental difference between realism and the 
argument put forward in the following pages. For realism, the innards of the 
state are of minor importance. States are intrinsically (for classical realists) 
or structurally (for neorealists) cursed to mistrust each other and maximise 
their influence in a context of anarchy. The approach defended in this thesis, 
on the contrary, recognises the importance of civil liberties and democratic 
institutions at the domestic level, insofar as only these freedoms can allow 
non-state actors to lobby government officials and to champion human rights. 
In their condition of norm entrepreneurs, civil society organisations in 
European democracies use international law as a tool for justice, and the 
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state must negotiate the meaning of norms at the domestic and the 
international levels. 
 
2.2. Order-over-Justice: An alternative explanation from the English 
School 
 
In contrast with what I see as the excesses of normative cosmopolitanism and 
the shortcomings of realist disbelief, this section provides an alternative 
explanation of the role and motivation of Western European states in 
promoting international human rights norms. Firstly, I introduce the notions 
of consent and consensus in IHRL (subsection 2.2.1), whose differences will 
give way to my theoretical approach within the contours of the English 
School and its dichotomies (2.2.2). Then, I present why Order-over-Justice is 
best suited to explain critically why Western European states promote 
human rights norms in international society (2.2.3). I conclude this chapter 
with the six propositions stemming from Order-over-Justice (2.2.4). 
 
2.2.1. International Human Rights Law is not (just) what states make of it 
 
The international human rights legal system is built on the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This was indeed the tool by which 
states gave content to a number of human rights-related provisions 
contained in the 1945 UN Charter: Articles 1, 55, 56 and 68.80 Based on a 
thorough survey of national legislation and case-law and on the analysis of 
statements by governments and international bodies, Hannum concludes that 
“the Declaration represents the only common ground when many states 
discuss human rights [and] it is the first instrument that should be consulted 
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when attempting to identify the contemporary content of international 
human rights law”.81 
Human rights, of course, were not invented in 1948. They had been discussed, 
explored and advocated long before, even in Ancient Rome and Greece, but 
especially in Europe since the Enlightenment.82 History had also witnessed 
solidarity movements, like labour in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and 
humanitarian projects, like the movement against slavery or the Red Cross, 
both of them in the 19th century. 
For Vincent, individual rights were “important for the birth of the idea of a 
society of states”,83 and Reus-Smit goes as far as to find in the struggle for 
individual rights a common theme in the “expansion of the international 
system” between the mid 17th century and the collapse of the Soviet Union.84 
Alternatively, Moyn argues that human rights only began to take a relatively 
important role in international affairs in the 1970s,85 and Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffmann even claims that to reach that point human rights had to wait until 
the 1990s.86 
The disagreement between these authors lies on their expectations. Albeit 
not verbalising it, these commentators have different understandings of the 
prominence that human rights could potentially have on the international 
stage. In a nutshell, the more we expect from human rights, the less likely we 
are to be persuaded that human rights actually shape actors’ behaviour in 
real life international politics. As I let slip in section 2.1, the point that 
expectations matter greatly will run through this thesis. I will come back to 
this in more detail later on. 
Be that as it may, the concept that emerged after the Second World War was 
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as revolutionary as it was surprisingly simple: That a shared humanity is 
enough to provide all individuals with the same rights and liberties. In the 
wording of the first two provisions of the UDHR: “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights” and “everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration”. 
The idea, however, is not that states create rights by international law. States, 
rather, recognise them, and that is the language used in international human 
rights documents, treaties and declarations, where states express their 
opinions via ratification and voting at the General Assembly or at ad hoc 
international conferences. 
In international law, a treaty is “an international agreement concluded 
between States”.87 As such, international treaties “are evidence of the express 
consent of States to regulate their interests according to international law”.88 
Any treaty is delimited by what states decide in the drafting process and it is 
only applicable to those countries that, in the exercise of their sovereignty, 
choose to ratify it. International organisations play a growing role as 
autonomous law-makers,89 significantly in the case of human rights by 
shaping and reframing the meaning of clauses over time, but to this day 
states remain the main political and legal actors in international affairs. 
A theory on international human rights norm promotion must therefore take 
the state as the central unit of analysis, because the state is the main author 
of international law and the main holder of human rights obligations. 
Traditionally, states were considered as the only subjects in international law 
and, therefore, the only duty-bearers. Yet, even if states are central, they are 
not alone any more. We also have local, national and international NGOs, 
think-tanks, journalists, academics and even country diplomats based in New 
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York and Geneva who may be more receptive to human rights debates. There 
is a plurality of actors, and a theory of state promotion of IHRL must beware 
of the range of writers of the ideas and interests that shape the international 
society. 
States play a central role in treaty-making, but also in keeping human rights 
in the diplomatic agenda by using a certain language and by voting in a 
certain way at the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council and other 
meetings in regional organisations. State action and opinion is key in order to 
establish the degree of settlement of a norm. This is the bottom line of the 
Nicaragua case (1986), where the International Court of Justice introduced 
the “modern approach” to customary international law.90 
“In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems 
it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent 
with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a 
given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, 
not as indicators of the recognition of a new rule”.91 
As observed by Schachter, “in place of a practice that began with the gradual 
accretion of acts and subsequently received the imprimatur of opinio juris, 
the Court reversed the process: an opinio juris expressed first as a declaration 
would become law if confirmed by general practice”.92 In other words, the 
existence of a customary norm would be determined, prior to state action, by 
the way the state justifies it. “Even massive abuses do not militate against 
assuming a customary rule as long as the responsible author state seeks to 
hide and conceal its objectionable conduct instead of justifying it by invoking 
legal reasons”.93 The researcher must therefore explore statements and 
voting patterns at the UN in order to identify the state's opinio juris in 
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relation to a given norm. They must also bear in mind the state’s “position of 
power within the international order”,94 because opinio juris is not dislocated 
from power distribution in the international system.95 
The politics of international law suggests that votes and statements provide 
useful information as regards the reasons why states behave in a certain way 
in the international sphere. However, before asking whether a state believes 
that its actions are the manifestation of a binding international norm (opinio 
juris), one must respond a fundamental question: Why is international law 
binding? 
The foundation of the binding nature of international law is a contentious 
matter, and the essence of the conflict is whether the obligatory force of 
international law comes from consent or from consensus. Since Oppenheim, 
who was convinced that “we are nowadays no longer justified in teaching a 
law of nature and a 'natural' law of nations”,96 the traditional view has been 
that states commit to abide by international law when, in exercise of their 
sovereignty, they choose freely to ratify an international treaty. The 
traditional or standard view of consent is formal and allegedly normatively 
neutral, and connects the authority of international law to its binding 
nature.97  
This was the view expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in the famous Lotus case (1927): “International law governs relations 
between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore 
emanate from their own free will”.98 Translated into domestic legal terms, 
based on this consent-based approach, international law would resemble 
private contract law more than public law. This is the intellectual framework 
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from which we must interpret E. H. Carr's words when he wrote that 
“international law differs from the municipal law of modern states in being 
the law of an undeveloped and not fully integrated community. It lacks three 
institutions which are essential parts of any developed system of municipal 
law: a judicature, an executive and a legislature”.99 This quote reflects the 
scepticism of those who harbour doubts about the very legality of 
international law. 
In opposition to this view, H. L. A. Hart, one of main figures of legal positivism 
in the 20th century, argued that the contractual view of international law is 
not deep enough, because consent still requires a rule of recognition, i.e., a 
meta-rule that gives validity to the normative system as a whole. Even 
private law requires a prior rule that affirms the binding nature of 
contractual agreements.100 
If the view based on consent has limitations, so does the alternative based on 
consensus. According to this approach, norms emerge and evolve as a matter 
of general practice and soft law, and in application of general principles over 
which states do not have absolute control.101 Defenders of consensus as 
binding force of international law often refer to the notion of jus cogens 
(peremptory law) as evidence of the existence of a set of rules whose 
observance is not constrained by states' will.102 The main argument against a 
consensus-based idea of international law is that the power of law depends 
on its authority, and authority requires hierarchy. States are functionally 
equal and coexist in an international structure that is anarchic, either by 
definition103 or by cultural and social construction104; hence, international 
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law must be toothless, and it cannot really be law.  
Whether international law is about consent or about consensus is perhaps 
the ultimate debate within the liberal view of international law, a view that 
sees “states-as-individuals” who agree on a set of rules to regulate their 
interactions and to order the international system thereby preserving their 
individual freedom.105 Since Vattel's Droit des gens,106 international lawyers 
have assumed that liberal principles, and in particular the rule of law, matter 
in international affairs.107 In his ground-breaking From Apology to Utopia, 
Koskenniemi argues that international law serves two opposite purposes at 
once. On the one hand, international law can be based on the state will and 
has the virtue of concreteness. Nevertheless, when it is too closely related to 
the actual state practice it becomes “apologetic” of existing power. On the 
other hand, international law can constitute an ideal or a plurality of ideals of 
state behaviour. As such, its virtue is that it asserts the autonomous 
normative power of the law. Its vice, however, is that it may be unreal insofar 
as it may be too disconnected from actual practice. In our terminology, 
Koskenniemi's idea of apology is the danger of the consent-based view of 
international law while his utopia lies at the edge of the consensus-based 
approach.108 
The debate between consent/positivism and consensus/naturalism is 
therefore a fundamental knot of modern international law. It is not the 
intention of this thesis to try undoing it. Yet, from a pragmatic perspective, 
we can bring forward the classic Roman law distinction between potestas and 
auctoritas. The former refers to the hierarchically superior authority that 
holds the power of coercion to decide over others; the latter, on the other 
hand, refers to the institution or individual who is socially deemed as a public 
authority in a given area. This second figure's power is recognised as 
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legitimate by the community due to its knowledge and moral standing and 
the persuasion and coherence of its arguments. Potestas can be imposed; 
auctoritas is conferred.  
States are not the only actors of international law. They do not retain full 
control over the meaning of human rights norms. Once they get 
internationalised, norms have a life of their own. The European Court of 
Human Rights has recognised a wide margin of appreciation over the 
meaning of the European Convention in each country, but it has also made 
clear that the Convention is a “living instrument which […] must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”,109 and it has absorbed a 
good deal of power thereby. However, one must remain prudent about 
cosmopolitan arguments based on an international law beyond states' will. 
States are an essential ingredient of international regimes. We might be able 
to conceive a world without states, but states qua states pose certain limits to 
a cosmopolitan understanding of human freedom. Ultimately the legitimacy 
of authoritative bodies (bodies with auctoritas) very much depends upon the 
extent to which states (with potestas) allow those bodies to carry out their 
work independent and effectively. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that, once states join international regimes, they 
cannot leave at no cost.110 Human rights treaties often set limitations to 
regressive measures and to reservations, but much more important is the 
fact that states feel “rhetorically entrapped” by the discourse of human 
rights.111 The power of human rights is such that once a given issue is framed 
in the language of rights, it is too costly for states to argue otherwise. Even if 
they do not agree with the way in which human rights provisions have been 
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interpreted, states have hardly any other choice but to accept them.112 One 
may legitimately wonder whether countries would have voted in favour of 
human rights documents had they known how they were going to be 
interpreted decades later. In fact, Brian Simpson, one of most authoritative 
analysts of the evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
believes they would have not: “Had the politicians then been able to foresee 
[the] intrusiveness [of the European Court of Human Rights] it is most 
improbable that the convention would have ever have been ratified”.113 It is 
certainly an interesting question, but the fact remains that states did join 
human rights regimes and that they have not left yet. 
To summarise, notwithstanding the lack of agreement about the source of the 
binding force of international law, we can assert that: a) States are bound at 
least by the obligations they consent to; b) the precise meaning of those 
obligations evolves over time and it rests on the interpretative work of 
authoritative bodies; and c) these bodies are set up by states, but states do 
not have control over the hermeneutics of independent human rights 
mechanisms and they get trapped in the rhetoric of human rights.  
None of this means that human rights have taken international law from 
consent to consensus. We now have international treaties on human rights-
related matters and independent bodies that more or less successfully 
monitor states’ compliance with those treaties. We did not have them only a 
few decades ago, and they are to be welcomed. That said, the remaining of 
this chapter argues that it would be rash to assume that IHRL has altered the 
most fundamental pillars of international society.  
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2.2.2. The English School and its dichotomies 
 
Why do Western European states promote international human rights norms? 
The theoretical explanation to be defended in this thesis is based on a 
political tension between two forces, order and justice, a tension that takes 
place in the battleground for legitimacy in the international society. This 
tension is best explained from the perspective of the English School. 
Even though some have certified the decline of the English School and 
predicted its marginalisation, 114  others find in it a bridge between 
cosmopolitanism and realist geopolitics.115 There is no academic agreement 
about the place of the English School in the theoretical spectrum of 
International Relations. According to Kratochwil, Bull's The Anarchical 
Society is “the most articulate counter-proposal to realism”,116 but for Donelly, 
the English School is “a heavily hedged realism”,117 and in fact Gilpin's major 
War and Change in World Politics makes several references to Bull's work 
when writing about “the nature of the international system”.118 Both Reus-
Smit119 and Bellamy120 treat Carr as the first prophet of the English School, 
while for Mearsheimer,121 and indeed for most historians of realist thought, 
Carr was one of the first proponents of realism.122 The lack of agreement 
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about whether Carr fits better as an early proponent of the English School or 
as a moderate realist is accentuated by Bull, who critiqued him for his alleged 
lack of attention to the role played by moral values in international society.123 
The confusion about the appropriate location of English School continues. 
Hobson found the English School in the drawer of “State-centric 
liberalism”,124 and later referred to it as “English Realism”,125 as had done 
Halliday, although his choice had been “British Realism”.126 For others, Bull 
was a sort of early visionary of constructivism. 127  From the realist 
perspective, Krasner also simplifies the similarities between constructivism 
and the English School.128 The difficulties encountered by R. J. Vincent, an 
English Scholar,129 when attempting to categorise Bull reveal a lot about the 
eclecticism of this theoretical paradigm: “Bull stood four-square in the 
Grotian or rationalist tradition, toward the pluralist end of its spectrum in the 
early writing on Hobbes and on Grotius; more toward the solidarist end in his 
later writing on the expansion of international society”.130 (See below about 
the distinction between pluralism and solidarism). 
Unlike constructivists, for whom “anarchy is what States make of it”,131 
English Scholars accept anarchy as a theoretical premise, thus the title 
chosen by Bull for his book. Unlike realists and neoliberal institutionalists, 
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the English School considers that the “international society can emerge as a 
natural product of the logic of anarchy”,132 because even within anarchy rules 
and norms can guide states' behaviour. Adding to the mélange of academic 
relatives, Suganami,133 Patomäki134 and Schouenborg135 have another name 
for English School: “British institutionalism”. 
Therefore, there is no agreement about the academic box that suits the 
English School best. Be that as it may, in its original sense,136 the English 
School is built on the distinction between the international society and the 
international system. The society needs the system but a system, at least in 
theory, can exist without a society. The breadth and depth of the interaction 
between the units, which for Bull were basically the sovereign states, 
generate certain propositions about each other's behaviour, and unleashes a 
conjunction of shared interests and values, from which an international 
society can emerge. In its minimalist form, the international society is “a 
practical normative answer to the anarchical condition of world politics”.137 
For English Scholars, the consequences of anarchy very much depend on the 
interactions between the units. Against realists, the balance of power is a 
consequence of order rather than of lack thereof.138 This is something 
neoinstitutionalists of the 1970s and 1980s could have accepted. However, 
the added value of the English School is the attention given to shared 
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interests and values, and the strength of the bonds generated between the 
units that form the international society. 
Rooted in the Grotian tradition of international law,139 Bull identifies an 
international society “when a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another, and share in the working of common institutions”. 140 Paraphrasing 
Buzan, the international society is “a regime of regimes”, in other words, it is 
“the political foundation that is necessary before regimes can come into 
play”.141  
Bull's international society is one constituted by states that share agreements 
and understandings. Writing in the 1960s, for him there was no reason to 
believe “that individual human beings are subjects of international law and 
members of international society in their own right”.142 Unlike Jackson, for 
whom a “global covenant”, the “institutional answer to the diversity of 
humankind”, is justified by the plurality of nations and value-systems,143 
Bull's international society is in no way prescriptive, but functional: It is 
based on an “actual area of agreement between states and informed by a 
sense of the limitations within which in this situation rules may usefully be 
made rules of law”.144 The notion of international society is Bull’s best 
interpretation of the world as he saw it in his time. For him, the level of 
cultural unity among states is not the relevant factor.145 Relying on the power 
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of the will, states constitute the international society ultimately to preserve 
order between them. 
Bull defined order as “a pattern that leads to a particular result, an 
arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values”.146 
For him, all societies recognise three elementary goals or elements of order: a) 
The limitation of the use of force; b) the sanctity of promises; and c) the 
assignment of property rights. 147 In international law, the first goal inspires 
the rules of jus ad bellum (UN Charter) and jus in bello (International 
Humanitarian Law). The second goal is ensured by the pacta sunt servanda 
(Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), and the 
third one by the principle of state sovereignty (Article 2(7) of the UN Charter). 
These goals do not derive “from the interests simply of the ruling group, but 
from the perceived interests of all states in securing the elementary 
conditions of social coexistence”.148 
Bull distinguished between three ideal types of international society, the 
Hobbesian, the Grotian and the Kantian, which resemble notably Wendt's 
“three cultures of anarchy”, epitomised by Hobbes, Locke and Kant.149 Even 
though Wendt's argument on the culture of anarchy “builds directly on 
Bull”,150 a fundamental distinction between the two is that, while the latter 
assumed a correlation between the level of unit cooperation and the strength 
of the society, for Wendt the “shared knowledge and its various 
manifestations -norms, rules, etc.- are analytically neutral with respect to 
cooperation and conflict”.151 For Wendt, a Kantian culture of anarchy, based 
on a high degree of cooperation, is compatible with a low degree of cultural 
internalisation of its norms and institutions. In that case, the units would 
abide by the norms for purely strategic reasons such as force or price, and 
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not because they grant them any particular legitimacy. This is a subtlety that 
Bull did not observe. 
The English School is defined by its dichotomies. The first dichotomy is the 
one between order and justice. Possibly influenced by Carr's classical 
realism,152 for Bull order is desirable because it is “the condition of the 
realisation of other values”, including justice.153 Order trumps justice, which 
for Bull could adopt any of these three forms: justice between states, justice 
in the form of universal human rights, and justice as a cosmopolitan and 
global idea.154 Order would not be states' only goal. Order is merely the 
primary goal. Other goals can be pursued as long as order is not put at risk. 
States may “consent” to normative or international policy changes in the 
name of justice,155 but only when they perceive sufficient consensus exists as 
per the meaning of those normative values. As we will see later in this 
subsection, a second wave of English Scholars two decades after Bull would 
give more prominence to justice as a driver in international society. 
In spite of its contributions, the English School has been duly criticised for its 
pronounced Eurocentric bias.156 Even though the Grotian conception of 
international society is meant to be theoretically and normatively 
universal, 157  the actual version of international society that early 
representatives of the English School had in mind is one that expanded from 
Europe to the rest of the world.158 This is something traditional English 
Scholars were aware of. Bull interpreted the anti-colonisation process, the 
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movement for racial equality and the struggle for international economic 
justice stemming from the then so-called Third World as manifestations of a 
“revolt against the West” and attempts to transform the international 
society. 159  When accounting for the “expansion” of the Western-type 
international society, Bull and Watson attempted to justify themselves: “it is 
not our perspective, but the historical record itself that can be called 
Eurocentric”.160 
For Hobson, on the one hand, the English School advocated a view of a 
pluralist and tolerant international society with only a small number of 
principles in common, while on the other hand it adopted a Eurocentric view 
of the expansion of the international society in line with a certain “standard 
of civilisation” established in the West.161 The idea of the “standard of 
civilisation” is definitely not unique to the English School, but it is very much 
engrained in this tradition.162 The standard was popularised in the 19th 
century, and applied retroactively.163 It was never defined in detail; it was 
instead constructed as self-image of the West in opposition to the other.164 
The standard of civilisation was not predesigned in the West and imposed 
later on the rest. On the contrary, it developed out of the interaction of 
Western countries with other cultures and peoples. While the centre of the 
international society remained in Europe, the features of this society were 
the product of Europeans’ engagement with the rest of the world. Thus, the 
construction of the standard of civilisation and the expansion of the 
European society took place at the same time.165 
Positivist consent-based modern international law was part of the civilising 
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project of the 19th century.166 Through international law, European nations 
developed a shared identity and a common understanding of the idea of 
international order based on the principle of sovereign equality and the 
predictability of behaviour. This idea of international order had a universal 
vocation, but also drew a line between civilised and non-civilised nations. 
Territorial sovereignty and the generality and predictability of the 
international rule of law were only to be expected within the confines of 
Western civilised countries. Interaction with non-civilised peoples was not 
guided by the same parameters. The international legal effects of the 
standard of civilisations reached as far as the 1945 Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, whose Article 38 says, in a language that makes 
us feel uncomfortable now, that one of the sources of international law are 
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (italics added). 
Hence, international order was not a neutral concept; it was a legal and 
political construct that intended to institutionalise and progressively enlarge 
a type of international society in light of the European image of the self. 
Insofar as the international law of the 20th century is the heir of the 
international order built in the 19th century, one must acknowledge the 
conservative, exclusionary, colonialist and definitely Eurocentric origins of 
our international society.167 
When doing the exposé of his international society, Bull talked tangentially 
about the idea of world society, which would include non-state actors, such as 
corporations and NGOs, and ultimately the world population at large. Based 
on his writing, the world society would cover both the international society 
and the values and interests of humanity as a whole; human rights could 
potentially be one of those values and interests, but only as long as they were 
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compatible with the requirements of international order.168 
The political structure and institutional settings of the idea of world society 
remained essentially undefined for years, but contemporary English Scholars, 
like Buzan and Dunne, have made the move from international society to 
world society.169 It is a move that has paralleled a shift from pluralism to 
solidarism,170 which Bull saw as the reproduction “in international society [of] 
one of the central features of domestic society”,171 i.e., the existence of some 
sense of common purpose that binds (international) society together. 
The change of perspective brought about by solidarism goes hand in hand 
with a displacement of the core of international society from the idea of order 
to that of justice.172 Unlike realists, pluralist English Scholars tend to see a 
rule-based international society guided by the preservation of order. Unlike 
pluralists, solidarist English Scholars173 are inclined to believe that interstate 
relationships are regulated by a broader scope of values, and the idea of 
human rights is one of those additional values. Cochran explains the 
difference with brilliance: “For pluralists, moral community does not run 
deep and cannot be relied upon to sustain cosmopolitan duties in 
international society. [...] For solidarists, there are indications that from a 
minimum level of moral community, more maximal ethical concerns can be 
brought to bear within international society without compromising the 
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edifice of this intersocietal form”.174  
The tension between solidarism and pluralism underpins the consent-versus-
consensus debate about what makes international law binding. While 
pluralists lean towards a version of international law based on the consent of 
states, solidarism remains more open to natural law and to norms that do not 
require the acceptance of the state ex professo.175 As we will see in chapter 7, 
this tension is of critical importance to understand the different positions vis-
à-vis the idea of humanitarian intervention and the challenges facing the 
notion of Responsibility to Protect. At this point, it is sufficient to note the 
irony that humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War era were justified 
by reference to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, devoted to “maintain or 
restore international peace and security” (Articles 39 and 1). It is as if a 
justice-based argument had been disguised as an order-based excuse. 
Generally speaking, the English School of the 1960s and 70s was pluralist but 
moved in the direction of solidarism in a second wave that began in the mid 
1980s.176 With the move from pluralism to solidarism, the extension of the 
English School into the realm of morality and normativity made an important 
contribution to the analysis of human rights. As Rengger puts it, human rights 
have become the “lingua franca” of ethical discussions in International 
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Relations.177  
The “normative turn” of the English School owes much to Vincent's Human 
Rights in International Relations.178 Vincent acknowledged that he wrote his 
book with the hope of making “some inroads on [Bull's] cheerful scepticism 
about human rights”.179 Indeed, as a pluralist, Bull was so convinced about 
the central role of states in the international society that he was highly 
suspicious about the implications of recognising individual human rights in 
international law: “Carried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human 
rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole principle 
that mankind should be organised as a society of sovereign states”.180 
According to Wheeler, for other pluralists “human rights issues could only 
achieve prominence on the agenda of international society if they were raised 
by individual states”.181 IHRL has indeed given human rights a place in 
international affairs while remaining loyal to the principle of state 
sovereignty at the same time.182 
The normative turn in English School opened the door to the study of the 
changing nature of legitimacy in international society, that is, the study of the 
admissibility of behaviour based on the shared values, rules and interests of a 
society constituted by states and other actors.183 The idea of legitimate power 
lies at the core of the research agenda of the English School.184 “Power is not 
self-justifying; it must be justified by reference to some source outside or 
beyond itself, and thus be transformed into 'authority'”.185 A number of 
authors have ventured to suggest that some degree of compliance with 
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human rights has become the standard of civilisation of our times.186 
Legitimacy can be interpreted as a political space that reveals the tension 
between order and justice.187  
Table 1 The dichotomies of the English School 
What actors? International society (of 
states) 






Solidarism: Shared interests 
and values 
What drives their 
actions? 
Order Order and Justice 




Positive law, realism and 
consent 
Natural law, idealism and 
consensus 
 
Contemporary solidarist English Scholars tend to argue that the world today 
has little to do with the one of their academic predecessors back in the 1960s 
and 70s. The state-led international society would have been replaced by a 
mélange of actors in the post-Cold War world society.188 English School 
would have to wash out its realist scent because justice would be at least as 
important as order with the surge of a “solidarist consciousness”.189 Wheeler, 
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for example, defends that a major transformation of the international society 
has given birth to a solidarist norm of humanitarian intervention that now 
outdoes the pluralist norm of national sovereignty.190 
The solidarist fashion within the English School was matched by the 
optimism of a number of publicists and legal philosophers after the Cold War. 
It is beautifully captured by the title chosen by Louis Henkin and Norberto 
Bobbio, who chose the same name for their books, published in 1990 in the 
US and in Italy respectively: The Age of Rights.191 As far as it is known, none of 
these two authors was aware of the title selected by the other one. Henkin 
could not hide his celebratory and triumphal tone: 
“Ours is the age of rights. Human rights is the idea of our time, the only 
political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948, has been approved by virtually all 
governments representing all societies. Human rights are enshrined in 
the constitutions of virtually every one of today’s 170 states—old 
states and new; religious, secular, and atheist; Western and Eastern; 
democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian; market economy, socialist, 
and mixed; rich and poor, developed, developing, and less developed. 
Human rights is the subject of numerous international agreements, 
the daily grist of the mills of international politics, and a bone of 
continuing contention among superpowers”.192 
The enthusiasm was not of these authors alone. Richard Falk wrote more 
than thirty years ago: 
“Given [the] combination of domestic and international factors, it 
becomes clear that governments cannot be entrusted with the role of 
serving as the guardian of fundamental human rights. In this regard, 
the whole tradition of international law is to some extent regressive in 
the current era. Even the United Nations is an organization of states in 
which the interests of peoples are misleadingly assumed to be 
legitimately represented by governments. […] A first step is for people 
to insist upon their own legitimacy as a source of rights, even against 
the state”.193 
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More recently, Falk has advocated a new citizenship (“citizen pilgrim”), a 
“necessary utopianism”, a “global parliament” and a “global democracy” in 
order to “achieve human rights”.194  
I find these conclusions well intentioned but too hasty. Irrespective of the 
opinion we may hold about Falk's call for action, human rights have reached 
international recognition through a certain institutional framework defined 
not the least by national sovereignty. The recognition of human rights in 
secondary institutions, i.e., international treaties and mechanisms, has not 
radically changed the deep structure of the international system and its 
primary institutions, particularly the principles of national sovereignty and 
positivist international law.195 Inasmuch as human rights are proclaimed in 
international law, considering the limitations of this regime, justice cannot 
replace or even join order as the new gravitational force of the international 
society. International NGOs and other actors have certainly pushed in that 
direction, but states remain the key players in international law-making. 
Paraphrasing Cox, “to change the world, we have to begin with an 
understanding of the world as it is, which means the structures of reality that 
surround us”.196 
In the following subsection I will develop why I believe that the role and 
motivation of Western European states’ promotion of IHRL is understood 
best as the product of political contention between international order and 
global justice. 
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2.2.3. A systemic approach to international human rights norm promotion by 
Western European states 
 
As Buzan observed more than two decades ago, the unit of analysis is not 
necessarily the source of explanation.197 The central unit of analysis of this 
thesis is the state, but the source of explanation will be systemic, since we 
look for it in the structure of IHRL. It is important to note that structuralism, 
understood as the approach that is based on the principle by which units are 
arranged within a system, is not equal to determinism.198 A single level of 
analysis, or indeed one source of explanation, is not sufficient to account for 
all events in international relations. The systemic theory defended in the 
following pages will not explain all the facts, but will hopefully explain the 
facts better than alternative theories. 
Based on a systemic understanding of IHRL, I claim that the international 
human rights regime has evolved as a result of a tension between two poles. 
On one end, we have an idea of international society with a minimalist 
conception of human rights, based on order and on the centrality of the state. 
On the other end, we find a broader conception of human rights, understood 
as a matter of universal justice. The argument defended in these pages is that 
for decades Western European countries have promoted a global human 
rights regime based on their own understanding of what order means in 
international society. 
The argument is systemic because it is based on the nature and functioning 
rules of international law. I argue that international law and the institutions 
of IHRL, as part of the international system, compel actors to act in a certain 
way, regardless of the possible preferences of states or their 
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representatives.199 When promoting IHRL, Western European states must be 
motivated or compelled by order, because states qua states cannot overcome 
the systemic pressures for order in the international system. However, the 
international human rights regime includes independent judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies that specify the meaning of human rights norms over time, 
and it also opens the door to the input of advocacy groups and individuals 
(even within governmental institutions), who have an influence in the 
interpretation of those norms. These actors, unlike states, are broadly 
speaking motivated by justice rather than order. IHRL is the product of a 
dialectical tension between state-led order and the idea of justice articulated 
by monitoring bodies, advocacy groups and like-minded individuals.  
This thesis follows Samuel Moyn’s narrative of IHRL.200 Up to the 1970s the 
idea of human rights was basically absent from collective imagination and 
political discourse. Human rights were spoken among an elite of diplomats, 
jurists and intellectuals. The UDHR had been adopted in 1948, but the first 
universal human rights treaty, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, only entered into force in 1969. As said 
in chapter 1, this was one of the first diplomatic victories of the newly 
decolonised countries. The European Court of Human Rights opened its 
doors in the 1950s, but it only dealt with a handful of cases in its first decades. 
With the exception of this Court, accountability mechanisms were inexistent 
until the late 1960s, and the creation of independent monitoring bodies at the 
UN was only reluctantly accepted by Western European states.201 The 
number of books on human rights in English multiplied by four in the 1970s, 
and by ten by the early 21st century.202 The number of references to “human 
                                                 
199  Order does not always have to be the result of individual’s deliberate intentions. In an 
international system “order may prevail without an orderer” (Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics, 77). “This basic tissue resulting from many single plans and actions of people can give 
rise to changes and patterns that no individual person has planned or created. From this 
interdependence of people arises an order sui generis, an order more compelling and stronger than 
the will and reason of the individual people composing it” (Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: 
Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000[1939], 366). 
200 Moyn, The Last Utopia. 
201 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, ch. 3. 
202 Beth Simmons, The Future of the Human Rights Movement, Ethics & International Affairs, 
28:2 (2014), 186. 
 55 
rights” in New York Times and the British Times multiplied fivefold in the mid 
1970s, coinciding with the time when President Carter promised that his 
foreign policy was going to be inspired by human rights.203 This happened in 
1977, precisely the year when Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. In that decade, human rights also obtained an academic mark. 
Between 1968 and 2000, more than 140 universities in 59 countries 
established research centres and degrees in this field.204 
In the aftermath of World War II, the recognition of IHRL in Europe was a 
conservative exercise to redefine the European identity.205 The European 
Convention on Human Rights includes the right to marry (Article 12) and the 
protection of private property (Article 1 of Protocol 1), and not the right to 
housing, the right to health or indeed the right to work. It is also not 
surprising that for more than two decades the international human rights 
regime was limited to the proclamation of rights, rather than the articulation 
of effective mechanisms to oversee their protection and fulfilment. At least 
for two decades, IHRL was conceived as a tool to institutionalise and thereby 
constrain the meaning of human rights. 
The idea of international human rights started to change in the 1970s, when 
groups and individuals started to frame their fights and grievances as human 
rights issues. It was also the period when the independent human rights 
accountability mechanisms at the United Nations and in the European and 
Inter-American systems began to expand the meaning of global human rights 
norms and to assess state performance based on them. In their view, the real 
meaning of human rights had to go far beyond the intention of states when 
they ratified the treaties. Human rights were grounded much deeper than 
that. They were prior and superior to state consent. They belonged to 
humanity as a whole. The idea is clearly visible in these words by Cançado-
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Trindade, member of the International Court of Justice and former judge of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
“It is not function of the jurist simply to take note of what the States do, 
particularly the most powerful ones, which do not hesitate to seek 
formulas to impose their ‘will’, including in relation to the treatment 
to be dispensed to the persons under its jurisdiction. […] [The Law] 
does not emanate from the inscrutable ‘will’ of the States, but rather 
from human conscience. General or customary international law 
emanates not so much from the practice of States (not devoid of 
ambiguities and contradictions), but rather from the opinio juris 
communis of all the subjects of International Law (the States, the 
international organizations, and the human beings). Above the will is 
the conscience.”206 
In spite of calls to push for a justice-based agenda, justice was not the force 
behind Western European states’ promotion of IHRL in the years after the 
War. The motivation was different, and it had more to do with the 
legalisation of order, as they understood it. Following Vattel’s description of 
the European political system of his time, European states had a “common 
interest in maintaining order and liberty”.207 This common interest pushed 
them to recognise human rights in international law and to encourage others 
to join them. However, in line with the traditional liberal principles of 
European societies, they allowed the creation of a system where other actors 
could make their voices heard, many of whom were unlikely to see 
international human rights the way they did (as a matter of order), but rather 
as a tool to recognise the inherent dignity, freedom and equality of humanity 
at large and of all members of the global family. 
IHRL then becomes a double-edged sword that serves two opposite purposes 
at once: concreteness of the regulatory framework and ideals of adequate 
behaviour. But, in Koskenniemi’s framework, advanced in subsection 2.2.1, 
both of these goals or purposes risk falling into two vices: respectively, 
apology of existing power, and absolute disconnect from reality and actual 
state practice. 
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Extracting the meaning of human rights from international law is therefore 
an exercise of “hegemonic contestation”, the expression chosen by 
Koskenniemi to refer to “the process by which international actors routinely 
challenge each other by invoking legal rules and principles on which they 
have projected meanings that support their preferences and counteract those 
of their opponents”.208 Nevertheless, one must beware that from the very 
moment when human rights get institutionalised, they are subject to the 
constraining effects of international law, a system where states are still the 
main gatekeepers. As long as international law remains the law states agree 
upon (apart from the interpretation, over which they do not have full control), 
international law is by definition limited in terms of emancipatory potential 
for justice. This is what Stammers refers to as the “paradox of 
institutionalisation”, or what Koskenniemi calls the “colonization of political 
culture by a technocratic language”.209 
Order-over-Justice looks with critical eyes to the English School, and in 
particular to its dichotomies and its evolution from a kind of soft realism in 
the 1960s and 70s to moderate cosmopolitanism since the 1990s. Several 
scholars have made the link between Critical Theory and the English 
School,210 and I see a number of points of reciprocal enrichment between the 
English School of International Relations and Koskenniemi’s critical approach 
to international law, regarding for example the politics of contention, the 
relationship between consent and hegemony, or the notion of legitimacy in 
international society.  
The dichotomies of the English School illustrate the political tension between 
Western European states and other actors in the human rights community. 
Notwithstanding the nuances that may distinguish them, the Order-over-
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Justice approach sees the group of Western European states as rational but 
not purely self-interested actors. Their intentions in promoting the 
international human rights regime are not simply cosmopolitan or 
humanitarian. They are not isolationists, but multilateralists, and they see 
international law as an essential component of their idea of order. Ultimately, 
Western European states believe international law cannot be imposed on 
them; they must expressly consent to it. However, the balancing entry of 
international law is that “if they once consent to submit themselves to a rule 
of international law, states are bound by such rule to the same extent and 
degree as subjects are bound by rules of the municipal law of their state”.211 
In other words, the notion that promises must be kept is one of the defining 
elements of the Western European concept of order in international society. 
The idea of IHRL Western European countries put forward is order-focused 
in its original formulation, and it is subsequently negotiated through the 
interaction with NGOs, UN officials and other actors, who demand states to 
respect the human rights norms they promised to abide by. 
Order-over-Justice foresees that Western European states will promote those 
rules that are in line with their understanding of international order. For the 
very same reason, they will refuse to endorse a norm that they consider to be 
at odds with an ordered international society. Once the norm is recognised in 
the human rights regime, political leaders with governmental responsibility 
are confronted by the need to balance a systemic impulse for order with a 
both internal and external pressure for justice. 
I argue that Western European states promoted IHRL as a manifestation of 
the liberal principles of the European society of the 19th century. Western 
European states promoted the international legalisation of their own 
Eurocentric view of human rights. In this sense, Western European 
promotion of IHRL worldwide is part of the expansion of the limits of the 
standard of civilisation. In the 19th century European mind-set, this standard 
drew a line between the gentlemen’s club among whom promises must be 
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kept (pacta sunt servanda), and everybody else, whose barbarism did not let 
them understand the value of order and norm-compliance. As the European 
society expanded worldwide,212 the civil rights and fundamental freedoms 
that supposedly define Western European societies had to be brought to the 
world as well. Human rights somehow became a new standard applicable to 
all countries, at least theoretically. 
Vincent argued that, by proclaiming human rights in international treaties, 
“states have dissolved international society into a world society in which 
groups and individuals have equal standing with states.”213 Unlike Vincent 
and a number of contemporary representatives of the English School, I do not 
believe that the recognition of human rights in international law is per se a 
sign of a solidarist turn in the international society. 
IHRL walks along a high wire with one gravitational force on each side: order 
and justice. A pluralist order-based idea of international society explains why 
Western European countries promote international human rights norms in 
the first place. However, as solidarists point out, states are not alone in the 
world society. Public and private actors advocate the adoption of 
international human rights norms for reasons that have more to do with a 
cosmopolitan idea of justice. International society is the field in which the 
human rights regime emerged and evolved and keeps evolving while we 
speak, in a process of complex interaction between world society and the 
society of states. The Order-over-Justice approach to IHRL helps us 
understand the continuum between an international society defined by order 
and a world society inspired by justice. 
 
2.2.4. Six propositions from Order-over-Justice 
 
This thesis is systemic because it takes the international system of IHRL as its 
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source of explanation. The theory defended here is not based on state 
identity or constitution but on the structure of the international system as a 
whole, a system of which states are the main units. This is not to say that 
there are not meaningful differences within Western Europe, but only that 
these differences are not relevant enough when it comes to explaining what 
drives Western European states to advocate the inclusion of human rights in 
international law. 
Finnemore and Sikkink claim in their well-known model of international 
norm diffusion that states play a key role in the “norm cascade” when they 
choose to embrace norms defended by norm entrepreneurs.214 As said earlier, 
for these authors states promote human rights norms “for reasons that relate 
to their identities as members of the international society”.215 Alternatively, 
Order-over-Justice suggests that Western European states will promote the 
rules that fit in their understanding of global order, and reject those that 
would squeal in an ordered international society.  
Order-over-Justice makes six propositions, the first two of which expect a 
change of state behaviour over time, while the remaining four look at the 
degree of clarity, burden, fitness with liberal principles, and salience in the 
advocacy of strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs.  
The passing of time, sequence and path-dependence matter greatly in 
politics.216 If Order-over-Justice is correct, the motivation to support a human 
rights norm must evolve over time. The driver of Western European state 
action will remain order rather than justice. In the beginning, states keep 
control over the meaning of the norm, since they hold the greatest power in 
international treaty making. They take part in the drafting process and they 
are formally free to sign and ratify the treaty, or not. However, human rights 
norms evolve over a long period of time, and once they get recognised in 
international law, and other actors (NGOs and UN independent bodies) join 
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in the interpretative exercise, states lose control over the meaning of human 
rights norms. Yet, the cost of denouncing a human rights treaty is too high, 
which means that states may formally endorse the human rights regime, even 
if the norm has progressively acquired a significance they do not necessarily 
feel comfortable with. If normative cosmopolitans were right and justice 
were at least as important as order, the mere recognition of the norm would 
not be sufficient. States would cooperate with other actors raising the global 
status of the norm, detailing and developing its implications, encouraging 
new states to accept this standard of adequate behaviour and creating new 
international obligations. On the contrary, provided the norm fits into their 
idea of international order, if Order-over-Justice is accurate, we would expect 
states to be more proactive in the beginning reducing the intensity over time. 
Therefore, the first proposition is that Western European states are more 
likely to promote a human rights norm at the early stages of its life (P1). 
The degree of settlement of a norm will also condition state practice. In fact, 
the status of an international legal norm depends greatly on state action, not 
the least because states draft, sign and ratify treaties and therefore create 
international rules, but also because with their actions and behaviour they 
express a certain opinio juris, the opinion about the normative adequacy of 
certain behaviour.  
The status of a norm depends on whether states deem it authoritative. I 
follow Hurd’s three ideal tests of norm authority: compliance, justification 
and automaticity.217 
The test of compliance was used by Hedley Bull,218 for whom the authority of 
a norm would depend on whether states comply with it or not. Bull followed 
this approach because in his opinion compliance with international law and 
fulfilment of the national interest go hand in hand.219 The essential problem 
with this approach is that promoting IHRL is not self-evidently a matter of 
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national interest, in spite of what international bodies have said for decades. 
The International Court of Justice proclaimed in the Reservations to the 
Genocide Convention case (1951) that this Convention had a “purely 
humanitarian and civilizing purpose” that represented “a common interest” 
among states; the court added that “a denial of the rights of existence of 
entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and 
results in great losses to humanity which is contrary to moral law”.220 In the 
Barcelona Traction case (1970), the ICJ concluded that “the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person” generate certain 
obligations for all states “towards the international community as a whole 
[and] in view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held 
to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes”.221 For the UN Human Rights Committee, this is also the fundamental 
principle that underpins the general legal obligation imposed by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.222 
However, by their nature these are essentially normative statements. It 
would not be wise to take for granted that states act in a certain way because 
an IHRL norm tells them so. States may be acting regardless of the norm 
(because it happens to go in their economic or security favour, for example), 
and not because of the norm. 
Precisely because norm compliance may be instrumental, Hurd's second test 
is based on the justification given to comply (or not to comply) with the norm. 
This is the approach followed by the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua case (1986), presented in subsection 2.2.1.223 However, in the case 
of human rights states may feel obliged to frame their intentions in line with 
IHRL because they are expected to do so, or so they believe. For example, a 
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government would never admit that they intervene militarily in another 
country because they wish to plunder its natural resources. Protecting the 
civilian population would always be a much more acceptable reason. 
Therefore, alleged justification is not enough, even if it must certainly be 
looked at carefully. 
The third and final test is the analysis of the automaticity of a norm, that is, 
the extent to which the norm “has entered into the decision-making calculus 
of states”.224 This means that the norm is automatically integrated in officials’ 
thinking process. This does not mean that states ever or seldom breach the 
norm. In fact, the reason of existence of any norm, domestic or international, 
is that its violation is foreseeable. “Any effective rule of conduct is normally 
violated from time to time, and if there were no possibility that actual 
behaviour would differ from prescribed behaviour, there would be no point 
in having the rule”.225 No treaty says that the Earth must be round and spin 
around the Sun. We establish norms because we believe that they are 
necessary because without them we would be worse off. The idea of the 
automaticity of the norm implies that the norm “can be fought against, 
contradicted, and reinterpreted, but it cannot be ignored”.226 
Following this automaticity test, the degree of settlement of human rights 
norms depends on state behaviour and, in particular, on the extent to which 
the norm is embedded and conditions the decision-making calculus of the 
state. The level of settlement of a norm is expected to be higher the longer it 
has been around in diplomatic forums. Therefore, it is more difficult for a 
state to question the human rights nature of a claim that was incorporated to 
the human rights regime long ago. Second proposition: Western European 
states are less likely to challenge a norm the longer it has been part of the 
human rights regime (P2). 
It is important to note the difference between the first two propositions. In 
the first one, we expect states to be more proactive in the promotion of an 
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international human rights norm at an early stage. In the second one, on the 
other hand, we expect states to be less inclined to oppose a norm when it 
reaches a greater level of settlement in the international system. 
The degree of linguistic and conceptual clarity is also a relevant factor, but 
actually in the opposite direction of what has been suggested in some of the 
literature. Fuller saw clarity as one of the essential principles of the inner 
morality of law; lack thereof would be a failure of the legal system.227 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that clear norms are more likely to be accepted 
than ambiguous ones.228 For Legro, “the clearer, more durable, and more 
widely endorsed a prescription is, the greater will be its impact”.229 Franck 
also saw determinacy and coherence as criteria for norms’ entry into the 
international system.230 
I hereby defend a very different view. Since norms generate the expectation 
of compliance, when governments want or feel the need to violate a norm, 
they have to interpret both the norm itself and the situation in a manner that 
presents the violation of the norm as socially acceptable.231 Explaining what 
lies behind the promotion of IHRL is an exercise of normative exegesis about 
the meaning of legitimate state action. International forums are the political 
space where the meaning of legitimacy unravels. Dialogue and discourse are 
essential in world politics, and international law is part of that dialogue, 
insofar as diplomacy is a form of “international legal justification, […] a set of 
resources with which states construct the explanations for their 
behaviour”.232 If we see international law as the language of international 
politics,233 less clarity favours debate and leaves more room for the political 
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fight. Normative open-endedness favours greater space for opposition of 
different political or normative views while formally respecting the language 
of the norm. If the human rights norm is drafted in a confusing or ambivalent 
way, the state can question the implications or requirements of the norm 
without having to question the norm itself. Clarity is desirable in principle, 
and it might benefit norm compliance and implementation, but lack of clarify 
would be preferred by countries that promote human rights norms as a 
matter of order. Less clear norms get more support from Western European 
states than more detailed ones (P3). 
The fourth proposition is that states are more likely to support human rights 
norms if their requirements are small because they do not affect their 
jurisdiction, or because they basically recognise a right that is already 
enshrined in the state's internal legislation. For example, the 1966 UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights included a collection of 
rights that were essentially part of the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights. Ratifying the commitment to respect civil and political rights should 
be easier the second time, particularly when these rights have experienced a 
growing level of settlement (see P2).234 Softer legal tools may be more 
agreeable from states’ perspective, because they leave room for 
interpretation, facilitate compromise solutions and interfere less with 
internal control.235 However, if justice were at least as important as order, 
one should expect a lower predominance of this cost-benefit analysis. Fourth 
proposition: Less demanding or burdensome norms get more support from 
Western European states than more demanding norms (P4). 
The fifth variable is to what extent the norm resonates with states' self-
perceived identity, which in the case of Western Europe, in contraposition to 
the other side of the standard of civilisation, is expressed by democracy, 
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liberalism and principles of free market capitalism.236 This is certainly an 
area of deep philosophical reflection, but we can safely say that there are a 
number of values that are conventionally associated with Western liberalism: 
individual freedom, rule of law, formal equality, private property, market 
freedom, etc. One must note, in any case, that the reasons why Western 
European states promote liberal norms do not have to be of normative 
nature, of genuine conviction about the common good. Indebted as they are 
to the old standard of civilisation, the promotion of liberal norms by Western 
European states would be the result of their constructed notion of the self. 
Norms that are deemed to oppose liberal principles are unlikely to get the 
necessary support from Western Europe because they would constitute a 
potential threat to their idea of order. So will the norms that are 
progressively interpreted in a way that may contradict liberalism. It will be 
easier for a state to accept, endorse and promote a new international norm 
when it resonates with pre-existing liberal domestic norms. Norms or 
interpretations of norms that are not perceived to be in line with liberal values 
get less or no support from Western European states (P5). 
The sixth and final variable is the role of the norm entrepreneur. Specifically 
in IHRL I understand that norm entrepreneurs can of course be NGOs and 
networks, but also UN independent experts, judicial and quasi-judicial 
international bodies, and other influential commentators. Their pull can be 
noticeable at the stage of norm emergence, but also when shaping the 
meaning of the norm over time. In order to achieve their goals, norm 
entrepreneurs use the necessary vocabulary (framing processes) for the 
maximisation of the available resources (mobilising structures) given the 
contextual (political) opportunities.237 The political opportunities very much 
depend on the extent to which the norms fit into Western European states' 
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idea of order in international society, but the identity, resources and 
language used by norm entrepreneurs are key factors as well. Western 
European states are more willing to support norms that are promoted by well-
known and resourceful entrepreneurs (P6). 
In summary, the proposition of Order-over-Justice is that the timing, the 
degree of norm settlement, the requirements imposed by the norm, its clarity, 
its compatibility with liberalism, and the role of norm entrepreneurs 
influence Western European states' decision to support a human rights norm 
and to promote its recognition in international law. In isolation, these 
propositions are far from exclusive to Order-over-Justice. The argument put 
forward here is that all of them matter when it comes to explaining why 
order drives Western European states decisions to promote some norms 
more than others. As developed in chapter 3, and further explored in 
chapters 4-7, once operationalised for different human rights norms, the non-
temporary propositions (P3-P6) lead to different expectations in some cases. 
Out of the burden, the clarity, the compatibility with liberalism and the role of 
norm entrepreneurs, the analysis of state practice will shed light over the 
relative weight of each proposition to understand critically why Western 






3. METHOD: CRITICAL INTEPRETIVISM OF STATES’ INTERNATIONAL 
PRACTICE 
 
“There are so many causal variables operating in the empirical world that no 
theory can embrace more than a fraction of them; consequently every 
theoretical explanation, strictly speaking, is ‘false’.” 
Glenn Snyder, 1996.238 
 
In the second chapter, I presented a systemic theory that essentially claims 
that Western European states promote IHRL more as a matter of order than 
as justice. The theory is built on the identification of the international system 
as the source of explanation and of the state as the main unit of analysis. As 
opposed to common constructivist assumptions about normative 
cosmopolitanism, but also to realist scepticism towards international law, the 
argument is critical of the development of IHRL and of the role of Western 
European states within it. With the English School categories of order and 
justice as conceptual tools to observe empirically, this thesis intends to 
explain why Western European states promote IHRL, and in order to do so, it 
interprets the way these states conceptualise human rights norms and 
advocate institutions accordingly in international law. 
Based on an epistemic commitment to the critical linkage between concepts 
and observations, I will first introduce a basic framework of critical 
interpretivism. I set this framework from the combination of a classical 
approach of English School and a critical epistemology of causality (section 
3.1). In the second part, I will present the research design, which projects the 
idea of critical interpretivism on the theory of Order-over-Justice in the form 
of a hermeneutical exercise of international legal tools of human rights 
promotion of different hierarchical importance, in relation to four norms at 
different stages of development, and paying more attention to two relatively 
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large countries in the Western European subregion: Spain and the UK (3.2). It 
is in this second section where I will also operationalise the six propositions 
presented in subsection 2.2.4 in relation to the four human rights norms. 
 
3.1. Introduction: Critical interpretivism 
 
The English School offers the opportunity to study the IHRL regime as a 
component of the international system. In its classical formulation, the 
English School adopts a traditionalist methodological approach based on 
philosophical, historical and legal reflection,239 explicitly reliant “upon the 
exercise of judgement”,240 as opposed to scientific hypothesis-testing.241 
The classical approach of English School provides a useful set of analytical 
references for the study of Western European state promotion of IHRL: State-
centrism, qualitative interpretivism, inductivism, the study of states’ 
discourse and action (practice),242 and a keen interest in international law as 
an object of research. 
The practice of diplomacy takes place in an international stage of law, and as 
a result, international law provides “a critical checklist”243 of international 
practice, from which we can infer meanings, assumptions and motives. This 
idea fits with the approach adopted by contemporary representatives of the 
English School,244  as well as with interpretivism in international law, 
                                                 
239 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant, ch. 3-4; Andrew Hurrell, Keeping History, Law and 
Political Philosophy Firmly within the English School, Review of International Studies, 27:3 
(2001), 489. 
240 Hedley Bull, International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach, World Politics, 18:3 
(1966), 361. 
241 Morton Kaplan, The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations, 
World Politics, 19:1 (1966). 
242 I borrow Adler and Pouliot’s definition of “international practice”, which encompasses both 
action and discourse: “socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or 
less competently, simultaneously embody, act out and possibly reify background knowledge and 
discourse in and on the material world” (International practices, International Theory, 3:1, 2011, 
4; italics are mine). 
243 Cornelia Navari, The concept of practice in the English School, European Journal of 
International Relations, 17:4 (2010), 622. 
244 Little, The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations, 395 and 408; 
 70 
understood as the product of shared practices in a group, where members 
may disagree about the meaning or the requirement of such practices, whose 
value and purpose is assigned by interpreters within certain historical and 
institutional constraints.245 
English School has been criticised for its insufficient attention to methods, 
and in particular its lack of engagement with causality. In different forms and 
shapes, critiques have originated from the thin constructivist tradition246 and 
from realism,247 but also from structuralist English Scholars.248 Far from 
disregarding these challenges, this thesis advocates a deeper understanding 
of the idea of causality in state practice.249 
Order-over-Justice acknowledges the importance of norms in international 
society, but in terms of causality it sees them more as effects than as causes. 
“They are downstream outcomes; they are not upstream inputs”.250 In other 
words, this thesis looks at institutionalised human rights as effects of Order 
and Justice-based forms of action and discourse, rather than the other way 
around. 
I do not attempt to test a set of hypotheses based on the theoretical argument 
built in chapter 2, as positivists would want me to. Instead, I intend to 
reinterpret Western European states’ promotion of IHRL through the prism 
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of Order-over-Justice to reflect on and ultimately understand the forces that 
push towards both ends of the Order-and-Justice continuum. 
It must be possible to identify causal relations between ideal types and state 
practice, but only as long as we follow a nuanced philosophy of causation: a) 
causes do exist, and are efficacious in producing actions, b) many causes are 
unobservable and therefore no causal analysis can be totally satisfying, c) 
multiple causes interact in a complex and dynamic milieu, which in our case 
means that we cannot explain six to seven decades of IHRL promotion by 
fifteen countries based on one idea only, order; and d) interpretation is key, 
insofar as knowledge is not universally valid, but contextual and socially 
produced.251 
I therefore confess epistemological relativism, including the inevitable 
subjectivism of the researcher when it comes to setting the bar of adequacy 
of state practice vis-à-vis human rights standards. At the same time, however, 
I do not reject causality altogether; on the contrary, I adopt the 
epistemological position that the causal link between motivation and 
behaviour can be inferred from actors’ words and actions (practice). 
Narratives and normative interpretations are therefore part of the causality 
from the institutionalised norm to state practice, and vice versa. This 
interaction between norm and practice does not take place in a vacuum; it is 
defined and conditioned by the nature of the international system, in our case, 
the IHRL regime. 
The idea of process in causality is present in Bull’s own notion of order, 
which he understood to be a “pattern of activity that sustains the elementary 
or primary goals of the society of states, or international society” (my own 
italics).252 By studying the evolution of Western European states’ diplomacy 
and attitude towards international human rights treaties and mechanisms 
(“secondary institutions”), we can identify “primary institutions” and the 
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forces that unite them,253 as well as the weight that order has in them.254  
This thesis is based on the idea that state practices can be patterned out of 
routines and repetitions,255 just like order can be as the underlying logic of 
the international system. The notion of “practice” has a key role in English 
School literature.256 Naturally, not all practices can be observed, just like not 
all causes can be observed. However, causal relations can be inferred from 
state practice over time. In more concrete terms, the weight of order and 
justice in a given country’s decision to promote the global prohibition of 
torture (or any other norm) can be inferred from its words and deeds, and 
from the way in which diplomats’ words and state actors’ moves evolve over 
time.  
My epistemological stance is critical, but Order-over-Justice attempts to 
“solve problems”, in the Coxian sense.257  It does not take delight in 
deconstruction and endless reflectivism. It aims at understanding why 
Western European states promote human rights norms in international law, 
and intends to identify complex causal relations and to deduce practical 
lessons from the theoretical and empirical analysis (see section 8.3). Doing so 
requires a critical interpretivist approach but based on the ontological 
acceptance of a world-out-there ripe to be understood and interpreted. As 
advised by Colin Wight, “getting things right is a practical, a political, and an 
ethical imperative, and although achieving it may be impossible, or knowing 
when we have achieved it extremely difficult, we cannot give up on the 
aspiration”.258 
This epistemological and methodological approach is not exempt of 
limitations. Conceptually, the interpretivist stance admits a certain degree of 
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uncertainty as per the weight of our conclusions. Using Order-over-Justice as 
a theoretical argument to reinterpret state practice, and following Kurki’s 
critical realism, I combine the realism of the observable with the subjectivism 
of the observer.  
At the same time, the analysis is based on a given normative position about 
what it means to comply with and to genuinely promote human rights norms 
as a matter of justice. I must admit from the outset that I set the bar rather 
high, higher than normative cosmopolitans (literature in chapter 1 and 
section 2.1). In other words, I would personally expect to see more from 
states if they were to act in accordance with human rights as global standards 
of adequate behaviour. This is a normative position, a starting point. Should 
we apply a lower or less demanding levelling rod, our conclusions and 
interpretations could be different. However, this is the standard freely 
chosen and applied by this researcher. 
 
3.2. Research design: Critical interpretivism in Order-over-Justice 
 
In this section I will show that critical interpretivism provides a 
hermeneutical toolkit that can be applied to Order-over-Justice within certain 
geographical boundaries (Western Europe), based on a hierarchy of tools 
(depending on their legal strength or importance) and a hierarchy of norms 
(depending on their degree of settlement in IHRL). 
Order-over-Justice must be operationalised differently for different human 
rights norms, and this section presents the general framework that will be 
applied in the following four chapters. First, I will present a hierarchy of 
international legal tools. Secondly, I will justify the choice of four human 
rights norms at different stages of development. And thirdly, I will anticipate 
how I will explore the six propositions of Order-over-Justice in relation to the 
four human rights norms in chapters 4-7. 
A critical study of the politics of international law requires an interpretation 
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of the discourse and language used in the negotiation and adoption of 
international norms in order to understand the interests and values at play, 
as well as the moral implications for the international society.259 IHRL is an 
international regime, and “regimes are inherently dialogical in character”.260 
It is tempting to take for granted the existence and normative power of an 
international regime by listing existing institutions, treaties and other 
diplomatic statements pronounced in international forums. However, the 
analysis of a regime like the one of human rights “demands an interpretive 
approach that infers norms from the meanings actors attach to their own 
actions and the actions of others”.261  
Order-over-Justice is based on the idea that there is a fundamental tension 
between international order and global justice and that this tension drives 
the evolution of IHRL. As explained in chapter 2, human rights promotion 
may adopt many forms, but this thesis focuses on the promotion of human 
rights norms through international law. Since promises must be kept (pacta 
sunt servanda), the research also looks at the level of state compliance with 
IHRL, thereby addressing not only discourse, but also state action.  
As argued in the introduction (chapter 1), international human rights legal 
promotion differs from norm compliance. Promotion goes beyond 
compliance but compliance is part of it. I see compliance as domestication, 
that is, the incorporation of international human rights norms into national 
law and policy. Domestication is the strongest form of international human 
rights norm promotion. Above diplomatic statements and treaty ratification 
or sponsorship, bringing home an international human rights norm is the 
most powerful message a government can send about its commitment to 
such norm internationally. By looking at how states domesticate the 
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obligations derived from international human rights treaties, we will find out 
to what extent the diplomatic words are merely rhetorical or an accurate 
description of states' positions. We must recall at this point that this thesis 
sees the state as the main unit of analysis, and therefore assumes that states 
are unitary actors. In principle, the power distribution within countries 
(separation of powers, federal/state level, etc.) is not treated as an 
explanatory factor of IHRL promotion by Western European states. 
 The list below presents a relation of ten available tools to promote human 
rights norms in international law. Not all tools have the same weight, which is 
defined by its relative importance in the international legal structure. The 
theory does not deny that diplomats and government officials, at the personal 
level, may truly believe in human rights as a matter of justice rather than 
order. They may in fact make use of their positions to advance certain causes, 
including the promotion of human rights norms. However, Order-over-Justice 
expects this hypothetical influence to wane with heavier or more powerful 
tools, where systemic pressures and national interests are expected to play a 
more prominent role. The greater the strength or importance of the legal tool, 
the smaller the influence that state diplomats would have in promoting 
human rights as a matter of justice rather than order. 
From the heaviest to the lightest, the ten available tools to promote IHRL are: 
a) Domestication: Incorporation of the international human rights norm 
into national law and policy.  
b) Treaty ratification or accession. 
c) Active promotion of the treaty in the travaux préparatoires.  
d) Position adopted at the Security Council. 
e) Official statement of the Government. 
f) Position adopted at the General Assembly dealing with the work of the 
International Law Commission.  
g) Government's dialogue with UN or regional human rights procedures, 
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in particular, Treaty Bodies, Special Procedures and Universal 
Periodic Review.  
h) Government's reaction to human rights bodies' decisions on 
individual cases. 
i) Sponsorship of human rights resolutions at the General Assembly and 
the Human Rights Council. 
j) Voting on human rights resolutions at the General Assembly and the 
Human Rights Council.  
There are other possible means by which governments could promote 
human rights abroad, for example by requiring labour and human rights-
related clauses in trade agreements, by pursuing quiet diplomacy, publicly 
supporting human rights defenders in foreign countries, or supporting NGOs 
and the OHCHR financially. However, this thesis deals with the promotion of 
human rights legal norms and therefore looks at promotion by legal means 
only. The empirical analysis in chapters 4-7 will explore the ten listed tools, 
which carry legal weight and can make a difference in the promotion of 
human rights norms in international law. 
This hierarchy of tools must be superimposed to the other hierarchy, that of 
IHRL norms. Following the automaticity test of authority presented in 
subsection 2.2.4, we can make a hierarchy of norms based on the extent to 
which they have been internalised by public officials.262 This test says that 
most authoritative norms simply cannot be ignored, which does not mean 
that they will always be respected. Similarly, Frost regards a norm as “settled” 
when the argument to deny or to override it requires special justification, 
and/or when the infringement of the norm is undertaken clandestinely.263 
Based on a test of automaticity, I propose this five-stage categorisation of 
norms depending on their degree of settlement:  
a) A globally settled norm is that which is generally accepted by states, 
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even if it is still sometimes violated in practice. 
b) Regionally settled norms are accepted as standards of adequate 
behaviour by European states, but they are not yet globally accepted. 
c) Norms at an advanced stage of development are those formally and 
generally endorsed by states, although some countries still question 
their practical implications. 
d) Proto-norms are promoted by norm entrepreneurs, but they are still a 
work in progress and are not yet sufficiently supported by states. 
e) A failed norm is that in relation to which the entrepreneur could not 
convince states to embrace the norm. 
The empirical reflection of chapters 4-7 looks at four norms at four different 
stages of development, two of which emerged during the Cold War and the 
other two after the Cold War. This selection allows us to explore the impact 
of the passing of time on norms that are very different in nature and yet can 
be and indeed are conventionally deemed to belong to the human rights 
regime. These are the norms that will be studied in this research: 
a) Prohibition of torture, a globally settled norm (chapter 4). 
b) Ecocide, a failed norm (chapter 5). 
c) Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, a norm at an 
advanced stage of development (chapter 6). 
d) Responsibility to Protect, a proto-norm (chapter 7). 
This selection provides a wide enough range of law and policy areas. The 
prohibition of torture goes to the core of one of the most fundamental liberal 
principles, the physical integrity of every individual. Attitudes towards 
economic, social and cultural right partly define the left-right divide in a 
political system. And ecocide and R2P could alter or could have agitated the 
fundamental tenets of jus in bello and jus ad bellum respectively.  
For reasons of research manageability, I did not include the study of a norm 
settled in the European regional context. Further research could extend the 
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design to norms at that level of development, for example women’s rights or 
LGBT rights, the use of international criminal law or the prohibition of the 
death penalty. 
Four of the six propositions of Order-over-Justice look at the nature of the 
norms themselves, and in particular, their clarity (P3), their level of burden 
(P4), how they fit with liberal principles (P5), and which norm entrepreneurs 
stood behind them (P6). The other two propositions are directly time-
dependent: Countries are expected to support human rights norms 
particularly in the beginning, when they have greater control over their 
meaning (P1), while they would resist them progressively less over time (P2).  
To keep the project manageable regarding propositions P1 and P2, I focus on 
two countries to examine the evolution of their attitudes towards the 
mentioned four international human rights norms. 
Literature has shown that, despite their modest influence, small states tend 
to be relatively more proactive in human rights terms.264 This probably has 
nothing to do with the systemic impulse for order, but with their internal 
institutions, domestic political changes or the role of political leaders in key 
moments. Internal factors shape foreign policies in all countries, but the 
systemic propositions from Order-over-Justice are more likely to be visible in 
larger states due to their relative centrality in the system. Larger states are 
therefore most-likely cases, and that is why this theory is explored in relation 
to larger Western European countries, notwithstanding the possibility that 
Order-over-Justice may also apply to smaller ones. 
Order-over-Justice expects that, regardless of the contrasts between Western 
European states, ultimately the idea of order in international society will 
push them to promote human rights law in a similar way. In other words, I do 
not expect to see big differences between countries, not at least between 
those that are relatively big for Western European standards. 
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Five countries stand out as large Western European states: Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain (the population of the sixth country, 
the Netherlands, is one third of that of Spain). The differences between them 
are noticeable. Germany and France belong to the core of the EU. Spain and 
Italy are less central, although Italy was one of the founding members of the 
European Communities. The UK has historically had a sphere of influence 
much larger than Europe. So has France, but throughout most of the 
existence of the IHRL regime, the UK has had a stable special relationship 
with the United States, something no other European country could say about 
itself. The UK won World War II. Germany and Italy lost. France was split in 
two. Spain leaned towards Germany and Italy, but unlike them it remained 
more or less isolated until the end of Franco's dictatorship in 1975-1977. 
France and the UK are permanent members of the Security Council. 
 Western Europe as a whole has been an active promoter of IHRL, but I deem 
it necessary to explore the propositions of the theoretical argument in 
relation to countries that are potentially dissimilar within the relative 
homogeneity of this subregion. This dissimilarity could be manifested, among 
other things, in their responsibility or position in matters of international 
security (whether they are permanent members of the Security Council), the 
democratic tradition (given the importance of a free civil society to promote 
human rights law as a matter of justice), and of course their economic power. 
Considering these criteria together, we can assemble the relatively large 
countries in two pairs, UK and France on the one hand, and Spain and Italy on 
the other, with Germany in between. 
The research in relation to the two explicitly time-dependent propositions 
(P1 and P2) could be explored in relation to all five of them, but the word 
limit and time constraints require a selection of two among them. I have 
decided to pick one country from either pair, and these countries are Spain 
and the UK. The UK is an old democracy with a long history of civil liberties. It 
has also played a central role in the history of international affairs, in 
particular at the UN level. To the contrary, Spain is a third-wave democracy, a 
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condition that according to Landman would make it a more likely candidate 
to embrace international human rights norms for reputational reasons.265 
Spain was only allowed to join the UN in 1955 and had no say in the earliest 
steps of the international human rights regime. In spite of its strategic 
geographical and geo-cultural location between Europe, Latin America and 
North Africa, it is a medium player in global diplomatic affairs. 
There are also good reasons to look into these two countries as a result of the 
choice of the four human rights norms of the empirical analysis. Torture has 
been reported and documented in both countries when dealing with the 
specific threat of terrorist violence. The UK is one of the few countries in the 
world with no written constitution and with a unique bill of rights scattered 
across centuries since the Magna Carta of 1215. On the contrary, the Spanish 
constitution contains a whole title devoted to the principles governing 
economic and social policy, which includes several economic, social and 
cultural rights. Written soon after the end of World War II, the Italian (1947), 
German (1948) and French (1958) constitutions do not elaborate as much 
the proclamation of these rights.266 The legal tradition of the UK is common 
law while that of Spain (and indeed most other European countries) is civil 
law. Its permanent seat at the Security Council makes the UK a main 
character in the normative construction of R2P. This said and despite all the 
differences, Order-over-Justice anticipates that both Spain and the UK would 
follow generally similar patterns in the promotion of international human 
rights standards. 
Let me now present the research design of the four human rights norms in 
chapters 4-7. The prohibition of torture is an example of a globally settled 
norm that took a strong root in international law with several resolutions 
adopted in the 1970s, but more importantly with the UN Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 
1984 (CAT). Even though torture and ill-treatment are still reported in most 
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countries and almost half the world's population does not feel safe from 
torture,267 the prohibition of torture in international law is considered a 
principle of jus cogens (peremptory law), and torture is prohibited in the 
criminal codes of most countries in the world. Universal and regional human 
rights documents include the prohibition of torture at the outset and there 
are a number of specific treaties on the subject, ratified by a large number of 
countries, as well as independent monitoring bodies. The 1948 Universal 
Declaration (Art. 5) and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights 
(Art. 3) prohibit torture, but it is widely accepted that the norm consolidated 
in the international system after the global campaign initiated by Amnesty 
International and others in the 1970s.268 That was also the decade when the 
ICCPR entered into force (in 1976), the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights opened its doors (1979) and began the drafting process of the CAT. 
Chapter 4 will start by introducing the prohibition of torture in IHRL from 
the 1948 UDHR to the 1984 CAT and its Optional Protocol of 2002. Secondly, 
the chapter will examine the level of clarity of the norm, how burdensome it 
is, the extent to which it fits in liberal parameters, and the role of non-state 
norm entrepreneurs in prohibiting torture in international law. This will be 
done by resorting to hermeneutics of the treaties and their negotiations, the 
opinions expressed by international courts and independent international 
bodies, as well as relevant secondary literature. The chapter will use specific 
cases to illustrate the evolution of the interpretation of the prohibition of 
torture by independent bodies: From the Northern Ireland case in the 1970s 
to the most recent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, as well 
as the relevant general comments of the Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee Against Torture in the 1990s and 2000s, and the relevant 
international jurisprudence on the jus cogens status of the prohibition of 
torture. The analysis is also based on keyword search in the UN treaty body 
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case-law online database, and on drafting working group annual reports and 
meeting summary records obtained in archival research from the UN general 
document database.269 
The drafting process in the 1980s gave countries the opportunity to position 
themselves in their commitment to the global prohibition of torture, more 
than three decades after the proclamation of the UDHR, and after seeing 
human rights bodies interpret the meaning of this human rights norm. 
Unfortunately, there are important methodological limitations in the study of 
the drafting process of the CAT. 
“The travaux préparatoires of the Convention cannot be easily studied 
in UN documents. The principal source materials which have been 
published are the seven reports submitted by the Working Group to 
the Commission on Human Rights during the period 1978-1984. No 
records were made of the deliberations of the Working Group. Most of 
the proposals tabled in the course of these deliberations had the form 
of conference room papers that have not been published. Several 
interesting details of the elaboration of the Convention are registered 
only in the memories of those who took part in the drafting work”.270 
Thankfully, we have access to those memories. Herman Burgers, a member of 
the Dutch diplomatic delegation who chaired the open-ended working group 
between 1982 and 1984, and Hans Danelius, a high-ranking official in the 
Swedish Foreign Office and author of the initial draft, wrote one of the two 
most authoritative references about the Convention.271 The other extremely 
valuable book is the 1500-page long commentary by Elizabeth McArthur and 
Manfred Nowak, who was the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture between 
2004 and 2010.272 Together with the working group annual reports, these 
two secondary sources provide a unique foundation to understand the 
positions adopted by different countries in relation to the global prohibition 
of torture in the early 1980s. 
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Chapter 4 will also examine the evolution of the practice and discourse of the 
UK and Spain in relation to the prohibition of torture since the mid 1980s by 
looking at their respective positions in the drafting process of the CAT, as 
well as the interaction of the two countries with the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the Committee Against Torture, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture, and the UN Special Procedures with torture-related 
mandates. In the archival research I have gathered all the national reports, 
civil society reports, meeting official records, and UN final reports since 1987, 
which are publicly available for research from the general UN documents 
database or from the website of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.273 Missing documents from this set of sources are the exception, 
which are noted in footnotes whenever necessary. The mentioned documents, 
namely the UN reports but also the information provided by governments 
and civil society, offer the relevant information about the national policies to 
prevent and adequately sanction torture within their jurisdictions. 
Ecocide would be an example of a failed norm. It emerged in the early 1970s 
and disappeared from the working documents of the UN International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 1996. In essence, the concept of ecocide means that 
crimes against the environment should be considered international crimes 
and be punished accordingly. In recent years, there have been movements to 
resurrect the term and advocate for the protection of the environment 
through international criminal law.274 However, this study looks at the norm 
of ecocide that vanished years ago, regardless of the possibility that it might 
come back. 
Chapter 5 will set the ground with the context of the progressive recognition 
of environmental concerns in international law, and specifically in IHRL, and 
a brief introduction of the idea of ecocide, as initially coined in the 1970s. 
This narrative is built on relevant case-law from international bodies and 
courts, obtained from the official online databases after careful scrutiny of 
                                                 
273 http://www.ohchr.org/  
274 http://eradicatingecocide.com/  
 84 
relevant literature and cited reports from the UN Environmental Programme.  
The analysis will continue with the application of the propositions of Order-
over-Justice to ecocide using the same hermeneutical chisel of the previous 
chapter. In third place, the chapter will explore the evolution of the 
international practice of Spain and the UK towards ecocide with three 
references: firstly, the positions expressed by country delegates during the 
negotiation of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and 
the 1998 Statute to the International Criminal Court (ICC); secondly, their 
interaction with the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities and with the International Law Commission 
(ILC); and thirdly, regulation at the domestic level. 
Together with secondary literature, primary sources are: ILC yearbooks 
between 1984 and 1996 (obtained from the UN document database or from 
the ILC website itself);275 the 1978 and 1985 reports of the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; 
content analysis of three relevant provisions as discussed in the travaux 
préparatoires of the 1977 Additional Protocols and of the 1998 ICC Statute; 
and keyword search within the three authoritative in-depth studies of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), namely, the 1987 
commentary to the Additional Protocols, and the two 2005 studies on 
customary international humanitarian law. These two studies included 
relevant information about the domestic regulation of ecocide (or lack 
thereof) in the UK and Spain, enriched by the more up-to-date content from 
the ICRC website.276 
Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) is a norm at an 
advanced degree of settlement that emerged in the 1990s. ESCR are 
recognised in a number of human rights treaties, the most important of 
which is the 1966 ICESCR, ratified by 165 countries to this day. We say that a 
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human right is justiciable when courts can enforce it.277 Most constitutions 
recognise one or more of the ESCR as justiciable,278 and in the last two 
decades judges from all over the world have shown that at least some 
elements of these rights are indeed enforceable at court.279 We also have an 
individual complaints mechanism at the UN level and a collective complaints 
mechanism in Europe, although only a handful of countries have accepted the 
jurisdiction. Even though all Western European countries have ratified most 
of the relevant treaties, practice shows that their governments still resist the 
full implications of recognising ESCR as human rights. 
As with the two previous chapters, after a brief introduction to the 
proclamation of ESCR in the international legal systems of human rights, 
chapter 6 will examine the propositions with the assistance of international 
treaties and the work of independent human rights mechanisms. 
Subsequently, the chapter will critically interpret the attitude of the UK and 
Spain since the mid 1990s by looking at the ratification of relevant treaties, 
their position in the drafting processes of the 2000 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the 2008 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, their 
responses to independent human rights mechanisms at the UN, and judicial 
enforceability of ESCR at the internal level. 
Together with secondary sources and literature, primary research sources 
are: Critical content analysis of the relevant provisions of international 
treaties and general comments from the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights; official reports of the preparation of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR; Lord Goldsmith’s account of the negotiation of the 
2000 EU Charter, together with the 2014 House of Commons report on the 
applicability of the Charter to the UK; and all the national reports, civil 
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society reports, meeting official records, and final reports by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as relevant UN 
Special Procedures concerning Spain and the UK since 1996. For the UN 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), I have made used of the publicly available 
database by the Geneva-based organisation UPR-Info.280 Materialising the 
2008 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR took a long time and a great deal of 
effort. During the drafting process, many of the debates between states were 
not recorded. However, analysts can resort to the privileged testimony of 
Catarina de Albuquerque, a member of the Portuguese delegation and the 
rapporteur of the working group that drafted the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR.281 As in the case of the prohibition of torture, the mentioned UN 
reports, together with the national reports and the alternative evidence from 
civil society, provide an accurate description of the recognition of ESCR 
justiciability at the domestic level in both Spain and the UK. 
Finally, many have framed the notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 
terms of human rights since its appearance in the early 2000s. Ultimately, 
R2P means that the international community of states has the duty to 
intervene anywhere, even militarily, in order to protect civilians from 
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Due to its short life and the 
controversy about whether it has ever been applied as such, R2P can be 
preliminarily considered a proto-norm. 
Focusing on its third pillar, which potentially covers military action, chapter 
7 will first introduce R2P as an evolved and sophisticated version of 
humanitarian intervention. The chapter will continue with the ascertainment 
of clarity, burden, liberalism and the role of norm entrepreneurs by relying 
on the narrative of the diplomatic process of R2P declaration. Some review of 
the literature helps assessing the degree of adjustment with fundamental 
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liberal principles of state sovereignty and value of human life. Thirdly, the 
chapter will observe the positions declared by the UK and Spain at the UN 
Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as other policy statements 
between 2005 and 2016. The chapter will also examine their positions in 
relation to Sudan (Darfur), Sri Lanka, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Syria. 
Primary sources will be: Content analysis of the two 2000 reports of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and 
the UN reports on the notion of R2P generally considered noteworthy by the 
literature; content analysis of the 2007 ICJ Bosnian genocide ruling, and 
relevant legal sources, starting from the UN Charter; official records of 
relevant UN General Assembly and Security Council debates on R2P in 
general (see list in subsection 7.3.1), and in relation to specific cases (Darfur, 
Sri Lanka, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Syria; 7.3.2); and keyword search from 
foreign policy and national security strategy position papers of the 
Governments of Spain and the UK. 
Regarding the specific cases, Darfur (Sudan) is often seen as the first case in 
which the R2P of the World Summit Outcome was used as a general reference. 
Sri Lanka has been presented as the “sin of omission” of R2P, that is, the only 
case where compliance with R2P would have clearly required a different 
response from the international community.282 Libya and (partly) Côte 
d’Ivoire are the only cases thus far where a military intervention was 
authorised by the Security Council in application of R2P. Finally, R2P has 
been mentioned in diplomatic conversations on Syria, but no military action 
against Assad’s regime was ever authorised. Although the dreadful war in 
Syria is not over at the time of this writing, the analysis for this chapter 
concluded in December 2016. I have not looked into the world’s reaction to 
the isolated US’s missile strike against Assad’s forces in April 2017. 
The prohibition of torture is a material norm, that is, a norm that determines 
what is an adequate behaviour and what is not. The other three are 
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procedural norms or mechanisms to implement other material norms. The 
deliberate destruction of the environment, ESCR, and genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity would be the material norms in ecocide, 
justiciability and R2P, respectively. For the purposes of this analysis, 
however, the difference between material and procedural norms is 
conceptual and does not hinder the comparability. 
This chapter has allowed me to do four things. Firstly, I have introduced the 
meaning of critical interpretivism and its value to examine states’ 
international practice along the continuum of order and justice. Secondly, I 
have offered a list of ten possible legal and policy tools of international 
human rights law promotion by states. Thirdly, I have presented a five-level 
categorisation of human rights norms based on their degree of settlement in 
the international human rights regime. And fourthly, I have advanced how I 
intend to give meaning to Order-over-Justice in relation to four human rights 
norms at different stages of development (the prohibition of torture, ecocide, 
justiciability of ESCR, and Responsibility to Protect) and with particular 
reference to two Western European states (Spain and the UK). 
I intend to do precisely this in the following four chapters, where I will use 
the theoretical argument of Order-over-Justice to reinterpret Western 
European states’ practice of IHRL promotion. The empirical analysis will also 
help us understand what propositions outlined in subsection 2.2.4 stand out 




4. PROHIBITION OF TORTURE 
 
“Why do states give us these whips to flagellate them with?” 
Sir Nigel Rodley, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 1993-2001.283 
 
This chapter re-examines the international prohibition of torture and the 
way in which Western European states have promoted this prohibition. The 
chapter begins by introducing the prohibition of torture in IHRL from the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the 1984 Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
and its Optional Protocol of 2002 (section 4.1). It continues with a critical 
analysis of the level of clarity of the norm, how burdensome it is, the extent to 
which it fits in liberal parameters, and the role of non-state norm 
entrepreneurs in prohibiting torture in international law (4.2). In third place, 
the chapter explores the evolution of the practice (action and discourse) of 
the UK and Spain in relation to this human rights norm in international 
forums since the mid 1980s (section 4.3): It combines their respective 
positions in the drafting process of the Convention Against Torture and the 
interaction of the two countries with international human rights bodies 
(discourse), with their national policies to prevent and adequately sanction 
torture within their jurisdictions (action). 
 
4.1. The prohibition of torture in IHRL  
 
Torture can be defined as the “deliberate infliction of severe pain or suffering 
on a powerless victim, usually a detainee, for a specific purpose, such as the 
extraction of a confession or information”, 284  and it is prohibited in 
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international human rights law. 
Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) leaves 
little room for interpretation: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. The prohibition of torture 
is also categorical in the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 3), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 7), the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (Article 5) and 
the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 5). Torture 
is also forbidden in international humanitarian law (Common Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and several provisions of these Conventions and 
of the 1977 Additional Protocols) and in international criminal law (Article 2 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention, and Articles 7 and 8 of the 1998 Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, concerning crimes against 
humanity and war crimes). 
As a human rights issue, the prohibition of torture is quite unique insofar as it 
has its own international treaty dealing specifically with it. The Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Convention Against Torture or CAT, for short) was adopted on 
10 December 1984, and entered into force in 1987 after the 20th ratification 
(Article 27). 162 countries have ratified it thus far, including all European 
states.285 
The CAT imposes obligations on state parties to prevent and punish torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment. The Convention also creates an independent 
Committee countries are obliged to report regularly to. The CAT also 
establishes three oversight mechanisms of voluntary subscription for states: 
inquiries, individual complaints and interstate complaints (more on this in 
section 4.2). 
As of August 2016, eleven countries had issued declarations to opt out from 
the inquiry procedure of Article 20; all of them are non-European.286 63 
                                                 
285 UN Status of Ratification Interaction Dashboard: http://indicators.ohchr.org/  
286 The countries that have opted out are: Afghanistan, China, Equatorial Guinea, Israel, Kuwait, 
 91 
countries have made a declaration accepting the competence of the 
Committee Against Torture on interstate complaints (Article 21), and 67 in 
relation to individual complaints (Article 22). With only one exception, all 
Western European states have accepted the competence of the Committee for 
both interstate and individual complaints. The exception is the United 
Kingdom, which has only accepted it for interstate complaints.287 Just like the 
Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture has never received 
an interstate complaint. 
Parallel to the drafting of the Convention Against Torture, countries in the 
Americas wrote the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Torture, adopted in 1985 and which entered into force in 1987. This treaty 
did not make substantial innovations to the provisions of the UN 
Convention.288 There is no specific treaty on torture in the African human 
rights system. 
On 26 November 1987, European countries formally adopted the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. Unlike the UN and the Inter-American ones, this 
treaty focused specifically on prevention, and set up a system to visit 
detention centres and other places where physical integrity might be at risk. 
The European Convention has been ratified by all 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
started to operate in 1989. The Committee performs a non-judicial 
preventive role; it does not judge whether human rights violations take place. 
                                                                                                                                     
Laos, Mauritania, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and United Arab Emirates. The inquiry procedure 
is confidential and requires the cooperation of the concerned state. The report (or a summary of it) 
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It carries out periodic visits, but it can also make ad hoc visits. The principles 
of cooperation and confidentiality guide its relationship with states. Reports 
are not made public unless the government gives its approval or refuses to 
cooperate with the Committee or to make improvements following its 
recommendations. The government is supposed to give the Committee 
unlimited access, including interviewing detainees in private.289 
A similar procedure for the whole world had been suggested by the Swiss 
Committee Against Torture and by Costa Rica in the discussion of the 
Convention Against Torture. However, it did not penetrate at the UN level in 
the early 1980s. Formally at the initiative of Costa Rica (again) in 1992, the 
Commission on Human Rights decided to establish an open-ended Working 
Group mandated with drafting an optional protocol to the UN Convention 
Against Torture.290 The Working Group required nearly ten years to conclude 
its work. According to authoritative observers, this was due to a deliberate 
strategy by states opposed to the idea of an international monitoring body of 
such nature.291 After years of conversation, in 2001 Mexico and Sweden made 
two separate proposals that included an innovation, not only in relation to 
the European Convention, but also in the international human rights regime 
as a whole. The idea consisted in establishing national preventive 
mechanisms in addition to the international visiting body, to be known as 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Although some European countries 
(and beyond) expressed doubts about the mandatory nature of the national 
preventive mechanism, the idea overall was welcomed by EU states, 
represented by Spain at that session.292 The final draft would include both 
mechanisms: the national one and the international one. With different 
intensity, some states (Cuba, USA, Japan, Egypt…) resisted the adoption of the 
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Optional Protocol to the last minute, but the text was finally adopted by a 
majority at both the Commission on Human Rights and the ECOSOC; by the 
time it got to the plenary of the General Assembly, the support was 
overwhelming, yet not unanimous: 127 votes in favour, 4 against and 42 
abstentions. All Western European states were in the first group. In fact, all 
European states were there, except Russia, which abstained.293 
The Optional Protocol entered into force in June 2006, one month after the 
20th instrument of ratification (Article 28). To this day, 83 countries have 
ratified the Optional Protocol to CAT. Three Western European states have 
signed but not yet ratified it: Belgium, Ireland and Iceland. Three more have 
not even signed it: Andorra, Monaco and San Marino.294 
 
4.2. What does Order-over-Justice mean for the prohibition of torture? 
Clarity, burden, liberalism and norm entrepreneurs 
 
Order-over-Justice predicts that Western European states will give more 
support to norms whose meaning remains obscure (P3) and to less 
burdensome norms (P4). The argument also expects that Western European 
states will be inclined to support norms in line with liberal principles (P5), 
and norms promoted by strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs (P6). 
 
4.2.1. Is the meaning of the prohibition of torture clear? 
 
The CAT is based on the premise that torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment were already outlawed when the 
Convention was being discussed. As said at the beginning of this chapter, a 
                                                 
293 Marshall Islands, Nigeria, Palau and USA voted against. Abstentions came from Asia, Africa 
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number of treaties had explicitly prohibited torture. “The principal aim of the 
Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition of such practices by a 
number of supportive measures”.295 
The CAT was the first international treaty to provide a definition of “torture” 
(Article 1(1)): 
“For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘torture’ means any act 
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” 
This provision was the result of intricate negotiations and it contributed to 
set a working definition potentially applicable worldwide. Up to that point in 
the mid 1980s, for better or for worse, the responsibility to draw the 
boundaries of the meaning of torture had been tacitly bestowed on the 
European Court of Human Rights. It is therefore appropriate to evoke the 
European Court’s appraisal. 
In the Greek case (1967/69) the no longer existent European Commission of 
Human Rights became the first international human rights body to conclude 
that a state had practiced torture and, by doing so, it had infringed 
international law.296 The shade arrived a few years after this moment of light, 
when the European Court of Human Rights contradicted the European 
Commission in the infamous Northern Ireland case (1971/78).297 In this case 
against the United Kingdom initiated by the Republic of Ireland, the 
Commission had initially applied the criterion that the purpose of the act, and 
not the severity of the pain, is what distinguishes torture from other forms of 
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inhuman and degrading treatment.298 In its ruling, the Court reversed the 
Commission’s decision as follows:  
“In the Court’s view, this distinction [between torture and inhuman 
and degrading treatment] derives principally from a difference in the 
intensity of the suffering inflicted. The Court considers in fact that, 
whilst there exists on the one hand violence which is to be condemned 
both on moral grounds and also in most cases under the domestic law 
of the Contracting States but which does not fall within Article 3 of the 
Convention, it appears on the other hand that it was the intention that 
the Convention, with its distinction between ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman or 
degrading treatment’, should by the first of these terms attach a 
special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious 
and cruel suffering.”299 (italics added) 
Accordingly, the Court found that the practices of ill-treatment applied by 
British military and police in Northern Ireland constituted “inhuman or 
degrading treatment” but not “torture”, and therefore they did not deserve 
the opprobrium of “special stigma”. 
In relation to this case, Bates notes that “the Court’s refusal to find that the 
five techniques constituted ‘torture’ reflected its conservatism in what was a 
highly politically-charged case. Here one might recall that Ireland v. United 
Kingdom was only the eighteenth case the Court had heard in its, by then, 
nearly twenty-year history, and the first ever interstate case it had heard”.300 
Even tough the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
evolved notably since then, this case left a mark and it has been used by some 
states in support of restrictive interpretations of the prohibition of torture. 
As we will see later (subsections 4.2.2 and 4.3.1), both the USA and the UK 
used it when they tried to define torture as a “extremely severe” form of ill-
treatment during the preparation of the Convention Against Torture. The 
European judgement was also intentionally echoed by the 2002 Bybee 
Memorandum, where the US Department of Justice attempted to give carte 
blanche to US forces in their War on Terror. The Bybee Memorandum 
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selectively added the words “leading case” to refer to Ireland v. UK.301 
The European Court of Human Rights does not apply that yardstick any more 
in its interpretation of Article 3 ECHR. Human Rights bodies now generally 
agree with the defunct European Commission of Human Rights more than 
with the Court of 1978: In order to determine if the practice constitutes 
torture, they infer intent from the presumptions of fact.302 
The CAT demands states to prevent “acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 
I” (Article 16). As shown in relation to the Greek and Northern Ireland cases 
in Europe, the borderline between torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment is one of the most debated issues among human 
rights bodies and commentators.303 Both forms of treatment are included in 
the Convention, but there is disagreement about the applicability of some 
provisions of the Convention to cruel, inhuman or degrading practices. 
Nevertheless, the UN Human Rights Committee does not “consider it 
necessary to draw up a list of prohibited acts or to establish sharp 
distinctions between” torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 304  The UN Committee Against Torture adopts a similar 
approach,305 and has emphasised “that elements of intent and purpose in 
article 1 do not involve a subjective inquiry into the motivations of the 
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perpetrators, but rather must be objective determinations under the 
circumstances”.306 
That is how independent human rights monitoring bodies generally interpret 
the global prohibition of torture and the distinction between torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment. However, as we will see in the cases of 
Spain and the UK (section 4.3), when states have the opportunity to express 
their opinion, they do not always share these views.  
The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in the 1960s and 70s 
generated a substantial degree of the bewilderment in relation to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. But its effects have barely lived on to 
these days, and nowadays it is fair to say that the prohibition of torture in 
international law is stated in unusually clear terms. 
 
4.2.2. Is the prohibition of torture burdensome? 
 
Michel Foucault wrote in Discipline and Punish that the important change 
introduced in the criminal systems of the 18th century was the result of a 
transformation in the way society perceived royal power.307 Public torment 
and executions were no longer effective in spreading fear and loyalty in the 
population. Other more effective systems of control and punishment had 
been established that made torture unreliable in the eyes of the authority. As 
the modern fight against terrorism attests, when it comes to torture and ill-
treatment, in practice humanitarian concerns are not disconnected from 
utilitarian calculations about whether torture works or not. 
Yet, the prohibition of torture represents a certain conception of law and of 
the use of violence in its enforcement. The normative idea beneath 
prohibiting torture is beautifully captured by Waldron: “Law is not brutal in 
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its operation. Law is not savage. Law does not rule through abject fear and 
terror, or by breaking the will of those whom it confronts”.308 In order to be 
meaningful, therefore, the prohibition of torture must be absolute. 
The prohibition of torture in IHRL is indeed engraved in absolute terms. 
Notwithstanding the fact that states have challenged the absoluteness of the 
prohibition time and again (as shown in section 4.3 in relation to Spain and 
the UK), independent human rights bodies have been clear. The UN Human 
Rights Committee has recalled that “no justification or extenuating 
circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 [ICCPR, on 
the prohibition of torture] for any reasons, including those based on an order 
from a superior officer or public authority”.309 The nature of the prohibition 
is also absolute for the European Court of Human Rights, even in “difficult 
circumstances”, like terrorism and organised crime, and “irrespective of the 
conduct of the person concerned”.310 
The absolute nature of this prohibition is reaffirmed in Article 2(2) of the 
Convention Against Torture: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture”. 
At first sight, the prohibition of torture is not only stated in unambiguous 
terms; it also imposes a heavy duty on public authorities insofar as it does 
not know of any possible limitation or exception of any kind. 
It was not always clear that the prohibition of torture had to be that 
burdensome. The drafting process of the Convention Against Torture was 
tortuous and revealed that in the 1970s and 80s there was no univocal 
understanding of the implications of making torture absolutely contrary to 
international law. 
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In 1973, on the 25th anniversary of the UDHR, Sweden, Netherlands, Austria, 
Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago, submitted a draft resolution on torture 
for the consideration of the General Assembly. Other countries joined them in 
sponsoring a similar text in 1974. Both resolutions (3059/XXVIII and 
3218/XXIX) obtained overwhelming support. Finally, pushed by the 
Netherlands and Sweden, on 9 December 1975 the General Assembly 
adopted without need for a vote the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Resolution 3452/XXX).311 
In January 1978, only two years and one month after the adoption of the 
General Assembly Declaration, the Government of Sweden and the 
International Association of Penal Law submitted two separate drafts to 
spark a conversation among states about the need for an ad hoc treaty on 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.312 Compared to a 
declaration, a treaty would take a step up in terms of legal obligatory nature. 
One month earlier, in December 1977, the General Assembly had requested 
the UN Commission on Human Rights to draw up a draft convention 
(Resolution 32/62). A number of countries co-sponsored this call for a 
binding treaty, including many that at the time had a far from clean record in 
preventing and punishing torture: Angola, Cameroon, Cuba, the German 
Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Tanzania, Upper 
Volta (Burkina Faso), Zambia… and Spain.313 
The UN Commission on Human Rights decided to set up an open-ended 
Working Group for this purpose. Open-endedness meant that all member 
states of the Commission could take part, as well as other states and NGOs 
with consultative status. Decisions were supposed to be adopted by 
consensus and majority rule did not apply. 
The open-ended Working Group decided to start from the Swedish proposal, 
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which was substantially based on the 1975 Declaration.314 The text included 
both torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It 
also incorporated the principle of non-refoulement, taken from the European 
case-law, which prevents states from expelling or extraditing a person to a 
country where there are reasonable grounds to expect that they would be 
subjected to torture or ill-treatment. The Swedish draft also established the 
principle of aut dedere, aut judicare, which requires states to extradite or 
prosecute an individual suspected of having committed torture. Finally, the 
text mandated the UN Human Rights Committee, created under the umbrella 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to also supervise 
state compliance with the future treaty on torture, with its existing tools 
(state reports, interstate complaints and individual complaints), but also with 
an inquiry procedure wherever torture was being practiced systematically. 
While most delegates supported the general idea of the Swedish draft in 1979, 
some others suggested the possibility of restricting the Convention only to 
torture, excluding cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
USA and the UK, for example, expressed the opinion that in order to be 
considered torture, the pain or suffering had to be “extremely severe”, not 
merely “severe”. Nevertheless, as said earlier, most countries generally 
supported the Swedish proposal, and during the session, Sweden presented a 
revised draft integrating the input from the discussion.315 
The 1980 session of the Working Group focused on non-refoulement, 
domestic criminalisation, jurisdiction, and reparation for victims, among 
other issues. Some Western countries expressed reservations about the 
application of universal jurisdiction, that is, a type of jurisdiction that, due to 
the gravity of the crime, disregards the personal connection with the 
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perpetrator or the victim or the territorial connection with the place where 
the crime took place.316 
The Netherlands was one of the Western European states that was critical 
with universal jurisdiction. It advocated making it contingent upon the failure 
of extradition attempts, but it changed its position on the matter by 1981, 
when Western European states seemed to be ready to accept universal 
jurisdiction for torture. As they had done before, in 1981, the USA and the UK 
still maintained that torture was an “aggravated and deliberate” form of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The 1981 session was also 
the one when states started to address the issue of implementation. Costa 
Rica and the Netherlands submitted proposals for an international 
verification mechanism to visit places of detention.317 This idea initially came 
from Jean-Jacques Gautier, one of the founders of the Swiss Committee 
Against Torture, who had proposed a system of visits following the model of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross for armed conflicts.318 The 
project did not bear fruit in the 1980s, but it did some time later: first, it 
inspired the model set up in Europe with the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted in 1987; and secondly, at the UN level, with the adoption of the 
Optional Protocol to the CAT, adopted in 2002. 
Considering the lack of agreement among states, the discussion about 
implementation had to be continued in 1982. Sweden submitted an 
alternative proposal regarding the implementation of the Convention.319 The 
idea consisted in creating a new independent monitoring body, a separate 
“Committee Against Torture”, different from the Human Rights Committee of 
the ICCPR, but performing similar functions even if only in relation to torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and whose 
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members would be elected by state parties but would act in their personal 
capacity. Most countries supported the idea of an independent monitoring 
body. However, some of them refused to accept that such mechanism would 
have to be mandatory. By 1982, all Western European states, bar Australia, 
endorsed the Swedish idea of including universal jurisdiction in the CAT. The 
Junta-led Argentina was the most vocal opponent of universal jurisdiction for 
torture.320 
Implementation was once again the hot topic in 1983, but this time, 
according to Burgers and Danelius, “the Working Group conducted its 
business in a very constructive atmosphere […] and made remarkable 
progress”.321 The vast majority of the Working Group agreed to the Swedish 
proposal, but opted for a simplified regulation in the Convention. The 
Committee Against Torture would therefore be mandated to examine country 
reports periodically, to resolve interstate and individual complaints alleging 
the commission of torture or other forms of forbidden ill-treatment, and to 
carry out confidential inquiries if it received “reliable information” 
suggesting that torture was being “systematically practiced” in a state party 
to the CAT. The Soviet Union, Ukraine and India argued that countries should 
be allowed to accept such mechanism voluntarily. On the contrary, all 
Western delegations defended that in order to be effective it had to be 
mandatory.322 
In spite of the slow process of previous years, in 1984 the Working Group 
managed to achieve consensus on the wording of almost all provisions. 
Importantly, by this time, no country opposed the inclusion of universal 
jurisdiction any longer. The Argentinean Junta had fallen in 1983. Brazil and 
Uruguay still had reservations (they dictatorships would end in 1985), but 
they refused to table them for the sake of consensus. The USA and the UK still 
opposed the extension of the right to redress and compensation (Article 14) 
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for victims of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Regarding implementation, in the end, both interstate complaints (Article 21) 
and individual complaints (Article 22) were made optional and dependent 
upon states’ recognition of the competence of the Committee to deal with 
these kinds of cases.323 
When the text got to the Commission on Human Rights, most delegations 
expressed their support, but the Commission did not manage to settle the 
issue about the mandatory nature of the country reporting procedure (Article 
19) and the inquiry procedure (Article 20). The draft was therefore 
submitted technically unfinished to the consideration of the General 
Assembly.324  
In the end, at the Third Committee and Plenary of the General Assembly, 
periodic country reports (Article 19), became the only obligatory mechanism 
for all state parties: A new provision was included to allow countries to opt 
out from the inquiry procedure for systematic forms of torture (Article 28 in 
relation to Article 20). This was the compromise that the Eastern bloc and the 
Western European states found for the former group to withdraw its final 
reservations. The Convention was unanimously adopted by the General 
Assembly on 10 December 1984.325 
Hence, while questioned openly in the 1970s and 80s, torture is now 
absolutely prohibited in international law. This has been settled in a number 
of declarations and international treaties, not least by the CAT in 1984. 
Torture is also widely prohibited in domestic law. Up to 86% of the countries 
have even prohibited torture at the constitutional level, although this does 
not necessarily have a direct impact on the actual disappearance of this 
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practice.326 According to a study carried by Amnesty International in 2012, at 
least 85 UN member states (hovering 44% of all) provide for universal 
jurisdiction over torture in their criminal procedural law.327  
The prohibition of torture has even reached the highest possible moral 
ground in the international sphere. In the last two decades, international 
bodies have concluded that the prohibition of torture is a norm of jus 
cogens.328 This means that the prohibition of torture would be a peremptory 
norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted. In 
other words, the norm would be so important in international law that states’ 
opinion about it would be immaterial. International bodies play a central role 
in the determination of what norms get to a point of jus cogens. By definition, 
states cannot be entrusted with the responsibility, because the norm reaches 
that point when it is recognised as such “by the international community” 
and “no derogation is permitted”.329 
However, in spite of the global and national prohibition, 30 years after the 
adoption of the Convention Against Torture, Amnesty International reports 
cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in at least 141 countries 
from all regions, and a survey commissioned by this organisation reveals that 
almost one out of two people does not feel safe from this supposedly 
absolutely prohibited treatment or punishment.330 More than a third of the 
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17,000 people from 16 countries331 surveyed by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross believed that torture against captured combatants could be 
acceptable in order to obtain information.332 
As said earlier (subsection 2.2.4), the automaticity test of norm development 
means that a norm can be considered settled in the human rights regime 
when it “has entered into the decision-making calculus of states”.333 That 
would mean that it has been internalised in the thinking process of 
government officials or, more generally, of those bound by the norm itself. In 
this sense, a human rights norm can still be breached, as long as states do not 
ignore the fact that they are breaching the norm. For Hurd, as a standard of 
adequate behaviour, torture can be a jus cogens norm while remaining widely 
practised.334 Higgins follows a similar thought: “Because opinio juris as to its 
normative status continues to exist […] no state, not even a state that tortures, 
believes that the international law prohibition is undesirable and that it is not 
bound by the prohibition”.335 
However, even if we accept Hurd’s automaticity test (as we did in chapter 2 
to categorise norms based on their degree of settlement in international law), 
we may still legitimately question its validity for jus cogens. The point of 
declaring a norm peremptory is not self-evident when one in two people fear 
that the norm would not protect them if police detained them. 
The announcement of the jus cogens status of the prohibition of torture was 
made in the post-9/11 era, a time when the absolute nature of the 
prohibition of torture faced an upfront opposition from governments. The 
formal proclamation of the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens norm 
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thereby became a tool by which international bodies intended to preserve 
the integrity of this human rights norm, precisely when it was under attack 
by the states that had agreed to its prohibition in the first place. 
As noted by Simmons,336 the crucial difference between torture and other 
human rights issues is that torture is perceived to have a critical bearing on 
states’ ability to preserve order and security within borders. As we will see 
later in relation to Spain and the UK (section 4.3), in the context of the War 
on Terror, states felt the need to ratchet up security even if at the expense of 
certain rights and liberties, including the protection of physical and 
psychological integrity. 
In his 2005 address to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the then UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, lamented that “for the first 
time since World War II, this important consensus of the international 
community (the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment) seems to have been 
called into question by some Governments in the context of their 
counterterrorism strategies”.337 However, history shows that governments 
have recurrently questioned the absoluteness of the prohibition of torture 
when they have felt under threat. Western European officials have resorted 
to utilitarian justifications of torture, normally by defending the legality of 
mild or moderate physical pressure, which international bodies tend to 
consider cruel, inhuman or degrading, and therefore prohibited in 
international law. It happened during the Franco-Algerian war with the 1955 
Wuillaume Report, during the so-called Northern Irish “Troubles” with the 
Compton Committee and the 1971 Parker Report, with the “moderate 
physical pressure” of the Landau Commission in Israel in 1987, and with the 
infamous 2002 Bybee report in the USA months after 9/11.338 
A common feature of all these retrogressions in the prohibition of torture is 
that this practice is framed as necessary in relation to the other. The dilemma 
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is not simply liberty versus security, but rather, their liberty versus our security. 
From this perspective, Linklater’s point is particularly valid when he puts 
torture in the context of the “civilising process”: the global prohibition of 
torture would be part of the globalisation of the European society and the 
expansion of the standard of civilisation.339 Yet, far from being a regular and 
linear process, the framing of the prohibition of torture as a global civilising 
process opens the door to the acceptance of a sort of “civilised torture” as 
long as it is exercised against the “barbarian other”, the savage and lawless 
enemy of civilisation, the terrorist.340 
The prohibition of torture is absolute and this imposes a heavy burden on 
duty bearers. In recent years, nonetheless, some states have openly 
questioned the absoluteness of the global prohibition of torture, while NGOs 
and independent bodies have acted as if this norm did no longer need of 
states’ recognition because it has reached the irreversible point of a 
peremptory norm of general international law. The autonomous 
development of the prohibition of torture in the first decade of this century 
shows how, once a norm gets settled in the international human rights 
regime, states do not have full control over the meaning of the norm anymore. 
What remains to be seen, though, is whether this means anything of 
substance when it comes to ensuring that people do not suffer human rights 
violations on their own skin. 
 
4.2.3. Does the prohibition of torture fit with liberal principles? 
 
The prohibition of torture fits within the liberal framework Western 
European states claim to be bound by. 
According to Morsink’s authoritative commentary to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, “Nazi medical experiments in the concentration 
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camps and other such inhumane practices figured heavily” in the prohibition 
of torture in the UDHR.341 Hence, the adoption of strong language against 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment cannot be disconnected 
from the Holocaust remembrance.  
However, the origins of the prohibition lie in the Enlightenment. Throughout 
most of history, torture had been deemed a legitimate tool to deter or 
intimidate, gather information, obtain self-incriminatory statements, or 
simply to express that the torturer considers the victim to be subhuman.342 In 
1764, Cesare Beccaria published Crimes and Punishments and joined 
Montesquieu, Voltaire and others in arguing that torture was both immoral 
and irrational, and therefore it could not be accepted in a new social contract 
based on liberal principles; the argument laid down the law to the point that 
by 1874 Victor Hugo even dared to resolve that torture had ceased to exist.343 
In the very long run the overall level of violence may have decreased over 
time,344 but the last century and a half proves that Victor Hugo and others 
were surely well intentioned but no less impetuous in their conclusions. 
As said, the roots of the prohibition of torture are located in the 
Enlightenment and its rational discovery of human dignity and individual 
freedoms. Either persuaded by the lucidity of thinkers like Beccaria, maybe 
as a result of the creation of more effective and private forms of 
punishment,345 or possibly influenced by both, the prohibition of torture 
became one of the earliest issues framed in the language of natural rights. 
Perhaps because of this, the European Court of Human Rights stated that the 
prohibition of torture proclaimed in Article 3 of the European Convention on 
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Human Rights “enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic 
society”.346 
This of course would not have prevented Western countries from developing 
sophisticated methods to make torture more difficult to detect.347 That said, 
bearing in mind the resonance with liberal principles, Western European 
states would be particularly willing to advocate the global prohibition of 
torture.  
 
4.2.4. Have strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs endorsed the 
international prohibition of torture? 
 
Human rights organisations, like the Swiss Committee Against Torture, the 
International Association of Penal Law, the International Commission of 
Jurists and Amnesty International, played a significant role in making the CAT 
happen in the 1970s and 80s; delegates of at least the second two ones got 
involved in the actual drafting of some provisions, even if they did so in their 
personal capacity; Amnesty International began a global campaign for the 
abolition of torture in 1972, and published in 1973 a 200-page report on the 
reality of torture worldwide.348 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, norm entrepreneurs held colloquiums and 
consultations to recover the idea of a global independent mechanism to 
monitor national practices of prevention of torture at the local and national 
levels. The Swiss Committee Against Torture and other organisations under 
the umbrella of the International Commission of Jurists, played a significant 
role; so did scholars like Manfred Nowak, Antonio Cassese, and the first UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Peter Kooijmans.349 
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As explained earlier (4.2.2), the CAT evolved partly from a 1978 proposal 
from the International Association of Penal Law, and the draft by the Swiss 
Committee Against Torture in 1981 was the basis of its Optional Protocol. 
More recently, since the mid 1990s, international criminal tribunals, 
international human rights bodies and the International Court of Justice have 
sustained that the prohibition of torture is not only absolute, but it is also a 
peremptory norm of international law, a norm so important that states’ 
consent or lack thereof makes no difference. 
Western European states would be more inclined to endorse norms 
promoted by stronger and more resourceful norm entrepreneurs (P6). 
Practitioners’ influence has persisted in their advocacy with independent 
human rights bodies. A survey carried out by the World Organization Against 
Torture (OMCT in French) found traces of their reports in between 19 and 53% 
of the recommendations of the Committee Against Torture.350 There is 
probably no other issue more salient than torture in reports and campaign 
materials of international human rights groups. Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect from the perspective of Order-over-Justice that the prohibition of 
torture would get more support than other human rights norms from 
Western European countries. 
Contrary to the propositions related to clarity (P3) and burden (P4), the 
connection with liberal principles (P5) and the role of norm entrepreneurs 
(P6) foresee that the prohibition of torture would be strongly endorsed by 
Western European states. Section 4.3 will shed light on this and identify 
whether burden and clarity together are more influential than liberalism and 
human rights activists when it comes to Western European state promotion 
of the international prohibition of torture. 
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4.3. Spain and the UK: How do they prohibit torture and encourage 
others to do the same? 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that some states explicitly disagreed about the sort 
of physical and psychological treatment that can be considered cruel, 
inhuman or degrading, the prohibition of torture is established in both global 
and regional treaties in very clear terms. Countries all around the world have 
domesticated the prohibition in their criminal codes, and in some cases even 
in their constitutions. “No government today would seriously dispute that 
torture is illegal”.351 International bodies have even proclaimed that the 
prohibition of torture is a norm of jus cogens, the highest possible point for an 
international norm. Even though torture is still very much real in too many 
parts of the world, the prohibition of torture is a globally settled norm. 
In light of Order-over-Justice, Western European states would have made use 
of the strongest normative tools in the early years of the norm (P1), adopting 
a more reactive approach later in time (P2). All other conditions remaining 
equal, they would have opposed this norm, and independent bodies’ 
interpretations of it, less vigorously in the most recent past. Considering that 
the travaux préparatoires of the Convention Against Torture lasted about six 
years and those of its Optional Protocol a whole decade, the proposition of 
less resistance in later years would also be visible throughout drafting 
processes. Dubious, sceptical or reluctant states would be more willing to 
express their views openly in early stages of the drafting process. 
This section looks at two case studies within Western Europe, Spain and the 
UK, to explore the way in which they have implemented the prohibition of 
torture at the domestic level and have encouraged others to do so as well. 
The critical interpretation of state practice on torture is subdivided in two 
subsections. First, the section starts with a review of the position expressed 
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by both countries in the drafting process of the Convention Against Torture. 
Doing so will illustrate how these two countries interpreted the prohibition 
of torture in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bearing in mind that the 
prohibition of torture had been established much earlier in the 1948 UDHR 
and in the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. 
And secondly, this section exhibits the main torture-related issues affecting 
Spain and the UK since the mid 1980s. It does so after a careful analysis of the 
periodic reports issued by independent human rights bodies: The UN Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee Against Torture, the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, and the reports of UN Special 
Rapporteurs with torture-related mandates (for the UK, the Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention in 1998; for Spain, the Special Rapporteur on Torture 
in 2004 and the Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights 
in 2008).352 
The analysis intends to examine the most salient problems in both countries, 
and the way the governments interact with international bodies and frame 
the meaning of the prohibition of torture at the internal level. Therefore, the 
study cannot be limited to the reports issued by the human rights bodies: it 
also looks at the governments’ original reports, shadow reports submitted by 
NGOs, government’s responses and, when available, the summary records of 
the meetings with county delegates. 
 
4.3.1. Ratification of relevant treaties and drafting process of the Convention 
Against Torture 
 
Spain ratified the Convention Against Torture in 1987, when it also accepted 
the Committee’s jurisdiction both for interstate complaints and for individual 
complaints. The UK ratified the CAT in 1988. It accepted the jurisdiction of 
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the Committee Against Torture for interstate complaints, a jurisdiction the 
Committee has never used thus far in relation to any country. The UK is the 
only Western European state not to give individuals under its jurisdiction the 
opportunity to appeal to the Committee Against Torture if they consider to be 
victims of a violation of their right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The UK signed and ratified the Optional Protocol to CAT in 2003. Spain 
ratified it in 2006. 20 independent bodies designated by the British 
Government constitute the National Prevention Mechanism in the UK.353 In 
the case of Spain, that responsibility was given to the Ombudsman (Defensor 
del Pueblo).354 
Both countries ratified the European Convention on Prevention of Torture on 
1 February 1989, precisely the day when the treaty entered into force. 
As introduced in section 4.2, the study of the drafting process of the 
Convention Against Torture is particularly challenging because there are no 
summary records of the sessions of the open-ended Working Group, the 
annual reports of this Working Group seldom mention any country by name, 
and many of the proposals tabled and ideas expressed are only knowable 
from the testimony of those actually present in the room during the 
deliberations.355 
Unfortunately, neither Burgers and Danelius nor Nowak and McArthur 
provide much insight about the official position adopted by Spain in the 
drafting process of the Convention. We know, however, that in the second 
session (1979), at the very infancy of its democracy, Spain joined East 
Germany and the USA in suggesting that the then future Convention had to be 
restricted only to torture, leaving other forms of ill-treatment out of scope.356 
However, in 1984, Spanish representatives proposed the application of the 
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principle of non-refoulement (Article 3) and of the doctrine of the tainted fruit 
of the poisonous tree (Article 15) not only to torture, but also to the other 
forms of ill-treatment or punishment. 357  The Spanish delegation later 
withdrew the proposal, and in the end, neither Article 3, nor 14 or 15 were 
included in the clause on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Article 16). In its declaration at the Commission on Human 
Rights in 1984, Spain stated that it “would have preferred a convention that 
was broader in scope”, with an adequate coverage of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and with a binding monitoring mechanism in the hands 
of the Committee Against Torture; “in the spirit of compromise”, however, 
Spain had nevertheless accepted the text as it had come out of the Working 
Group.358 
The record is more detailed in relation to the UK. In 1979, together with the 
USA, the UK insisted that the definition of torture in the Convention had to be 
limited to “systematic” and “intentional” infliction of “extreme pain or 
suffering”. These positions drew from the Northern Ireland case 
controversially resolved by the European Court of Human Rights only one 
year before.359 
As said earlier (4.2.1), the European Commission of Human Rights had 
unanimously established in 1976 that, when combined, the so-called “five 
techniques” (wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep 
and deprivation of food and drink) used by British forces in Northern Ireland 
amounted to torture in violation of Article 3 ECHR. The European Court of 
Human Rights, however, considered that the techniques did not attain the 
level of severity implied in the idea of torture, and ruled that the UK had only 
incurred in cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
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Official documents unveiled in 2013 that the UK did not disclose all the 
relevant information to the European Court of Human Rights. One of those 
documents would be a communication from 1977 between the then Home 
Secretary Merlyn Rees and the Prime Minister James Callaghan, where the 
former explicitly admits that “torture” had been applied as a result of a 
decision taken in 1971 “by ministers – in particular Lord Carrington, then 
secretary of state for defence”.360 Considering that torture is the deliberate 
infliction of severe pain or suffering, we will never know if the European 
Court of Human Rights would have ruled the way it did had it known that the 
application of torture in Northern Ireland had been endorsed by the UK 
Government.  
Going back to the negotiation of the Convention Against Torture, British 
delegates also disagreed about the inclusion of any reference to 
discrimination among the grounds on which ill-treatment could equate to 
torture. The British delegate made the following statement: “The United 
Kingdom shares the concern to eliminate all forms of torture, including any 
motivated by discrimination. The United Kingdom is doubtful of the need to 
isolate this particular motivation and in particular terms the United Kingdom 
thinks that there will in any case be difficulties in doing so with the necessary 
degree of precision for a criminal offence”.361 In 1980, the UK was among the 
Western European states that had reservations about the inclusion of 
universal jurisdiction in the Convention.362 In 1981, the UK still maintained 
that torture was an “aggravated and deliberate” form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.363 In 1982, the UK doubted whether a 
mandatory supervisory mechanism was needed, but by then its delegates had 
already accepted the inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the treaty.364 In 
1983, the UK accepted the mandatory nature of the mechanism for the 
inquiry procedure in relation to those countries where there are reasons to 
                                                 
360 The scandal was aired by the Irish TV in June 2014 with the documentary “The Torture Files”: 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/prime-time-web/2014/0604/  
361 Report of the Working Group on a Draft CAT, 1979, para. 27. 
362 Nowak and McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture, 262-263. 
363 Burgers and Danelius, A Handbook, 73. 
364 Id, 78 and 82. 
 116 
believe that torture is practiced systematically.365 Finally, in its declaration at 
the Commission on Human Rights in 1984, the UK delegate appreciated the 
“necessary flexibility” showed by delegations in order to build consensus, but 
expressed regret for what he considered an insufficiently clear definition of 
the word “torture” in the Convention, which in the British Government’s 
opinion ought to “relate specifically to aggravated forms of maltreatment 
which deliberately caused intense pain and suffering”.366 
This narrative illustrates how, over the drafting process, even if not entirely 
enthusiastic about the final draft, both countries showed an increasing 
willingness to support an inclusive proclamation of the prohibition of torture 
and a more protectionist set of guarantees. This evolution is particularly 
noticeable in the case of the UK. 
 
4.3.2. Implementation of the prohibition of torture: Interaction with 
international human rights bodies  
 
United Kingdom 
The Bill of Rights banned the infliction of “cruel or unusual punishment” in 
1689. However, torture never fully disappeared from the British Isles. And, as 
we have seen in the previous section, historically the UK Government did not 
adopt the most proactive approach in fostering a protectionist interpretation 
of the prohibition of torture in international law. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has examined the UK seven times. The first 
two reviews took place in 1979 and 1985, before the entry into force of the 
Convention Against Torture in 1987, which is the starting point of this 
analysis.367 The Committee Against Torture has examined the UK five times, 
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the first one dating from 1992. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention visited the UK in 1998. The European Committee on the 
Prevention of Torture visited the UK approximately every other year 
between 1990 and 2016, issuing 19 reports.368 
The first report from the Human Rights Committee after the entry into force 
of the Convention Against Torture was issued in 1991. The Committee 
expressed concerns in relation to the measures taken by the British 
Government to counter terrorism in Northern Ireland, in particular 
considering the risk posed by extended detention during the state of 
emergency, detention that could last up to seven days without access to court. 
The Government assured the Human Rights Committee that evidence 
obtained under duress was not admissible in court. However, the Committee 
would question the state about it based on NGO reports that would suggest 
otherwise. The Committee also criticised the non-prohibition of corporal 
punishment in privately funded schools.369 Corporal punishments in schools 
were only going to be totally outlawed in the UK in 2004.370 
In 1992, the Committee Against Torture expressed concerns about 
incommunicado detention in cases of terrorism. The Committee relied on 
NGO sources to point out the alleged reliance on confessions in convictions 
for terrorism-related activities in Northern Ireland. Knowing that the UK had 
advocated a restrictive interpretation of the international notion of torture in 
relation to other forms of ill-treatment, the Committee also wanted to make 
sure that the UK defined “torture” in domestic law in accordance with the 
Convention. 371  To this the Government responded that the domestic 
definition of torture “was very close in substance and form to” the one of the 
Convention. This issue would come up regularly in the dialogue between the 
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Committee and the state in the following years. Relying expressly on NGO 
information, the Committee expressed concerns about the alleged lack of 
accountability for police and military abuse in Northern Ireland: “The 
implementation of the Convention in Northern Ireland was far from 
satisfactory”. It also recalled the rule of non-refoulement, which the 
Government assured to respect. This would also be another recurrent topic 
in the interaction between the Committee and country delegates for the 
following quarter of a century.372 
When asked by the Committee to consider accepting its jurisdiction on 
individual complaints (via Article 22), the UK has regularly responded 
making reference to the two European mechanisms it is already bound by: 
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture. In the Government’s view, accepting the jurisdiction of 
the Committee Against Torture on individual complaints would not add 
anything important to the implementation of the prohibition of torture 
within the UK. 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture travelled to the UK 
for the first time in 1990, visiting five prisons and five police stations. The 
Committee did not find any evidence of torture, but concluded that the 
“cumulative effect of overcrowding, lack of integral sanitation and inadequate 
regimes amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment”. 373  The UK 
Government disagreed strongly with this appraisal and issued two reports 
(in 1991 and 1993) in response to the views of the European Committee. In 
its second visit, of 1993, the Committee visited Northern Ireland, where it did 
not hear allegations of torture and “hardly any allegations of other forms of 
ill-treatment”.374 Yet, it made some recommendations that, broadly speaking, 
were going to be shared by other human rights bodies in subsequent reviews. 
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In 1995, the UN Human Rights Committee repeated concerns about detention 
conditions in Northern Ireland, the lack of independent investigation in case 
of police or military abuse, the use of excessive force in the deportation of 
immigrants and asylum-seekers, and the admissibility of corporal 
punishments in private schools.375  
In its report to the Human Rights Committee, the Government detailed the 
measures adopted in relation to torture.376 Among other issues, it included 
information about the way in which the Government had implemented the 
recommendations of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. 
The Government also spoke about the Independent Commission for Police 
Complaints for Northern Ireland, the training received by police and prison 
officers, or the fact that confessions obtained from torture were inadmissible 
in court. It assured the Committee that crimes and abuses committed by 
army officers in Northern Ireland were not left unpunished, but argued that 
terrorism posed a threat that required the adoption of exceptional measures, 
for example in relation to police detention. In relation to corporal 
punishment in private/independent schools, the Government defended its 
position by reference to a recent decision by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which had ruled that on this particular issue the UK was not in breach 
of Article 3 ECHR, which prohibits torture and other forms of ill-treatment.377  
Also in 1995, the UN Committee Against Torture welcomed the establishment 
of the Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland, 
but expressed concerns for the nearly permanent state of emergency and the 
“practice of vigorous interrogation”. It also criticised the forcible returns or 
deportations that in some circumstances may put the non-refoulement at 
jeopardy. Corporal punishment in schools was also mentioned in the report. 
So was the general concern about the way in which torture was defined in 
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domestic legislation.378 In its interaction with Government officials, the 
Committee rapporteur “said that he had never seen such a long report [from 
a state], just as he had never received so much NGO material”.379 Such 
meticulous information contributed to a very thorough conversation about 
the challenges facing the UK in relation to torture. Committee members 
echoed NGO reports about lack of investigation of alleged cases of ill-
treatment by the police in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. The UK argued 
that, in spite of the temporary cease-fire, it was not possible to put an end to 
the exceptional legislation in Northern Ireland until a peace agreement had 
been reached. Nonetheless, the Government assured the Committee to be re-
examining the situation constantly and willing to consider lifting some of the 
exceptions by 1996.380 
In the third reporting period, of 1998, the Committee Against Torture praised 
the UK for the enactment of the Human Rights Act and for the peace 
agreement in Northern Ireland. It repeated concerns about the definition of 
torture in internal law, the infringement of the non-refoulement, living 
conditions in prisons and refugee/migrant detention centres,381 the injuries 
caused by rubber bullets used by police, and the need to reassure that 
evidence obtained as a result of torture in Northern Ireland was never 
admissible at court. Since the exam coincided with the indictment of General 
Pinochet by a Spanish judge, the Committee recommended the UK to either 
prosecute Pinochet or extradite him to Spain.382 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited several detention 
centres for migrants and refugees in the UK in September 1998, and made its 
report public less than three months later. The Working Group appreciated 
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the full cooperation of British authorities and assured to have been able to 
carry out its work without limitations. The Working Group lamented the 
common policy of detaining asylum seekers and refugees, with no time limit 
and without judicial oversight, and regardless of whether they could be 
deported to their home country, for example, due to the inexistence of 
extradition treaties or the impossibility to determine their nationality. That 
said, the Working Group wrote in its report that it had the “distinct 
impression” that the New Labour Government, “on the one hand, wishes to 
help genuine asylum seekers by making it easier for them to seek entry into 
the United Kingdom, but, on the other hand, seeks to make the legal regime 
tighter for those who set out to seek asylum on unfounded grounds. The 
Government is seeking to make the law sufficiently accessible and precise in 
order to avoid all risk of arbitrary detention”.383 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture visited Northern 
Ireland in 1999. It observed that the detention conditions were just as bad as 
in 1993, when it had visited Northern Ireland for the last time. The European 
Committee advocated the immediate closure of that centre, and the UK 
Government complied with the recommendation in a matter of days.384  
In the Concluding Observations of 2001, adopted only weeks after 9/11, the 
UN Human Rights Committee warned about the risks of restricting human 
rights in the fight against terrorism. The Committee also expressed concerns 
about the way in which asylum-seeker dispersal policies may negatively 
affect their physical security. In relation to Northern Ireland, the Human 
Rights Committee criticised the delays in the investigation of murders, 
incidents about religious hatred and issues related to fair trial, but not 
torture per se.385 
The UK issued a response to the Human Rights Committee, saying that 
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Islamist terrorism had created a public emergency that required exceptional 
measures regarding human rights: “We believe that there is a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation”. The prohibition of torture is 
absolute and is not among the rights that can be suspended in exceptional 
circumstances (Article 4). However, the tone set by that sentence was 
followed by another paragraph related to the expulsion of suspected 
terrorists, where the Government mysteriously said that, even though the 
principle of non-refoulement stood firm, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 sought a balance “between the interests of the individual 
suspected terrorist and the general community”.386 
This Act permitted the detention of foreign nationals who were suspected of 
being involved in international terrorism, and who were believed to present 
a risk to national security, but could not be expelled from the UK. Insofar as 
this form of detention could clash with foreigners’ right to liberty and 
security, the UK made a reservation to Article 5 ECHR. This reservation lasted 
until 2005, because in December 2004 the House of Lords declared the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act incompatible with the human rights 
obligations of the UK.387 
Yet, while the exception was in force, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture visited the UK twice (in 2002 and 2004) precisely to 
monitor the application of that Act and its impact on the rights of suspected 
terrorists. In 2002, the European Committee did not hear any allegation of 
physical ill-treatment by police, and only one in relation to prison officers.388 
However, when visiting the venues two years later, the Committee concluded 
that the detention conditions had seriously damaged the mental health of the 
detainees, and in some cases even their physical well-being, based on what it 
resolved that their situation “could be considered as amounting to inhuman 
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and degrading treatment”.389 
The fourth report from the UN Committee Against Torture came out in 2004. 
The Committee welcomed the “responsiveness” of the UK to some of the 
recommendations made by the Committee before, such as the closure of 
certain problematic prison facilities or the cease of use of baton rounds by 
army and police in Northern Ireland. The decision of the House of Lords in 
the Pinochet case was also well received. 390  The Committee also 
congratulated the UK Government for the extension of independent police 
complaint commissions to other parts of the UK beyond Northern Ireland. 
However, it still insisted on old concerns: the need to make sure that 
evidence obtained from torture is inadmissible at court, and the need to 
adapt the domestic definition of torture to international human rights 
standards. The Committee also disagreed with the Government’s restrictive 
interpretation of the extraterritorial application of the Convention to 
territories where UK forces hold effective control de facto. The Committee 
also called on the state not to rely on “diplomatic assurances” in cases of 
deportation to countries where supposed terrorists may be subjected to 
torture.391 
During the discussion with the Committee, the state delegation argued that 
no other European country had accepted as many asylum seekers as the UK 
in previous years. Also, the UK had stopped using prisons to hold immigrants 
prior to deportation, using only ad hoc detention centres. A new topic on the 
table was the issue of female genital mutilation, which had not been raised by 
the Committee before. The Government assured the Committee that British 
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were fully aware of the legal implications of 
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the Convention for the conduct of their activities.392 However, in spite of 
these assurances, in 2007 the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights received evidence that indicated that British forces in Iraq had made 
used of practices that had been outlawed in compliance with the Ireland v. UK 
1978 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, such as hooding and 
stress positioning.393 
The UK delegation did not avoid the criticism from the perspective of non-
refoulement, but justified its reliance on diplomatic assurances as follows: 
“The United Kingdom was concerned to abide by its international 
obligations and its policy was not to return any person to another 
State where there were substantial grounds for believing that they 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, or to return anyone 
to a country where there was a real risk that the death penalty would 
be applied. However, if the United Kingdom Government considered 
that securing assurances from another State would enable it to 
remove a person in a manner consistent with its international 
obligations, it believed it was worth trying to do so. It was clearly a 
difficult area but, properly handled, such assurances could make it 
possible for justice to take its course while fully complying with 
human rights obligations. Clearly, the nature of any assurances and 
the level at which they were provided -usually ambassadorial or 
ministerial level- must be sufficient to satisfy both the Government 
and the courts.”394 
In 2005 and 2006, together with other countries, the UK Government tried to 
open up a discussion within the Council of Europe on the development of 
guidelines about the admissibility of diplomatic assurances on cases dealing 
with terrorism. After strong criticism from NGOs and human rights bodies, 
the initiative was dropped before it bore any fruit.395 
Prior to the 2008 review, the Human Rights Committee received a relatively 
high number of shadow reports (22) from national civil society organisations, 
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international NGOs, and national human rights institutions (the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission and the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission), which informed the conversation between the Committee and 
the UK delegation. 
During that conversation, the UK explained the position defended at the 
Saadi v. Italy case (2008), ruled by the European Court. The UK had 
intervened in support of Italy arguing “that account must be taken not only of 
the possible risks to the persons threatened with expulsion but also, to a 
certain extent, of the risks that those same persons posed to others. It had 
also requested that, in view of the gravity of the cases in question, a higher 
level of proof should be required to attest the risks to which such persons 
were exposed”.396 Judges in Strasbourg, however, did not agree with the 
UK.397 In relation to the applicability of international human rights law in 
armed conflict, the UK delegation also explained the Government’s official 
position that the ICCPR “could only have effect outside the territory of the 
United Kingdom in very exceptional circumstances”. In relation to CIA 
rendition flights in the context of the War on Terror, the UK formally 
“condemned any practice of extraordinary rendition leading to torture and 
never used torture for any purpose”; however, “as it was not possible to 
check every flight, an intelligence-led approach should be used”.398 
The report of the Human Rights Committee was very much focused on the 
challenges posed to human rights by the fight against terrorism. First, the 
Committee criticised the UK’s reluctance to apply “appropriate safeguards” to 
avoid returning suspect terrorists to countries were they may not be free of 
torture, relying excessively on diplomatic assurances. Secondly, it denounced 
allegations that the UK was allowing transit through British Indian Ocean 
Territory (Chagos Archipelago) for CIA rendition flights. And thirdly, it 
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criticised the Government’s position that the protection of the ICCPR does not 
apply in relation to suspects in custody by the British armed forces in 
detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan.399 
In 2013, its latest session thus far, the Committee Against Torture received 
22 shadow reports from NGOs and national human rights institutions. The 
Committee congratulated the House of Lords, in its old judicial capacity, for 
making explicit the prohibition of use of evidence obtained from torture, 
although the Committee made clear that the burden of proof in these cases 
must lie on the state, and not on the alleged victim. It disagreed one more 
time with the UK’s interpretation of the extraterritorial applicability of the 
Convention, and called “on the state party to publicly acknowledge that the 
Convention applies to all individuals who are subject to the State party’s 
jurisdiction or control”, and recommended the state to carry out inquiries 
into allegations of torture overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan. It reiterated 
issues raised in previous sessions, such as the definition of torture in 
domestic law, the overreliance on diplomatic assurances, or the living 
conditions in migrant detention centres.400 It also added new ones to the 
discussion, related to the necessary inquiries of past abuses of children 
committed in residential institutions, the need to raise the age of criminal 
responsibility, and the need to control the use of Taser electric guns.401 
The situation of children in residential institutions and their criminal 
responsibilities had been raised at least by five NGOs in their respective 
shadow reports, and by the national human rights institutions of Scotland 
and England/Wales. Also, in 2008, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture had recommended the UK to ensure that 17-year-olds 
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detained by the police are treated as juveniles, not as adults.402  
The Committee had asked about the measures taken to tackle violence 
against women, an issue brought up by NGO shadow reports. However, after 
receiving the Government’s response,403 the Committee did not make any 
recommendation in this regard. One Committee member recommended the 
state to lodge an interstate complaint against the USA in relation to the case 
of a British citizen held in Guantánamo since 2002. The country delegation 
responded that “it was the Government’s position that intense bilateral 
engagement with the Government of the United States of America remained 
the most effective way of securing his release and return from 
Guantanamo”.404 It is important to recall that no country has ever lodged an 
interstate complaint to the Committee Against Torture.  
In the latest session, in 2015, the Human Rights Committee received shadow 
reports from 26 NGOs and from the national human rights institutions in 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and England/Wales. The Committee expressed 
concern about the lack of accountability for conflict-related violations of 
human rights in the past in Northern Ireland, including “police misconduct”. 
It also called for strong accountability mechanisms for the violations 
committed by British military beyond British borders. The Committee also 
admitted to be worried about self-inflicted deaths and injuries by detainees 
in custody. It repeated concerns about the accordance between the definition 
of torture in international law with that in domestic law, about the lack of 
adequate prohibition of corporal punishments at home,405 the excessive 
reliance on diplomatic assurances in case of extradition, and allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment in immigration detention facilities. There were two 
novelties related to women’s rights on this occasion: The Committee framed 
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both the restriction of access to safe abortion services in Northern Ireland 
and the state responsibility in addressing violence against women as issues 
related to the prevention of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.406 The 
issue of abortion in Northern Ireland was raised by two NGOs in their 
shadow reports: Amnesty International and the Committee on the 
Administration of Justice. The connection between Article 7 (on torture and 
ill-treatment) and violence against women is explicit in three shadow reports: 
The Human Rights Consortium of Scotland, and the national human rights 
institutions of Northern Ireland and England/Wales. 
The UK Government accepted the interpretation of the European Court of 
Human Rights about the extraterritorial application of international human 
rights standards, although in relation to the ICCPR it still maintained that the 
obligations are “primarily territorial”, in the sense that in principle they were 
in force mainly within the borders of the internationally recognised United 
Kingdom. However, the Government did not accept the idea that British 
military presence abroad automatically generates a situation of effective 
control over a foreign territory, and that is the reason why it refused to 
accept that the ICCPR may be applicable to British forces around the 
world.407 Arguing in front of the European Court of Human Rights, the UK 
maintained the same position in relation to the applicability of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.408 Highly questionable from a legal viewpoint, 
the UK Government announced in late 2016 its intention to derogate the 
Convention to avoid its extraterritorial application to armed forces.409 
Only a few days after the discussion with the country delegates, the Human 
Rights Committee received a communication from the British Ministry of 
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Justice with further details. In relation to the regulation of abortion in 
Northern Ireland, the UK Government engaged in the discussion, stating that 
“the Northern Ireland Department of Justice will continue to consider the 
issue of abortion in the case of sexual crime, but as noted any change to the 
law on abortion in Northern Ireland will require cross party consent in the 
Assembly”.410 
Spain 
The UN Human Rights Committee has examined Spain six times, but the first 
two took place in 1979 and 1985, before the entry into force of the 
Convention Against Torture. The Committee Against Torture has also 
examined Spain six times, the first one dating from 1990 and the latest one, 
from 2015. The Special Rapporteur on Torture issued its report on Spain in 
2004, and the Special Rapporteur on Counter-terrorism and Human Rights 
did so in 2008. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
visited Spain 16 times between 1991 and 2016.411 
The Committee Against Torture reported on Spain for the first time in 1990. 
The Committee found the state’s report too focused on the legal regime, and 
requested the Spanish delegation to share information about the challenges 
in the implementation of the Convention at the domestic level. Committee 
members also wanted to know more about incommunicado detention, other 
restrictions in the context of counter-terrorism, compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement, regulation of universal jurisdiction and 
extradition in case of torture, and also how was torture defined in internal 
criminal law and how many prosecutions had been pursued.412 In general, 
these issues would come up time and again the following reporting years. 
In 1991, the Human Rights Committee delivered its third periodic report on 
Spain. This was the first one since the entry into force of the CAT. Members of 
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412 Committee Against Torture, Report to the General Assembly, Supplement No. 44, UN doc: 
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the Committee expressed a particular interest on the regulation of the state 
of emergency, and the special detention regime for people suspected of 
terrorism, mostly the Basque group ETA (active until 2011) and a much 
smaller far-left organisation called GRAPO (until late 1990s-early 2000s). 
They also asked about incommunicado detention and whether there had 
been any prosecutions for officers accused of torture.413 
The Committee Against Torture examined Spain again in 1993. This 
Committee was worried by the apparent inconsistency between the 
Convention and the way in which torture was defined in Spanish law. It also 
echoed NGO reports of cases where detainees had been subjected to torture 
in police stations during questioning. The Committee also regretted the use of 
incommunicado detention for suspects of terrorism, and the extension of 
official pardons to police officers convicted of torture and ill-treatment. In its 
interaction with the state delegation, the Committee said to be disappointed 
by the lack of detail and clarity of the written and oral report submitted by 
the Government.414 
The Spanish Government only agreed to the publication of the findings of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in 1996, after this body 
had visited the country three times, in 1991 and twice in 1994. In its first 
visit, the European Committee heard a number of allegations of torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment, mostly from people accused of crimes related to 
terrorism. Concerns would remain in the two subsequent visits. The 
Committee refused to give credit to the Government’s dismissal of these 
allegations as some sort of smokescreen, and demanded effective action from 
the state.415 Torture in the context of counter-terrorism would be a persistent 
concern for the European Committee. 
                                                 
413 Human Rights Committee, Report to the General Assembly, Supplement No. 40, UN doc: 
A/46/40, 1991, para. 142-185, particularly para. 150-152 and 158-161. 
414 Committee Against Torture, Report to the General Assembly, Supplement No. 44, UN doc: 
A/48/44, 1993, para. 430-458. 
415 ECPT, Reports to Spain (1-12 April 1991, para. 18 and 25) (10-22 April 1994, para. 16) (10-14 
June 1994, para. 5), Coe doc: CPT/Inf (96) 9, 5 March 1996. According to the Secretariat of ECPT, 
the response of the Spanish Government to the first report was never made public (email received 
on 24 September 2015). 
 131 
“Numerous reports” of ill-treatment and even torture inflicted on people 
suspected of terrorism were the first reason of concern for the UN Human 
Rights Committee in 1996. The Committee also lamented “that investigations 
are not always systematically carried out by the public authorities and that 
when members of the security forces are found guilty of such acts and 
sentenced to deprivation of liberty, they are often pardoned or released early, 
or simply do not serve the sentence. Moreover, those who perpetrate such 
deeds are seldom suspended from their functions for any length of time”. 
Furthermore, “proofs obtained under duress are not systematically rejected 
by courts”. The Committee also expressed concern about incommunicado 
detention for terrorist suspects, who did not have access to a lawyer of their 
choice.416 
The Committee devoted a lot of attention to torture in their interaction with 
the Spanish delegation. Some members requested the Spanish delegation to 
provide more information about the way in which Spain intended to 
implement the recommendations of the Committee Against Torture and the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The Spanish 
representatives responded by saying that “propaganda was the weapon of 
choice of terrorists”, although they also admitted that not all torture reports 
could be false, giving some credit to the findings of the European Committee. 
Spain also defended the use of pardons as a governmental prerogative, and 
assured that they “were not granted systematically in cases of mistreatment 
or torture of prisoners”.417 
In 1997, the Committee Against Torture congratulated Spain for the way in 
which it had defined torture in Article 174 of the Criminal Code of 1995. In 
the Committee’s view, the new definition provided “citizens with greater 
protection” than the Convention itself. On the negative side, nonetheless, the 
Committee denounced the lengthy and ineffective investigations in torture-
                                                 
416 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Spain, UN doc: CCPR/C/79/Add.61, 3 
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related cases, the indulgence with which judges treated officers accused of 
having committed torture, the reports of racial discrimination, and the 
admission of evidence obtained under duress or torture, if not for self-
incrimination, at least for the incrimination of co-defendants.418 In the 
dialogue with the state representatives, some Committee members expressed 
concerns about reported cases of breach of the principle of non-refoulement 
with questionable deportations of immigrants to Morocco. The state 
delegation warned the Committee that it should not believe ETA detainees: 
“It was routine for such persons to allege ill-treatment, and […] at no stage in 
their detention had they been ill-treated”.419 
In 2001, after its seventh visit to the country, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture remained disappointed because the Spanish 
Government had not delivered on the promises made to implement some of 
its previous recommendations, particularly regarding incommunicado 
detention.420 In its response, however, the Spanish Government maintained 
that it believed the legal safeguards already in place were sufficient to comply 
not only with the fundamental rights recognised in the Constitution, but also 
with Spain’s international human rights obligations.421 
The UN Committee Against Torture reviewed Spain again in 2002. The 
Committee noted the obvious disagreement between the concerns expressed 
by numerous human rights bodies and the state’s assertion that torture and 
ill-treatment do not occur in Spain, “isolated cases apart”. 422  It also 
denounced xenophobic and racist attacks against migrants, and 
recommended a change in the criminal legislation to include discrimination 
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as one of the protected grounds. The Committee also pointed out delays and 
failures in investigations of torture, excessive force in the expulsion of 
migrants, particularly minors, and severe living conditions in prisons.423 One 
more time, the Committee made the point that “regardless of the legal 
safeguards for its application, (incommunicado detention) facilitates the 
commission of acts of torture and ill-treatment”, and it recommended, the 
video and audio recording of police interrogations, as well as joint 
examinations by a forensic physician and a physician chosen by the detainee 
held incommunicado.424 As it had done before, the Spanish delegation 
warned the Committee that terrorists systematically lie about being victims 
of torture, arguing that by doing so they spark an international public 
reaction in favour of their cause; in the Government’s opinion, terrorists’ only 
intention would be to justify their terrorist acts by defaming Spanish police 
forces.425 
In October 2003, the then UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo van Boven, 
visited Spain. The Special Rapporteur examined issues related to the legal 
framework and existing safeguards for the protection of detainees, paid 
attention to reports about the occurrence and extent of torture, and 
scrutinised the investigation and punishment of acts of torture, mostly but 
not only against ETA members. 426  This report received an unusually 
aggressive reaction from the Spanish Government. The introductory 
paragraph gives a good sense of the tone of the 81-page response: In the 
opinion of the Spanish Government, van Boven’s report “contains so many 
major factual errors that the conclusions drawn by the Special Rapporteur 
are seriously undermined, with the result that the report is virtually 
unacceptable in its entirety, being unfounded and lacking in rigour, substance 
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and method”.427 In an unprecedented way, the Spanish delegation left the 
meeting room while van Boven was presenting his conclusions at the 59th 
session of the Commission on Human Rights. Van Boven later said not to have 
recollections of any other government reacting “as strongly” as the Spanish 
one did with his report.428 
The fifth report of the Human Rights Committee came out in 2008, 12 years 
after the previous one. This was due to a considerable delay of about seven 
years in the state’s submission. The conservative government (PP) had had a 
bad experience with the Special Rapporteur on Torture, but in March 2004, 
the social-democratic party (PSOE) won the national elections and got back 
to power after eight years in opposition. However, it took the new 
government three more years to submit its report to the attention of the 
Human Rights Committee, even though by 2004 it was four years late already.  
In the meantime, in 2005 and 2007, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture had delivered two disturbing reports with serious 
allegations of ill-treatment against foreigners in Melilla, unaccompanied 
minors in Canary Islands and people held incommunicado in application of 
the anti-terrorist law.429 
In its 2008 report, the Human Rights Committee reiterated the need to put a 
definitive end to incommunicado detention (up to 13 days), which the 
Committee considers incompatible with the absolute prohibition of torture. It 
also made other recommendations to prevent torture in detention centres. 
For the first time, the Committee made specific recommendations regarding 
Franco-era dictatorship: it proposed repealing the 1977 Amnesty Law, not 
applying statutes of limitations for crimes against humanity, and setting up a 
commission to establish the “historical truth” about the crimes committed 
during the 1936-1939 civil war and the 1939-1975 dictatorship. For the first 
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time, the Committee made specific recommendations for the state to adopt 
effective measures to prevent violence against women. 430  In their 
communications, at least two NGOs made the connection between Article 7 
ICCPR, which prohibits torture and ill-treatment, and the crimes against 
humanity committed during Franco’s time. Amnesty International did so in 
relation to violence against women. Most of the 16 NGO shadow reports dealt 
with Article 7 ICCPR. Several NGOs also raised the issue of xenophobia and 
racism, illegal repatriations and police treatment of migrants at the border 
with Morocco, in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
The Spanish Government particularly disliked the recommendation to scrap 
the Amnesty Law and to ensure accountability for past crimes. It regretted 
the inclusion of these issues in the report, because in the Government’s 
opinion, they are not grounded in any provision of the ICCPR. Furthermore, 
the Spanish Government defended the 1977 Amnesty Law as a key 
contribution to the transition to democracy in Spain: “Not only Spanish 
society, but also public opinion worldwide knows about and has always 
supported the transition process in Spain, which was made possible in part 
by this law”.431 
In 2008, Spain was visited by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism, Martin Scheinin. The Special Rapporteur expressed concerns 
about the restrictions to freedom of expression and association, the broad 
definition of “terrorism” in criminal law and in the law regulating political 
parties, and the allegations of commission of torture in counter-terrorism 
activities.432 The 41-page response written by the Spanish Government was a 
straight rejection of most if not all the points made by the Special Rapporteur. 
The Government started by saying that, in the European context, Spain had “a 
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very specific situation” when it comes to terrorism, due to the existence of an 
internal threat (ETA) as well as an external one (Madrid bombings of 11 
March 2004). In spite of numerous reports that said otherwise, the Spanish 
Government assured that “Spain has never adopted special legislation to fight 
against terrorism”. The Spanish Government also criticised the Special 
Rapporteur for relying too much on “non-corroborated” reports by NGOs and 
groups that advocate the independence of the Basque Country. The 
Government claimed that ETA terrorist suspects systematically denounce 
being victims of torture, which in the Government’s opinion would make 
their allegations unreliable. Furthermore, Spain explicitly challenged the 
Special Rapporteur’s view, also shared by other human rights bodies, that 
incommunicado detention per se infringes the right to be free from torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment.433 
In 2009, the Committee Against Torture welcomed the modification of Article 
174 of the Criminal Code to include discrimination as one of the grounds for 
torture, but made new recommendations to align that particular provision to 
Article 1 CAT. It also required a higher penalty for people convicted for the 
commission of torture.434 The Committee also called on the state to ensure 
that evidence obtained from the practice of torture is never admissible at 
court. It required the abolition of incommunicado detention, and warned 
about reliance on diplomatic assurances. On this, based on Article 3 CAT, the 
Committee made clear that “under no circumstances must diplomatic 
guarantees be used as a safeguard against torture or ill-treatment where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment upon return”. The Committee 
was particularly concerned about reports that suggested that minors 
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returned to Morocco had suffered ill treatment by police. The Committee 
wanted to know more from the state about the use of Spanish airports in the 
extraordinary rendition flights of the CIA. It also recommended not applying 
statutes of limitations and the 1977 Amnesty Law to the crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed during Franco-era dictatorship, and it warned 
about the proposed restriction of universal jurisdiction in Spain and its likely 
impact on the prosecution of torture. Finally, the Committee raised more 
concerns about detention conditions, human trafficking, violence against 
women, racial violence, and the use of Taser electric guns.435 
14 shadow reports were submitted to the consideration of the Committee 
Against Torture, including one from the Ombudsman as the national human 
rights institution. Several reports addressed the issue of torture and counter-
terrorism. As it had done with the Human Rights Committee only one year 
earlier, Amnesty International made the explicit link between the prohibition 
of torture and violence against women. At least one Committee member 
raised this issue in front of the state delegates making a reference to Amnesty 
International’s shadow report.436 The International Commission of Jurists 
joined Amnesty International in bringing both the role of Spain in the CIA 
rendition flights and the restrictions to universal jurisdiction to the attention 
of the Committee. Accountability for gross violations of human rights 
committed in Franco’s dictatorship was demanded by Amnesty International 
and one national NGO. 
The latest report by the Committee Against Torture was published in 2015 
and reiterated most of the issues covered in the previous report of 2009: 
domestic definition and adequate criminalisation of torture, incommunicado 
detention, non-applicability of statutes of limitations to torture and of the 
1977 Amnesty Law to crimes against humanity, reliance on diplomatic 
assurances in case of deportation, restrictions to universal jurisdiction, and 
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violence against women.437 In line with some of the concerns raised by the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture in 2011, 2014 and 
2016,438 the Committee also singled out the human rights of migrants: the 
summary forced return of migrants in Ceuta and Melilla (known as “hot 
expulsion” in Spain), the excessive use of force by border police, or the living 
conditions in migrant detention centres.439 The human rights situation of 
migrants was particularly present at least in three of the nine shadow reports, 
two from national groups and the one submitted by Amnesty International. 
As in previous sessions, Article 7 ICCPR was particularly prominent in the 
latest review of Spain by the Human Rights Committee. Violence against 
women was again an issue. This time, however, the Committee also 
expressed concerns in relation to a bill that intended to restrict access to safe 
abortion for teenager women and women with disabilities.440 The Committee 
also reprimanded the state for the excessive force by police in handling 
peaceful anti-austerity demonstrations, and for the application of official 
pardons to officers who had been found guilty of torture or ill-treatment. For 
the first time, the Human Rights Committee also condemned the reported 
living conditions in detention centres for migrants. Once again, the 
Committee called for the elimination of incommunicado detention, 
particularly considering that ETA declared a permanent ceasefire in 2011, 
and regretted the lack of investigation of allegations of torture, which had led 
to convictions by the European Court of Human Rights.441 The Committee 
expressed worries about Spain’s regular practice of conducting collective 
expulsions of migrants to Morocco, with excessive use of force in some cases, 
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and breaches of the principle of non-refoulement. It reiterated the concerns 
about the need for truth, justice and reparations for victims of human rights 
abuses during Franco’s dictatorship.442 The new issues included in the 
Committee’s report had been brought to its attention by some NGOs, 
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. As in 2008, the 
Spanish delegation openly disagreed with the Committee with regard to the 
compatibility of the 1977 Amnesty Law and Spain’s international human 
rights obligations.443 
In 2016, Spain provided extensive responses to several of the points raised 
by both the Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee 
one year before. In particular, in relation to incommunicado detention, Spain 
informed that, since ETA had stopped acting, the Government had proposed 
and the Parliament had adopted legal changes to restrict the application of 
incommunicado detention; none of the 172 terrorism-related detainees (28 
linked to ETA, 94 to Jihadism, and 50 to others) had been held in 




The prohibition of torture is a globally settled norm in the international 
human rights regime. Human rights bodies have even established that it has 
reached the point of being a peremptory norm, that is, a norm whose 
applicability does not depend upon states’ consent anymore. Yet, despite 
international law and existing international and national monitoring 
mechanisms, torture is still a more or less regular practice in too many places. 
Even countries with a rather poor human rights record supported the idea of 
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an international treaty against torture in the 1970s. Spain was among the 
ones that endorsed the earliest General Assembly resolutions, even though 
institutional support for democracy and fundamental rights was still far from 
strong. 
During the drafting process of the Convention Against Torture, some Western 
European states, the UK among them, attempted to restrict the meaning of 
the prohibition of torture by excluding cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or by setting limits to the implementation of the norm. However, 
country delegates showed willingness to compromise in their positions and 
eventually all Western European states subscribed to the standards as set out 
in the Convention. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Western Europe did 
not set obstacles to the adoption of the Optional Protocol to CAT, because 
after all this Protocol essentially replicated a monitoring mechanism that had 
been functioning in Europe since 1990. As confirmed by witnesses, European 
states forged “new, firm and surprising” alliances with NGOs and with 
countries in other regions, which created “a snowball effect” that made the 
Optional Protocol look inevitable after ten years of awkward 
conversations.445 
These observations would confirm the propositions P1 and P2, according to 
which support for a human rights norm at a discursive level does not require 
a profound conviction from government officials or a high level of acceptance 
or internalisation of the norm. Dubious or sceptical countries would be more 
willing to express their views openly in early stages of the drafting process, 
but over time would go along with the flow and adapt to the birth and 
development of the norm. Drafting processes, as long and bureaucratic as 
they can sometimes be (as in the case of the Optional Protocol to CAT), can 
provide the necessary space to smooth out state resistance to human rights 
norms. 
Finding its roots in Enlightenment, the prohibition of torture resonates 
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clearly with liberal principles that define the self-perception of Western 
Europe, which partly explains their willingness to endorse the norm at the 
international level (P5). 
It is reasonable to expect more support for norms advocated by resourceful 
groups and advocates (P6), and existing literature shows that the prohibition 
of torture has also received a considerable support from them. Amnesty 
International launched its first global campaign on torture in the early 1970s, 
and together with other NGOs and with influential legal scholars and 
practitioners, they lobbied government officials during the drafting processes 
of the relevant treaties. The case studies of Spain and the UK show that 
independent human rights bodies at the UN and the Council of Europe 
influence each other in framing an increasing number of grievances as issues 
connected to the prohibition of torture. There is also a strong link between 
the concerns and recommendations of the Committees and the issues 
denounced in NGOs’ shadow reports, particularly from well-known and 
respected human rights groups. 
Certain issues have regularly appeared in reports and conclusions of UN and 
European bodies. It is certainly the case of torture in the context of counter-
terrorism: in the UK, in relation to Northern Ireland first and then in the 
global War on Terror; for Spain, basically the internal threat posed by ETA. 
Additionally, the conditions of the detention facilities in the UK and 
governmental pardons to officers convicted of torture in Spain are also 
recurrent topics. 
However, the number of issues covered by the general prohibition of torture 
has grown significantly in the last quarter of a century. Fed by NGO reports, 
in recent years independent bodies have also expressed an interest in sexual 
and reproductive rights (in Northern Ireland and most recently in Spain), 
violence against women and accountability for past crimes (in relation to 
Northern Ireland and Franco’s dictatorship). This practice is likely to 
continue in the future. For example, in the list of issues the Committee 
Against Torture wants to see covered in the next periodic report of the UK, 
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for the first time the Committee has included questions about measures to 
prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of persons with 
disabilities.446 
Generally speaking, both Spain and the UK have accepted the frame 
developed by human rights bodies. However, in some cases, they have also 
openly challenged their interpretation about the meaning and extension of 
the prohibition of torture. We can observe this at least in four instances in 
relation to the UK: The UK does not accept that its domestic definition of the 
prohibition of torture does not match that of the Convention Against Torture; 
the state defends the need to adopt a more flexible approach to legal 
safeguards when it comes to fighting terrorism; the UK strongly resists the 
extraterritorial application of its human rights obligations; and it considers 
that, under certain circumstances, diplomatic assurances may suffice to 
comply with the principle of non-refoulement. Spain has adopted a similar 
approach to that of the UK as regards terrorism and diplomatic assurances. 
Apart from these two issues, Spain has complained about the credit that 
human rights bodies seem to give to certain groups that, in the Government’s 
opinion, play into terrorists’ hands. Also, Spain does not accept the 
incompatibility of its Amnesty Law with international human rights 
standards or the need to investigate the crimes committed during Franco’s 
time. These disagreements have persisted over time, and no significant 
changes were observable when different political parties came to power in 
either country. Changes to anti-terrorism legislation may come, nevertheless, 
from the fact that ETA does no longer pose a threat in Spain. On top of this, 
unlike Spain and all other Western European states, the UK does not accept 
the jurisdiction of the Committee Against Torture on individual complaints 
(Article 22 CAT). In the past, Spain showed a more aggressive tone and 
attitude than the UK in making its disagreement known to UN human rights 
bodies. 
                                                 
446 Committee Against Torture, List of issues prior to submission of the sixth periodic report of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN doc: CAT/C/GBR/QPR/6, 7 June 
2016. 
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The prohibition of torture is formulated in clear and absolute terms in 
international law. Therefore, from the perspective of Order-over-Justice, 
other factors remaining equal, torture would not be a likely candidate to get 
the support of Western European states (P3 and P4). However, the analysis 
shows that, beyond some initial doubts, broadly speaking Western European 
states advocated the global prohibition of torture in absolute terms. In 
principle, this would contradict the propositions that countries would be 
more willing to back blurrier and less onerous human rights norms. However, 
the case studies of Spain and the UK show that, in certain circumstances, 
governments would not shy away from defying independent bodies, with 
rather hostile and undiplomatic language if necessary, as Spain did with the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture in 2004. This could indicate that Spain and the 
UK agreed to promote the prohibition of torture insofar as the prohibition 
was light enough or flexible enough for them to make exceptions in tricky 
areas.  
The prohibition of torture in international human rights law suggests that the 
passing of time (P1 and P2), the compatibility with liberal principles (P5) and 
strong advocacy by resourceful norm entrepreneurs (P6) are key factors in 
explaining Western Europeans’ willingness to raise the profile of a given 
issue as a human rights norm. However, when the interpretation of the norm 
touches upon sensitive areas, such as those related to armed forces, 
terrorism or accountability for serious crimes committed in the past, even 
with a globally settled norm like the prohibition of torture, states may still 
openly resist the burden imposed by human rights bodies. Level of burden 
and clarity (P3 and P4) would therefore be less prominent factors than the 
other four, as long as they do not affect core and strategic policy decisions 




 “God blessed them and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the 
earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and 
over every living creature that moves on the ground’." 
The Bible, Genesis 1:28 
 
The definition of ecocide has never been conclusively settled in legal and 
academic circles. That said, unless specified otherwise, in this thesis ecocide 
is understood as the attempt to treat the deliberate destruction of the natural 
environment as a distinct international crime against peace and security. 
There is a well-established principle in international law by which nations 
must refrain from causing damage to the environment of other nations. 
However, this chapter does not look at interstate responsibility, but at the 
legal and political efforts, mostly between the early 1970s and mid 1990s, to 
frame environmental damage in the language of international criminal law 
and international humanitarian law. 
The chapter begins with the context of the progressive recognition of 
environmental concerns in international law, and specifically in international 
human rights law, and a brief introduction of the idea of ecocide, as initially 
coined in the 1970s (section 5.1). The analysis continues with the application 
to ecocide of the propositions related to the clarity and burden of the norm, 
its effective fit within liberal principles, and the role of norm entrepreneurs 
(section 5.2). In third place, the chapter takes the case studies of the UK and 
Spain to explore the evolution of Western European states’ practice towards 
ecocide by looking at: a) the positions expressed by country delegates during 
the negotiation of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
and the 1998 Statute to the International Criminal Court, b) their interaction 
with the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities and the International Law Commission, in 1978 and early 1990s, 
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and c) state practice regarding criminalisation of ecocide at the domestic 
level (section 5.3).  
 
5.1. How environment met human rights in international law and the 
birth of ecocide 
 
The idea of ecocide was born in the 1970s, the decade when the environment 
entered into the room of international law and international politics.447 The 
principle that states are not allowed to damage each other’s environment had 
been established decades earlier;448 and at least since the beginning of the 
20th century, customary international humanitarian law loosely restricted the 
use of force with no military purpose, and did not permit the destruction of 
private or public property in occupied territories.449 However, the starting 
point of international environmental law is conventionally set in the first 
international conference on environment, held in Stockholm in 1972.  
Some time earlier, the realist George Kennan had made a proposal “to 
prevent a world wasteland”.450 He was calling for a multilateral convention to 
agree on international standards, promote coordination of research and its 
widest possible dissemination, and to set up an international “watchdog” to 
oversee the conservation of global nature. 
Kennan’s proposal was not materialised, but at least in hindsight the time 
seemed ripe for international regulation on environmental issues. Among 
others, the following universal treaties have been adopted since the 1970s: 
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
                                                 
447 Although the roots of the international environmental regime can be traced back to the 19th 
century, the 1970s were a key milestone, “starting from the rise of much international 
nongovernmental association and discourse and leading to interstate treaties and later to 
intergovernmental organization” driven by compelling scientific research on environmental issues 
(John Meyer et al, The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870–1990, International 
Organization, 51:4, 1997, 623). 
448 Dixon and McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law, 466-467. 
449 UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of 
International Law (Nairobi: UNEP, 2009), 19-21. 
450 George Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland, Foreign Affairs, 48:3 (1970), 401. 
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Fauna and Flora; 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea; 1985 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer; 1992 Convention 
on Biological Diversity; or the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, with its 1998 Kyoto Protocol. 
In international humanitarian law, two novelties are worth emphasising from 
the first decade of global environmental awareness: the 1976 Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environment 
Modification Techniques (Environmental Modification Convention or 
ENMOD), and Articles 35 and 55 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions, with two specific provisions on environmental protection in 
international armed conflicts. 
In the 1990s, Europe witnessed one case of failure and one of success. On the 
one hand, the Council of Europe adopted the 1993 Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, 
but rather unprecedentedly, no country has ratified this treaty yet, and 
therefore it is not in force.451 On the other hand, the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe pushed forward the 1998 Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters. Its preamble recalls the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration and recognises that “adequate protection of the environment is 
essential to human well-being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, 
including the right to life itself”; the preamble also establishes that “every 
person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health 
and well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with others, 
to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future 
generations”. The Convention entered into force in 2001, and has been 
ratified by 47 Central Asian and European states, including Spain and the 
UK.452 
International environmental law has also evolved outside treaty making. No 
                                                 
451 See list of signatories at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/150/signatures?p_auth=iRfhVgMH  
452 Find the Convention and the list of signatories at: https://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html  
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other ruling represents better the difficult equilibrium between states’ 
interests, on the one hand, and human rights and environmental concerns, on 
the other, than the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996).453 In that case, 
the Court reiterated states’ general obligation to respect each other’s 
environment,454 and called on them to take the environment into account 
when determining what they deem necessary and proportionate use of 
force.455 That said, in an exercise of hermeneutical juggling, the Court 
concluded by a majority of none but with the President’s casting vote that, 
while nuclear weapons “would generally be contrary to the rules” of 
international humanitarian law, “in the view of the current state of 
international law”, the threat or use of nuclear weapons may still be 
admissible “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very 
survival of a State would be at stake”.456 The dissenting judges, however, did 
not share the appraisal of the majority of the Court, stating among other 
things that the use of nuclear weapons would by definition threaten life and 
cause long-term and very severe damage to the environment, and therefore 
these weapons cannot be admissible “in the view of the current state of 
international law”.457 
In the 1980s, but more strongly in the 1990s, the environment started to get 
a foothold in IHRL. The 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
included the collective right of “all peoples” to a “general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development” (Art. 24), and the 1988 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (“Protocol 
of San Salvador”) stated that “everyone shall have the right to live in a 
healthy environment” (Art. 11(1)). 458  However, the appearance of 
                                                 
453 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996. 
454 Id, para. 29. 
455 Id, para. 30. 
456 Id, para. 105. 
457 Find separate opinions at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&p3=4&case=95  
458 There is a stress on the principle of active participation of rights-holders in the protection of the 
environment, most visible in the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
(Art. 6), the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Principle 10), and one of the 
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environmental concerns into the international human rights regime is not so 
much due to states’ desires expressed in international conventions, but due 
to the exegesis by international human rights bodies. Since the 1990s, the 
European Court of Human Rights, the European Committee of Social Rights, 
the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights have extended human rights 
standards on the right to life, health and private and family life to 
environmental concerns.459 At the UN level, since late 1990s and early 2000s 
the former Commission on Human Rights, the successor Human Rights 
Council, and Special Procedures have tried to use human rights standards to 
protect the environment.460 
Considering this hermeneutical bond between environment and human 
rights, only one year after the ICJ Nuclear Weapons case, Judge Weeramantry, 
who had been a dissenting voice in that decision, wrote in his Separate 
Opinion of the Danube Dam case (1997) that “the protection of the 
environment is a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a 
sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the 
right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as damage to 
the environment can impair and undermine all the human rights spoken of in 
the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments”.461 Despite 
these words, however, the place of environmental concerns in IHRL was far 
from guaranteed back then, and remains so to this day. As noted by the UN 
Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment in his first 
                                                                                                                                     
three pillars of the mentioned 1998 Aarhus Convention. 
459 For example, European Court of Human Rights, López Ostra v. Spain, Judgement of 9 
December 1994, Guerra and Others v. Italy, Judgement of 19 February 1998, Taskin and Others v. 
Turkey, Judgement of 10 November 2004; European Committee of Social Rights, Complaint No. 
30/2005, Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece, Decision on the merits of 6 
December 2006; African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, SERAC v. Nigeria, 
Communication No. 155/96, Ruling of 27 May 2002; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits of 27 June 2012. 
460 Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?, European Journal of 
International Law, 23:3 (2012); UNEP, UNEP Compendium on Human Rights and the 
Environment: Selected international legal materials and cases (Nairobi: UNEP, 2013). 
461 Christopher Weeramantry, Separate Opinion, ICJ Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement of 25 September 1997, 92. 
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report, in spite of the growing recognition of environmental rights at the 
constitutional level, starting with Portugal in 1976, “no global agreement sets 
out an explicit right to a healthy (or satisfactory, safe or sustainable) 
environment”, and states have not been short of opportunities to do so in the 
last four decades, if they had wanted to.462 Some time earlier, another 
independent voice appointed by the same Human Rights Council, the Special 
Rapporteur on the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous 
products and wastes, complained about “the lack of attention” paid to his 
mandate, and admitted that country delegates often reacted to his inquiries 
by arguing that “issues of toxic waste management are more appropriately 
discussed in environmental forums than at the Human Rights Council”.463 
In sum, the environment has been a matter of international legal and political 
concern at least since the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Since the 1990s, IHRL 
has taken effect on environmental issues with both material and procedural 
contributions. Materially, independent human rights bodies expanded the 
range of the rights to life, health and private and family life. Procedurally, 
incipient rules and principles call on states to recognise individuals’ access to 
justice and active participation on environmental issues. 
That said, UN human rights databases show that no human rights treaty-body 
or Special Procedure mandate holder, and no Human Rights Council 
resolution has advocated the idea that the deliberate destruction of the 
natural environment ought to be treated as a serious human rights violation, 
comparable to genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.464 In other 
words, ecocide is foreign to contemporary institutional human rights 
                                                 
462 John Knox, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating 
to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, 2012, para. 12-14. 
463 Okechukwu Ibeanu, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the adverse effects of the illicit 
movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human 
rights, 2008, para. 34. 
464 Universal Human Rights Index: http://uhri.ohchr.org/ Human Rights Council resolutions and 
reports: http://right-docs.huritech.org/ UN treaty body case law: http://juris.ohchr.org/ Perhaps less 
unexpectedly due to their more constrained judicial task, ecocide is also absent in case-law from 
regional human rights courts (European Court of Human Rights: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/index.cfm?lang=en; African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: http://caselaw.ihrda.org/).  
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vocabulary. This might appear surprising considering that the idea of ecocide 
was born precisely at the time when the international community started to 
build a collective awareness about the environment. 
The term ecocide was first used in 1970 by Professor Arthur Galston.465 
Months later, who was to become American Ambassador L. Craig Johnstone 
made an argument in Foreign Affairs in favour of US’s ratification of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.466 The 
article used the word ‘ecocide’ in the title, but nowhere did it specify what the 
author meant by it. 
By 1972, however, the term had acquired certain prominence, and in fact the 
Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme put ecocide in the forefront of 
international diplomacy when he said in his inaugural speech of the 
Stockholm Conference: 
”The immense destruction brought about by indiscriminate bombing, 
by large-scale use of bulldozers and herbicides is an outrage 
sometimes described as ecocide, which requires urgent international 
attention. […] It is of paramount importance […] that ecological 
warfare cease immediately”.467 
One year later, Richard Falk made public a draft international convention on 
the crime of ecocide.468 This is how ecocide was born as a potential human 
rights norm, in the broadest sense of the word. As we will see (section 5.2), 
for about two decades, ecocide survived in the corridors of the United 
Nations, being considered by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the International Law 
Commission, until the idea dropped out of the agenda in 1996. And that is 
how ecocide passed away, or nearly passed away, because since 2010, a 
second generation of norm entrepreneurs have been campaigning to 
                                                 
465 From Anja Gauger et al, The Ecocide Project: ‘Ecocide is the missing 5th Crime Against Peace’ 
(London: Human Rights Consortium SAS, 2012), 6. 
466 Craig Johnstone, Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol, Foreign Affairs, 49:4 (1971). 
467 From Tord Björk, The emergence of popular participation in world politics – United Nations 
Conference on Human Environment 1972 (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1996), 19. 
468 Richard Falk, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide: Facts, Appraisal, and Proposals, Security 
Dialogue, 4:1 (1973). 
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resurrect this old idea to address contemporary environmental challenges, 
notably climate change. 
Section 5.2 will explore four of the six propositions of Order-over-Justice to 
explain how Western European states reacted to the proposed norm of 
ecocide (the other two propositions will be examined in section 5.3). 
Although this thesis is about why Western European states promote certain 
norms but not others, and not about how good they are at it (in other words, 
impact), their discourse and (in)action against the norm can explain the 
failure of Ecocide I, and perhaps also shed some light on the possibly murky 
future of its revival, Ecocide II. 
 
5.2. What does Order-over-Justice mean for ecocide? Clarity, burden, 
liberalism and norm entrepreneurs 
 
5.2.1. Was the meaning of ecocide clear? 
 
It was never categorically established if ecocide was to become an 
international crime in its own right, or if the goal was to protect the 
environment in international humanitarian law by treating the deliberate 
destruction of natural environment as a form of war crime. 
The article in which Falk presented his proposal framed the issue within the 
confines of international armed conflict; not in vain, the article had for title 
“Environmental Warfare and Ecocide – Facts, Appraisal, and Proposals”. 
Professor Galston had spoken at a conference on war. Johnstone argued in 
favour of the ratification of a legal treaty to regulate military conduct in 
armed conflict. Palme explicitly referred to ecological warfare. And all this 
was happening, not only at a time of growing environmental awareness in 
Western countries, but also in the context of very controversial use of 
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dangerous and toxic chemicals by the American military in South East Asia.469  
However, Falk left the door ajar for the expansion of the applicability of the 
idea of ecocide beyond the battlefield; the first article of his draft read as 
follows: “The Contracting Parties confirm that ecocide, whether committed in 
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which 
countries undertake to prevent and to punish“ (emphasis added).470  
If ecocide were a call to protect the environment in times of war, one would 
expect the campaign for the recognition of ecocide to finish in 1976 and 1977, 
with the adoption of the Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD), 
which prohibited the use of environmental modification techniques as a 
means of warfare, and of the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. Art. 35(3) of this Protocol establishes the basic rule according 
to which “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment”. Article 55, on the “Protection of the 
natural environment” states that: “1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect 
the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. 
This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the 
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the 
population. 2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals 
are prohibited”. Although it may appear as an unnecessary duplication, 
Article 35(3) is constrained to methods of warfare, while Article 55 intends 
to ensure the survival and health of the population.471 
Additional Protocol I concerns only with international armed conflicts, and 
not civil wars or non-international armed conflicts, which are regulated by 
Protocol II, also of 1977. This other Protocol does not have equivalent clauses 
for environmental protection, although the idea was on the table for some 
                                                 
469 Ludwik Teclaff, Beyond Restoration – The Case of Ecocide, Natural Resources Journal, 34:4 
(1994). 
470 Falk, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide, 93. 
471 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 (Dordrecht: ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 414. 
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time.472 That said, again, if ecocide was about the protection of natural 
environment in and around the battlefield, in 1977 the campaign should have 
shifted from norm promotion to advocacy for the widest possible ratification 
and effective implementation of Protocol I, and perhaps a prompt revision of 
Protocol II in order to provide equivalent level of environmental protection 
in non-international armed conflicts. 
However, official discussions ensued after 1977, both at the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
and at the International Law Commission. 
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities discussed ecocide in two instances, in 1978 and in 1985. Just like 
Falk five years earlier with his draft convention, in 1978 the Special 
Rapporteur on genocide, Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, also contributed to the 
quandary by talking about ecocide, on the one hand, “as an international 
crime similar to genocide”, and on the other hand, “as a war crime”, together 
with “the prohibition to act against the environment and the climate for 
military purposes”. 473  Ruhashyankiko’s open-ended formulation is 
understandable because his role as Special Rapporteur was not to make a 
choice, but to frame the general debate and to help the Sub-Commission 
addressing the prevention and punishment of genocide. However, by doing 
so, perhaps unintentionally the report maintained the uncertainty about the 
nature of ecocide. 
The question surfaced again in 1985. The new Special Rapporteur, Benjamin 
Whitaker, did not answer it in the one paragraph devoted to ecocide in his 
62-page report on prevention and punishment of genocide. Whitaker briefly 
admitted that some members of the Sub-Commission were in favour of 
broadening the definition of genocide to cover environmental concerns. He 
                                                 
472 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 156. In spite of a lonely proposal by Australia (Official Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflict, Vol. XV, 324, CCDH/215/Rev.1, 3 February – 18 April 1975). 
473 Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 1978, para. 462-478. 
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argued that this would be particularly important for indigenous peoples, and 
recommended that “further consideration should be given to this question, 
including if there is no consensus, the possibility of formulating an optional 
protocol”.474 
The Sub-Commission never talked officially again about ecocide until its 
closure in 2006, when the Human Rights Council replaced the Commission on 
Human Rights. The Sub-Commission’s mission was to make 
recommendations to the old Commission, made out of state delegates, on 
how to protect and promote human rights. However, in relation to ecocide, 
the Sub-Commission did not manage to adopt a common position on whether 
the definition of genocide had to be broadened to cover environmental 
damage, or in other words, whether ecocide was a type of war crime, or a 
distinct international crime. 
The second UN body to study the idea of ecocide was the International Law 
Commission (ILC), constituted by independent legal experts working on the 
codification of international law. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ILC considered 
the possibility of adding ecocide to its list of international crimes against 
peace and security. In 1984, ILC Member and Special Rapporteur Doudou 
Thiam proposed a second draft code of offences against peace and security. 
For the Special Rapporteur, the new draft code had to incorporate “certain 
violations of international law recognized by the international community 
since 1954”, the year when the first draft code had been made public; among 
those violations he included “acts causing serious damage to the 
environment”.475 
Although ILC members agreed that serious damage to the environment had 
to be treated as an international crime, they had different views about 
whether it should be a crime against humanity, insofar as these crimes can be 
                                                 
474 Benjamin Whitaker, Revised and updated report on the question of the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide, 1985, para. 33. 
475 ILC, Yearbook of 1984, Vol. II, Part 1, UN doc: A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.l (Part 1), 89-100, 
para. 79. 
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committed in peacetime.476 In 1986 and 1989, the Special Rapporteur 
included the “serious breach” of international environmental obligations and 
“serious harm to a vital human asset, such as the human environment” in his 
two draft lists of crimes against humanity. Both attempts provoked positive 
and negative reactions among his colleagues in the ILC.477 
The ILC set up a drafting committee that submitted a text for the 
consideration of the Commission in 1991. The drafting committee deleted 
serious environmental damage from the list of crimes against humanity, but 
included one separate clause, the very last one of the list, number 26, “on 
wilful and severe damage to the environment”. ILC members expressed 
reservations mostly in relation to the threshold drawn by the words 
“widespread, long-term and severe”, but in the end the ILC adopted the draft 
with a minor change. Article 26 would read: “An individual who wilfully 
causes or orders to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced [to…]”.478 
Thereby, the ILC appeared ready to extend the environmental protection that 
international law attempted to provide in times of war also to times of peace. 
This would have raised the profile of ecocide from a type of violation of 
international humanitarian law (in the 1977 Additional Protocol I) to an 
international crime in its own right. 
However, Thiam admitted that Article 26 was among those that were 
“strongly opposed” by Western governments.479 He added that, “from a 
political standpoint, any codification exercise must, in order to be successful, 
be supported by a clearly expressed political will”. As a result, Thiam simply 
deleted Article 26 from his final report to the International Law 
                                                 
476 ILC, Yearbook of 1984, Vol. II, Part 2, UN doc: A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.l (Part 2), 16, para. 
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Commission.480 With it, the Special Rapporteur sent ecocide back to the realm 
of armed conflict. 
And that is where ecocide was to remain from then onwards, because the 
International Law Commission decided to drop entirely the idea that ecocide 
may be an international crime of its own.481 The ILC included environmental 
damage as a form of war crime in Article 20(g) of the Code.482 In its statement 
to the General Assembly, the International Law Commission said that it had 
“acted in response to the interest of adoption of the Code and of obtaining 
support by Governments”.483 Christian Tomuschat, ILC Member in favour of 
ecocide as a distinct international crime or at least as a crime against 
humanity, wrote at the time that nuclear weapons were in the back of the 
mind of ILC members and state delegates that opposed the recognition of an 
entirely different crime of a status similar to that of genocide, war crimes or 
crimes against humanity.484 
For more than one decade, the International Law Commission engaged with 
the idea of ecocide, and even considered the possibility of declaring it a 
separate crime against peace and security. However, in the end, the pressure 
exercised by some Western countries bore fruit and environmental damage 
was remitted to the sphere of international humanitarian law in the form of 
war crimes. Two years after the adoption of the Draft Code, the 1998 Statute 
of the International Criminal Court did not give this Court the power to know 
of cases of ecocide in peacetime, but recognised serious environmental 
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damage as a form of war crime in Article 8(2)(b)(iv),485 in line with the Draft 
Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of the ILC. 
The meaning of ecocide is not clear. Neither initial norm entrepreneurs in the 
1970s nor UN high-ranking officials in the 1980s and 1990s stated clearly if 
ecocide was a distinct international crime, a form of genocide, a form of crime 
against humanity, or indeed a form of war crime. The Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities left the question 
unanswered, and the International Law Commission finally decided to 
narrow environmental damage to the serious violations of humanitarian law 
that constitute war crimes. This was not a revolution from customary 
practice after what the international community had agreed to in Additional 
Protocol I in 1977. 
 
5.2.2. Was ecocide burdensome? 
 
The inclusion of ecocide in the list of international crimes against peace and 
security would have made of it one of the most burdensome norms in the 
international human rights regime. Genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are widely considered the worst kinds of human rights violations. 
Their prohibition is a peremptory norm of international law. Countries are 
supposed to outlaw these crimes in their national legislation. They can 
trigger international prosecutions by the International Criminal Court, 
international tribunals or hybrid courts, as well as national courts in 
application of universal jurisdiction. For some, these crimes may even justify 
a military intervention with humanitarian purposes (see chapter 7, on the 
Responsibility to Protect). 
As we have seen, in the end ecocide did not reach the status of international 
                                                 
485 Article 8(2)(b)(iv): “Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”. 
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crime against peace. However, environmental damage was prohibited in 
Protocol I in 1977, and it was treated as a form of war crime by the 
International Law Commission in 1996, and confirmed as such in the 1998 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. If war crimes are the most serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, and if they are one of the 
international crimes against peace, they must unleash the legal and political 
consequences mentioned in the previous paragraph. Therefore, one would 
expect that the prohibition of intentional environmental damage, when 
occurring in armed conflict, would be a very burdensome norm for states. But 
reality is quite different. 
Firstly, although the International Law Commission did not specify it in 1996, 
both customary international humanitarian law and the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court restrict the prohibition only to international 
armed conflicts, not to non-international ones, which are the majority of 
conflicts nowadays.486 
Secondly, according to the authoritative interpretation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the wording of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC 
Statute would be more restrictive than customary international 
humanitarian law on the protection of the environment.487 On a more 
positive note, unlike the ILC Draft Code, the ICC Statute may be considered 
ecocentric and not anthropocentric, insofar as it does not seem to require 
harm to human health or survival to meet the threshold of the crime. 
However, the provision is full of vague terms, such as “widespread, long-term 
and severe damage”, “clearly excessive” or “overall military advantage”, and 
the intentionality is entirely subjective since the perpetrator is supposed to 
“know” the environmental consequences of their attack, all of which makes it 
too difficult not to deem the environmental damage compensated by military 
necessity (emphasis added).488 
                                                 
486 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I, 575. 
487 Id, 583. 
488 Time will tell about the effects of Prosecutor’s Office’s announcement of their intention to 
prioritise cases where environmental damage played a significant role, in the form of “illegal 
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Thirdly, and most importantly, post-conflict environmental assessments 
conducted by the UN Environmental Programme between 1999 and 2009 
show that international humanitarian law has been ineffective in protecting 
the environment “due to the stringent and imprecise threshold required to 
demonstrate damage”; and, in the absence of a precautionary approach, the 
general international humanitarian principles of distinction, necessity and 
proportionality are impracticable to limit environmental damage in the face 
of the all-powerful requirements of military necessity.489 
In conclusion, at least when it happens in the context of an international 
armed conflict, the prohibition of deliberate environmental damage in 
international humanitarian law could in principle be a burdensome norm for 
the state. However, this has hardly been the case in practice due to the 
rigorous language with which the prohibition has been written in 
international humanitarian and criminal law. 
 
5.2.3. Did ecocide fit with liberal principles? 
 
According to Order-over-Justice, Western European states would promote 
norms that are aligned with liberalism. One of liberal principles is that 
individual human beings are the rights-holders. This fundamental premise of 
the international human rights regime is not held in the case of ecocide. 
Contemporary norm entrepreneurs argue that ecocide is more in line with 
Lemkin’s original notion of genocide than with the idea of genocide 
proclaimed in the 1948 Convention.490 Lemkin had advocated the protection 
of social groups from “cultural destruction”.491 Genocide would not only be 
                                                                                                                                     
exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land” (Office of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court, Policy paper on case selection and prioritization, 15 September 
2016, para. 41). 
489 UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict, 4-5. 
490 For example, Martin Crook and Damien Short, Marx, Lemkin and the genocide-ecocide nexus, 
International Journal of Human Rights, 18:3 (2014), 304. 
491 Raphaël Lemkin, “Les actes constituent un danger général (interétatique) considérés comme 
délites des droit des gens”, in Pedone, A., Librarie de la cour d’appel et de l’ordre des avocates 
 160 
committed with the physical destruction of a group by killing all or most of its 
members, but also by attempting to disintegrate “the economic existence” of 
such group.492 However, by reading Lemkin’s own appraisal of the then 
ongoing drafting process of the 1948 Convention on Genocide, it is very hard 
to believe that he had the protection of nature in mind.493 His focus was 
rather on the effective protection of minorities and on states’ obligations to 
prevent and punish attacks against them wherever these attacks took place. 
Be that as it may, the fact that some ecocide promoters refer to Lemkin as one 
of their intellectual forefathers suggests that they adopt an anthropocentric 
approach to nature. In other words, they would see the prohibition of ecocide 
as a tool to protect nature inasmuch as a healthy environment is in humans’ 
interests because nature conditions humans’ existence. This anthropocentric 
approach is followed in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions, whose Article 55(1) prohibits the use of certain means of 
warfare that may damage the environment and “prejudice the health or 
survival of the population”. 
Nonetheless, while human rights law intends to “protect existing individuals 
within a given society”, environmental law tries to “sustain life globally by 
balancing the needs and capacities of the present with those of the future”.494 
Just like military necessity and the protection of the environment in the 
ecocide-lite of the international humanitarian law (subsection 5.2.2), it is not 
difficult to fathom situations where protecting nature may recommend not 
going forward with a large development project that could otherwise favour 
the general enjoyment of socioeconomic rights, for instance the right to work. 
If the international human rights regime contains a set of claims humans hold 
against public authorities within a certain jurisdiction, it is not self-evident 
                                                                                                                                     
(Paris, 1933). 
492 Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of 
Government – Proposals for Redress (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1944), 79. 
493 Raphaël Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, 41:1 (1947). 
494 Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, Stanford 
Journal of International Law, 28 (1991), 111. 
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who is to be protected by ecocide, who holds the right not to be a victim of 
ecocide. 
Some norm promoters make a radical proposal. The British barrister Polly 
Higgins says she decided to work on ecocide when she realised that “the 
Earth needs a good lawyer”.495 For her, the Earth would therefore be the 
rights-holder to be protected by the global prohibition of ecocide. This 
approach would probably be shared by indigenous peoples, whose identity 
and collective existence is not only linked but depends on nature, on the 
Earth and land they step on and live through.496 It is worth-noting the 2008 
Constitution of Ecuador, which has a whole chapter on the “Rights of Nature” 
or “Pacha Mama”, as the Earth is known in indigenous languages in Latin 
America. Indeed, at the Paris Conference on Environmental Change in 
November 2015, President Correa made an appeal for a “universal 
declaration of the rights of nature”, and for the creation of an “international 
court of environmental justice” to sanction attacks against the rights of 
nature and to enforce obligations regarding the “environmental debt”.497 
Another example is Bolivia, which adopted a Law of Rights of Mother Earth in 
2010.498 The Government of Bolivia also drafted a Universal Declaration of 
the Rights of Mother Earth in 2009, which did not pass at the General 
Assembly, but since then, Bolivia has sponsored annual UN General Assembly 
resolutions on “harmony with nature”.499 
With the progressive recognition of indigenous peoples’ different 
cosmologies, the discourse of rights of nature or rights of Mother Earth is 
gaining momentum in some parts of South America. Yet, it is hard to imagine 
it seriously endorsed by Western European states, whose industrialisation 
                                                 
495 Polly Higgins, “Ecocide, the 5th Crime Against Peace”, talk at TEDxExeter, 2 May 2012.  
496 The connection to the land is of paramount importance in the 1989 Convention No. 169 of the 
ILO on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. 
497 President Correa’s speech of 30 November 2015: http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2016/01/DISCURSO-COP21-FRANCIA.pdf  
498 From Alan Vargas Lima, El derecho al medio ambiente sano en la Nueva Constitución Política 
del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano, 18 
(2012). 
499 Carlos Mamani and Bartolomé Clavero, Study on the need to recognize and respect the rights 
of Mother Earth, 15 January 2010.  
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was only possible thanks to the systemic exploitation of natural resources 
and the prospect of limitless consumption. Derived from liberalism, Western 
European states have a very different tradition and understanding of the idea 
of human rights. This does not mean that Western European countries cannot 
build institutions and cooperate on environmental matters, but only that they 
would not use international human rights standards or mechanisms to do so. 
This is notwithstanding the fact that some Western norm entrepreneurs, like 
Polly Higgins, may campaign for a different notion of human rights. 
It is therefore uncertain how proclaiming the Earth as rights-holder can be 
compatible with the liberalism behind Western European states’ idea of IHRL. 
Seeking ways to ensure that economic growth is sustainable is one thing; 
putting limits to capitalist accumulation because the Earth has rights is quite 
another. It is no less challenging for those who argue that “future generations” 
can have rights. 500  The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, and the more recent international law of indigenous peoples, 
refer loosely to the obligations that present generations have vis-à-vis future 
ones, but they do not treat future generations as rights-holders and present 
ones as corresponding duty bearers. It is hardly conceivable that Western 
European states would proactively uphold such approach to international 
human rights. 
Apart from this indeterminacy regarding the rights-holder, ecocide also 
poses a challenge to the human rights regime because environmental damage 
often has extraterritorial effects. Internationally recognised human rights 
impose obligations on states within their jurisdiction. Particularly since the 
1990s, human rights bodies have defended the idea that jurisdiction does not 
have to be exclusively territorial, but states often resist the extension of 
obligations beyond their borders.501 Insofar as nature does not know of 
customs and checkpoints, if they were to take ecocide seriously, states would 
                                                 
500  Like Edith Brown-Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the 
Environment, American Journal of International Law, 84:1 (1990). 
501 As seen in chapter 4 regarding the UK’s position on the application of international human 
rights standards in armed conflict. See also the 2011 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (chapter 6). 
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have to be willing to accept that human rights naturally unfold 
extraterritorial obligations for duty bearers. In other words, they would have 
to agree that the justice-based goal of protecting human rights globally 
trumps the order-based principle by which human rights are a shield to 
sovereign power exercised within a certain jurisdiction, generally (yet not 
solely) equated to territory. 
In sum, because of the lack of definition of the rights-holder and the intrinsic 
extraterritoriality of environmental damage, it is extremely hard to make 
ecocide fit within Western European states’ idea of the international human 
rights regime, defined by liberalism and by international order more than by 
global justice. 
 
5.2.4. Did strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs endorse the 
international criminalisation of ecocide? 
 
Order-over-Justice expects that Western European states will be keener to 
promote norms that are endorsed by strong and resourceful entrepreneurs. 
Ecocide did not benefit from them. 
As explained earlier (5.2.1), some scientists and legal scholars advanced the 
idea of ecocide in the 1970s, and there is no doubt that the highest point of 
ecocide came quite soon with Olof Palme’s remarks at the opening ceremony 
in Stockholm in 1972. However, Palme was absolutely clear in keeping his 
words contained to the scope of armed conflict, which would eventually 
result in the known provisions of Additional Protocol I. The idea was also 
briefly explored in two reports on the prevention and punishment of 
genocide of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, in 1978 and in 1985, but the Sub-Commission did 
not take the issue any further. And for about one decade the International 
Law Commission considered formulating ecocide as an international crime of 
its own, or at least as a form of crime against humanity, but the idea was 
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discarded for good in 1996, which led to no consequence other than the word 
‘ecocide’ rotting in oblivion for nearly 15 years. 
If the norm entrepreneurs that endorsed Ecocide I in the 1970s were not 
great in number or in influence, neither are for now the ones behind Ecocide 
II. Similar to Falk with his draft international convention on ecocide,502 in 
2010, Polly Higgins wrote an amendment to include ecocide in the ICC 
Statute.503 To this day, no country or major environmental NGO has endorsed 
Higgins’s call.504 In January 2013, a group of activists drafted an EU directive 
and campaigned for a European Citizens Initiative “to give the Earth rights” 
and to outlaw ecocide.505 The initiative was finally archived when it failed to 
reach the target of one million signatures required to make the European 
Commission react in any way.506 
No regional human rights court, UN human rights treaty-body, or Human 
Rights Council Special Procedure mandate holder has ever mentioned 
ecocide in their reports (section 5.1). In 1994, the Special Rapporteur on 
human rights and the environment appointed by the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities made a link 
between the environment and international peace and security, echoing the 
then ongoing work of the ILC as well as the question on nuclear weapons that 
had been posed to the consideration of the International Court of Justice.507 
She also made a reference to applicable international humanitarian 
standards on armed conflict.508 However, in 2012, the UN Independent 
Expert on human rights obligations relating to the environment, John Knox, 
said nothing about international humanitarian or criminal law, and in 
relation to corporate responsibility he chose to draw attention to the much 
                                                 
502 Falk, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide. 
503 Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide: Laws and Governance to Stop the Destruction of the 
Planet (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 2010), ch. 5 and 6. 
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505 Sailesh Mehta and Prisca Merz, Ecocide – a new crime against peace?, Environmental Law 
Review, 17:1 (2015). Text of the directive: http://eradicatingecocide.com/the-law/ecocide-
directive/ Campaign website: www.endecocide.eu  
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laxer Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.509 
In sum, while human rights bodies and activists have advocated a human 
rights-based approach to environmental protection, ecocide was not 
supported by resourceful and well-targeted campaigns endorsed by key 
players. 
 
5.3. Spain, the UK and ecocide: Evolution over time 
 
According to the idea of Order-over-Justice, considering the importance of 
the passage of time in states’ endorsement of human rights norms, Western 
European countries would be more likely to promote human rights-related 
norms at the early stage of their life (P1), and less likely to challenge them 
once these norms have become part of the human rights regime (P2). 
A caveat is necessary at this point, because as we have seen in section 5.2, the 
idea of ecocide as a distinct crime was never engrained in international law. 
However, ecocide-lite was enshrined in international humanitarian law, first 
in the form of prohibition of deliberate environmental damage that may 
affect human interests (in Additional Protocol I of 1977), and progressively in 
customary law until being included in the list of war crimes in the ICC Statute 
of 1998, as had been recommended by the International Law Commission in 
1996.  
Since ecocide never got to a point of advanced development, it is only 
possible to assess the extent to which countries did not challenge the norm in 
relation to the ecocide-lite, the only version of the norm that ultimately 
received some sort of recognition in international law. In other words, 
considering that ecocide is an example of a failed norm, P1 can be explored 
adequately, but P2 only in relation to ecocide-lite, which is the version of 
ecocide that stood the test of time. 
                                                 
509 Knox, Report of the Independent Expert, para. 50. 
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Focusing on Spain and the UK, this section will explore the evolution of 
Western European states’ practice (action and discourse) towards ecocide, 
understood both as a crime in its own and as a war crime. The analysis will 
start from the drafting processes of the Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
in 1977 and of the Statute to the International Criminal Court in 1998. It will 
continue with states’ interaction with the work of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the 
International Law Commission in particular in 1978 and early 1990s. The last 
subsection will look into state practice regarding criminalisation of ecocide at 
the domestic level. 
As will be seen, unlike the UK, when it had the opportunity in the relevant 
international forums Spain did not make its opinion known about the 
international prohibition of ecocide. Hence, the analysis in subsections 5.3.1 
and 5.3.2 looks more to the UK, with references to other countries as well. 
Subsection 5.3.3, on national legislation and practice, however, is informed 
by both cases. 
 
5.3.1. From 1977 Additional Protocol I to 1998 ICC Statute 
 
Additional Protocol I has two protective provisions of the natural 
environment in international armed conflicts. Articles 35(3) and 55 prohibit 
the use of methods or means of warfare that may cause “widespread, long-
term and severe damage” to the natural environment putting at risk the 
health and life of the population; they also forbid carrying out reprisals 
against natural environment. 
In its official Commentary on Additional Protocol I, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross admits that the initial draft had not contained 
specific provisions to protect the environment specifically, and the inclusion 
of these two provisions in the treaty was due to concerns expressed by 
several state delegations: Australia, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic 
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Republic, Hungary, Sweden and Yugoslavia.510 
After long deliberation and drafting committees, the inclusion of Articles 
35(3) and 55 was adopted by consensus at a plenary meeting.511 The UK was 
the only country to oppose Article 35(3) because it considered the paragraph 
superfluous. It did so with the following statement: 
"We regard this paragraph as otiose repetition of Article 48 bis 
[Article 55 in the final version] and would have preferred that 
paragraph 3 not be included in this Article. We consider that it is 
basically in order to protect the civilians living in the environment 
that the environment itself is to be protected against attack. Hence the 
provision on protection of the environment is in our view rightly 
placed in the section on protection of civilians. Now that Article 33 has 
been adopted with paragraph 3, we shall interpret that paragraph in 
the same way as Article 48 bis, which in our view is a fuller and more 
satisfactory formulation."512 
The travaux préparatoires do not show contributions or engagement from 
Spanish delegates regarding Article 35(3) or Article 55. Spain ratified the 
1977 Additional Protocol I in 1989, and its few interpretative declarations 
did not concern any of the two articles. 
The UK, on the other hand, ratified it in 1998, but issued interpretations 
regarding the two provisions related to environmental damage. Firstly, the 
UK said that “the risk of environmental damage […] is to be assessed 
objectively on the basis of the information available at the time”; the UK also 
interpreted Articles 51-55 under the premise of reciprocity from any other 
party the UK may be militarily engaged with.513 
After nearly fifty years of deliberation about international crimes under the 
roof of the International Law Commission, the official records of the Rome 
Conference of June-July 1998 show that the inclusion of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) in 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court did not generate much 
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511 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, 419 and 662-663. 
512 Id, 420. Official Records, Vol. VI, 118, CDDH/SR.39, Annex, 25 May 1977. The Argentinian 
delegate said they would have abstained had it been put to a vote (p. 113). 




controversy among states.514 This might come as a surprise considering that 
the ICC Statute does not require the environmental damage to harm human 
health or survival. Therefore, one could consider it more protective of the 
environment than the more anthropocentric Additional Protocol I (see above, 
subsection 5.2.3). On the other hand, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is written in such 
cryptic and ambiguous terms that it would make the case very difficult for the 
prosecution, and vice versa, very easy for the defence, would it ever be 
applied (subsection 5.2.2). 
Spain ratified the ICC Statute in 2000, and the UK did so in 2001. In one of its 
declarations, the UK confirmed and drew to the attention of the Court the 
declarations it had made, inter alia, to the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions. 
We can observe that, in spite of not being persuaded in 1977 by the idea of 
environmental protection in international humanitarian law, the UK finally 
ratified the Additional Protocol in 1998, and furthermore accepted its status 
in the list of war crimes when ratifying the ICC Statute in 2001, 
notwithstanding the caveats in the form of interpretive declarations.  
 
5.3.2. States’ interaction with UN bodies 
 
In 1978 and 1985, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities considered whether ecocide could be a distinct 
international crime or at least a form of a more broadly defined genocide. 
According to the 1978 report, apart from the Vatican, only one country 
expressed support to the idea: Romania.515 However, a number of states 
rejected the possibility of revisiting the 1948 Convention on Genocide. The 
UK was the only one to make a very emphatic statement against the 
                                                 
514 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I, 583. Official records are 
available at: http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/icc-1998/icc-1998.html  
515 Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
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international criminalisation of ecocide: 
“There is no definition of the term ‘ecocide’ and it would appear that 
the term is incapable of carrying аnу precise meaning. The term has 
been used in certain debates for the purposes of political propaganda 
and it would be inappropriate to attempt to make provisions in an 
international Convention for dealing with matters of this kind.”516 
The 1985 Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission had received input from 
a number of countries, including Spain, but not the UK.517 However, the 
Special Rapporteur only referred to ecocide in passing in one paragraph, and 
the Sub-Commission never addressed the issue again.518 
For its part, the International Law Commission also debated for more than 
one decade whether ecocide could be considered an international crime, or 
perhaps a form of war crime or even a crime against humanity. All options 
were on the table at one point or another. 
In 1993, the ILC received 12 written comments from 16 countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden submitted a joint document) in relation 
to proposed Article 26, which prohibited ecocide in peacetime. Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Greece, Paraguay and Uruguay expressed their support, and 
even defended the removal of the word “wilfully” from the clause, which they 
deemed too restrictive. The UK, together with the Netherlands, the Nordic 
countries and the USA, rejected it. Brazil and Poland expressed more 
ambiguous positions.519  
On the other hand, when the ILC Special Rapporteur got rid of Article 26, the 
decision received negative feedback from country delegates at the UN 
General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal) in 1995. The states that defended 
the inclusion of a provision on ecocide in the Draft Code of Crimes Against 
Peace and Security came from different continents: Guatemala, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Switzerland, Chile, Slovenia, Belarus, Trinidad and Tobago, Morocco, 
                                                 
516 Id, para. 468. 
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518 Id, para. 33. 
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Egypt, Jamaica, Burkina Faso, Malaysia, Italy and Bangladesh. However, most 
of those who endorsed its removal, or at least expressed doubts about the 
pertinence of its inclusion, were Western countries: France, Brazil, the Czech 
Republic, United States, New Zealand and Germany.520 
The interaction with the Sub-Commission on Minorities and with the 
International Law Commission shows that the UK expressed a clearly 
negative view of ecocide in 1978, and reiterated it in 1993. Other countries in 
Western Europe and elsewhere adopted a more sympathetic attitude 
towards the idea in the 1990s. 
 
5.3.3. Domestic law and practice on ecocide 
 
Not surprisingly, most countries do not criminalise ecocide in their domestic 
legislation. Vietnam and a number of ex Soviet countries are the exception: 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine and Vietnam.521  
Of course, many other countries, including European ones, adopt protective 
measures of the environment in their criminal law. Of particular importance 
in this regard is Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council, of 19 November 2008, on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law, which had to be transposed in all 28 Member States.522  
However, in line with the development of international criminal law 
presented above and with the list of international crimes against peace and 
security, according to the most authoritative database of state practice of the 
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International Committee of the Red Cross, no European country includes 
ecocide as a distinct international crime in their national legislation. 
Ecocide does not appear in Title 24 of the 1995 Spanish Criminal Code, 
devoted to “crimes against international community”, but the Code sanctions 
the deliberate environmental damage in armed conflict, international or not, 
with ten to 15 years in prison.523 Spain’s 2007 Manual on the Law of Armed 
Conflict referred to the Additional Protocol I and to the 1976 Environmental 
Modification Convention, as did the 1996 version. 524  The 2009 Royal 
Ordinances of the Armed Forces affirm that these Forces must not use means 
or methods of warfare prohibited in international law that may cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.525 
The current Criminal Code is therefore in line with the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, and the Manual of Law of Armed Conflict and 
the Royal Ordinances of the Armed Forces follow Additional Protocol I and 
customary international humanitarian law. By contrast, the old 1973 
Criminal Code was frugal in relation to crimes of international law, and did 
not sanction war crimes or crimes against humanity.526 
The UK does not single out ecocide either, but since 2001 war crimes are 
punishable in accordance with the definition of the ICC Statute; before 2001, 
the definition of war crimes was that of the Geneva Conventions Act, which 
did not cover environmental concerns.527 The UK made clear in its 1981 
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict and in the statement to the International 
Court of Justice in 1995 on the occasion of the Nuclear Weapons case that it 
considered the restriction of use of means and methods to apply only to 
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conventional weapons, not nuclear weapons.528 The 2004 Manual, however, 
does not mention this exception.529 
In sum, ecocide is not a crime in most countries. Ecocide-lite, on the other 
hand, has been domesticated in the UK and Spain. And, considering the ICRC’s 
analysis of state practice of customary international humanitarian law, many 




This chapter leads to one firm conclusion. While the window of opportunity 
was half open, between the 1970s and 1990s, no country volunteered to 
champion the cause of ecocide as a distinct international crime, and some of 
them were particularly vocal in their opposition, especially the UK. The 
international criminalisation of the deliberate destruction of the environment, 
either in peacetime or at war, was mostly the concern of a handful of norm 
entrepreneurs. Only a few states showed some willingness to consider it, but 
they did so with diplomatically and normatively weak tools, in the form of 
statements made at the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, and 
communications sent to independent UN rapporteurs. With a few relatively 
exotic exceptions, ecocide is not recognised as a crime at the national level 
either.  
On the other hand, the protection of natural environment in international 
armed conflict proved more successful, and it did so rather quickly, in the 
very first decade of the campaign in the 1970s. According to travaux 
préparatoires, the ICRC analysis of evolving state practice and UN 
consultations with member states, Western Europe was no more proactive 
than others in seizing the opportunity of the negotiation of the Additional 
Protocol I to prohibit ecocide in international humanitarian law. The 
                                                 
528 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II, 882 and 894. 
529 https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rulP35 
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exception would be Sweden, whose Prime Minister Olof Palme had actually 
put ecocide at the vanguard of environmental diplomacy with his speech at 
the Stockholm Conference. The UK was the only country to reject the 
inclusion of Article 35(3) in the 1970s because it considered it superfluous. 
By 1998, the UK ratified the Additional Protocol, and although its 
declarations when ratifying the Protocol, and again with the ICC Statute in 
2001, may water down the effectiveness of the treaty vis-à-vis British forces, 
at least the UK did not introduce a reservation to any of the relevant 
provisions.  
With their practice and national legislation, both the UK and Spain have been 
showing for a number of years that they accept that the deliberate 
destruction of natural environment in armed conflict, at least in international 
armed conflict, is a war crime. 
The analysis confirms the proposition of Order-over-Justice according to 
which, despite some possible doubts at earlier stages, Western European 
states would not resist a human rights norm once it has reached a point of 
settlement in international law.  
Order-over-Justice predicts that Western European states would be more 
inclined to support unclear and weaker norms that fitted with liberalism and 
were promoted by powerful norm entrepreneurs. This chapter shows that 
ecocide suffered from serious problems of clarity, since the same term has 
been used to refer to a form of war crime, a crime against humanity, genocide 
and a new and different international crime against peace and security. The 
prohibition of ecocide could have imposed burdensome obligations on states, 
but the vagueness of the legal terminology and the apparent high threshold 
made it insufficiently effective. It is difficult to match ecocide with some 
liberal principles of the human rights regime regarding the definition of the 
rights-holder and the territorial confines where rights are meant to be 
protected. Ecocide did not enjoy the support of strong norm entrepreneurs, 
and never resonated in the corridors of independent human rights bodies in 
Geneva, Strasbourg or elsewhere. In other words, ecocide met one of the four 
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non-temporal propositions, that of clarity, but undoubtedly did not meet two 
other, those on liberalism and norm entrepreneurs, and was at the very least 
ambiguous in relation to the fourth one, on burden. 
The natural environment is the home of all commons, and the story of 
ecocide attests that taking it seriously poses a radical challenge to our 
international society. That may explain why ecocide and related 
environmental campaigns such as the frustrated declaration on the rights of 
Mother Earth have so far had a hard time in the international human rights 
legal framework. 
Contemporary promoters of the revival of ecocide (Ecocide II) do not agree 
that international criminal law on environmental protection should be 
confined to armed conflict. This second wave of norm entrepreneurs wants to 
apply ecocide to peacetime situations,530 and refers to it as “the missing 5th 
crime against peace”.531 They see in ecocide a potentially effective tool to 
address contemporary environmental problems, ranging from water and air 
pollution, deforestation, climate change, violations of indigenous peoples’ 
rights, financial investment in non-renewable energy sources, or land-grabs 
by extractive industries. I do not question the moral standing of the 
protection of the global environment, or the case for recognising the Earth as 
a rights-holder. Time will tell if this second campaign does not run into the 
sand, but the new generation of ecocide promoters ought to beware that their 




                                                 
530 Allan Gray, The International Crime of Ecocide, California Western International Law Journal, 
26 (1996). 
531 Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide; Gauger et al, The Ecocide Project, 11; Polly Higgins, Damien 
Short and Nigel South, Protecting the Planet: A Proposal for a Law of Ecocide, Crime, Law and 
Social Change, 59:3(2013); Mehta and Merz, Ecocide – a new crime against peace? 
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6. JUSTICIABILITY OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
“Equality has become a dirty word because it has come to be associated with 
the worst aspects of pointless political correctness and social engineering. […] 
Government will no longer dictate how people should behave. Instead we will 
put in place an architecture to support business and wider society to do the 
right thing.” 
Theresa May, 17 November 2010.532 
 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the proclamation of 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) in the international legal systems 
of human rights (section 6.1). This is followed by the analysis of the level of 
clarity of the norm, how burdensome it is, the extent to which it fits in liberal 
parameters, and the role of non-state norm entrepreneurs in defending the 
need to make economic, social and cultural rights justiciable (6.2). Then, the 
chapter critically interprets the attitude of the UK and Spain, in the Western 
European context, vis-à-vis the justiciability of ESCR since the mid 1990s, by 
looking at the ratification of relevant treaties, their position in the drafting 
processes of the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 2008 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on ESCR, their responses to 
independent human rights mechanisms at the UN and the Council of Europe, 
and judicial enforceability of ESCR at the internal level (6.3).  
 
6.1. ESCR and their justiciability in international law 
 
ESCR are covered by Articles 22-28 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). Article 23 recognises the right to work, Article 24, the 
right to rest and leisure, Article 25, the right to social security and an 
                                                 
532 Theresa May, “Socio-economic duty to be scrapped”, 17 November 2010: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/socio-economic-duty-to-be-scrapped--2  
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adequate standard of living (from which many ESCR derive), Article 26, the 
right to education, Article 27, the right to take part in cultural life and to 
enjoy the outcome of cultural production, and finally Article 28 requires a 
“social and international order” in favour of human rights. 
ESCR are also recognised in a number of treaties ratified by countries from all 
over the world, the most important of which is the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which entered 
into force in 1976.533 Some years later the UN set up an independent body to 
oversee states’ compliance with it: the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR). 
ESCR were also proclaimed at the European level. However, while the 
European Convention on Human Rights provided protection to civil and 
political rights as early as 1950, ESCR had to wait until 1961, when Member 
States of the Council of Europe adopted the European Social Charter. All 
Western European states, with the exception of Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein, have ratified it.534 The Charter is very much labour-focused, 
with a long list of rights related to work (Articles 1-10 and 18-19), the 
protection of health, social security and welfare (Articles 11-14), protection 
of people with disabilities (Article 15) and protection of family, mothers and 
children (Articles 16-17). This list of rights was extended in 1988 with an 
Additional Protocol that has only been ratified by ten countries, Spain among 
them, but not the UK. A revised version of the European Social Charter was 
adopted in 1996, but several European countries have failed to ratify it, 
including Spain and the UK. 
After years of negotiations, under the UN umbrella the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR was adopted in 2008, and entered into force in 2013. The main 
innovation of this treaty is that it allows individuals under the jurisdiction of 
a State party to lodge a complaint to the CESCR for the violation of any of the 
                                                 
533 Other human rights treaties also contain provisions on ESCR. It is the case of the 1965 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, or the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
534 The ratification scorecard is available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/TreatiesIndex_en.asp  
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rights recognised in the ICESCR. A similar procedure had been working for 
civil and political rights for four decades. Section 6.2 will explain the political 
and normative reasons behind this different treatment. 
 
6.2. What does Order-over-Justice mean for the justiciability of ESCR? 
Clarity, burden, liberalism and norm entrepreneurs 
 
Order-over-Justice predicts that, within the human rights regime, Western 
European states prefer norms that are less clear (P3) and less burdensome 
(P4), norms matching liberal principles (P5), and that are promoted by 
strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs (P6). 
 
6.2.1. Is the meaning of justiciability of ESCR clear? 
 
The inclusion of ESCR into the UDHR and its subsequent recognition in 
international law was a complex process where Western European states 
played a significant role.  
The Commission on Human Rights, a subsidiary body of the UN Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), had been established in February 1946. 
Conformed by states elected by the Members of ECOSOC, its first mission was 
to draft an international bill of rights.535 Small nations wanted a treaty that 
would bind large and small nations alike, but the US and the Soviet Union 
were satisfied with a declaration of the General Assembly.536 The UK was one 
of the strongest advocates of a binding treaty. In the end, a Chinese and 
                                                 
535 ECOSOC Resolution 9 (II), of 21 June 1946, adopting the terms of reference of the 
Commission on Human Rights, para. 7. 
536 Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 15-20. The legal nature of General 
Assembly resolutions is a matter of academic dispute (see Blaine Sloan, General Assembly 
Resolution Revisited (Forty Years Later), British Yearbook of International Law, 58:1, 1987). At 
the very least, it is generally accepted that they have declaratory value (opinio juris), but they lack 
the binding nature of international treaties, which are sources of international law (Article 38 of 
the Statute of the ICJ). 
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French proposal gained momentum and, in July 1947, the Commission 
decided to proceed first with a declaration, and to move later to a formal 
treaty with measures of implementation.537 
Article 22 UDHR sets the tone of the proclamation and future implementation 
of ESCR: 
“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and 
is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of 
each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for 
his dignity and the free development of his personality.” (italics added) 
This language is carefully carved. In his masterful commentary to the UDHR, 
Morsink writes that drafters carefully chose their words in order to blur the 
meaning of the obligations derived from Article 22: “entitlement to 
realization”, “national effort”, “international co-operation”, “in accordance 
with the organization and resources” of the state… were all vague enough to 
allow different and even contradictory interpretations within it.538 
No similar language was used for civil and political rights (Articles 3-21 
UDHR). For example, the prohibition of torture was stated in clear-cut terms 
(Article 5): “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”. 
The UDHR was negotiated quickly and finally adopted on 10 December 1948, 
but the adoption of international legal obligations took considerably more 
time, up until 1966. In fact, in the end the General Assembly decided there 
were going to be two treaties, one on civil and political rights (ICCPR) and 
one on ESCR (ICESCR).539  
After a long drafting process, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the ICESCR were adopted in 1966. Both treaties were 
discussed in parallel and adopted on the same day, 16 December 1966, via 
                                                 
537 Report of the Drafting Committee on an International Bill or Rights to the Commission on 
Human Rights, UN doc. E/CN.4/21, 1 July 1947. 
538 Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 222-232. 
539 General Assembly, Resolution 543 (VI), Preparation of two draft international covenants on 
human rights, 5 February 1952. 
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one single UN General Assembly text (Resolution 2200 (XXI)). Both of them 
entered into force in 1976, three months after the 35th ratification (Articles 
49 ICCPR and 27 ICESCR), only a few weeks apart. To this day, 169 countries 
have ratified the ICCPR, and 165 have ratified the ICESCR. Basically all 
European countries have ratified both covenants.540 
The two treaties were adopted the same day, included in the same legal 
document, entered into force the same year and have achieved a similar 
number of ratifications. However, there are fundamental differences between 
them, both in terms of semantics and of implementation.  
Firstly, the different treatment of ESCR and civil and political rights is clear in 
the words chosen for the second articles of their respective treaties, with 
important semantic implications. Article 2(1) ICCPR states plainly that: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.” 
Yet, Article 2(1) ICESCR uses a much more cryptic language which, just like 
Article 22 UDHR, waters down the level of protection of the rights proclaimed 
therein: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” 
(italics added) 
Article 2(1) ICESCR is one of the most extensively interpreted clauses in 
international human rights law. Commentators and country delegates would 
regularly refer to its wording (“to take steps”, “maximum available resources”, 
“progressive achievement”, “all appropriate means”…) to question the 
standing of ESCR as opposed to civil and political rights. Regardless of 
                                                 
540 Andorra is the only European country that has not ratified the ICESCR. It has ratified the 
ICCPR, though. UN Status of Ratification Interaction Dashboard: http://indicators.ohchr.org/ 
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academic interpretations, the truth remains that UN Member States chose a 
less than resolute language for ESCR. 
The language of Article 22 UDHR and Article 2(1) ICESCR makes the meaning 
of the recognition of ESCR far from clear. Nonetheless, over time, scholars, 
practitioners and human rights bodies would try to build the case that 
judicial enforceability is one of those “appropriate means” to achieve the full 
realisation of ESCR (see more in subsection 6.2.4). This is an academic and 
jurisprudential construction, and the idea of justiciability is nowhere to be 
found in the treaties. That aside, assuming one accepts that international 
human rights treaties are living instruments and therefore justiciability could 
be derived from Article 2(1), its meaning would be relatively clear and 
operational. 
 
6.2.2. Is making ESCR justiciable a burdensome requirement?  
 
When compared with the norms examined in the other chapters, the 
justiciability of the ESCR recognised in international law appears far from 
onerous. This is due to three main reasons: a) the words used in international 
treaties; b) the existing compliance mechanisms; and c) the limited 
transformative potential of courts and tribunals in front of structural 
socioeconomic conditions in society. 
Whelan and Donnelly have challenged the still widely spread view among 
academics that, in the context of the Cold War, ESCR were endorsed by the 
East while the West favoured civil and political rights.541 Focusing on the 
institutionalisation of international human rights as an object of study, 
Whelan concludes that the summary records of UN negotiations, treaty and 
                                                 
541 Jack Donnelly, “The West and Economic Rights”, in Hertel, Shareen and Minkler, Lanse (eds.), 
Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement, and Policy Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 
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declaration drafting procedures and timelines “clearly challenge the 
orthodoxy of a socialist genealogy of economic and social rights”.542 
The travaux préparatoires of the UDHR shows that “no Western state pressed 
for a Declaration without economic and social rights”.543 However, the 
travaux of the ICESCR also show that no country, on either side of the Cold 
War aisle, adopted an upfront position in favour of strong implementation 
mechanisms for ESCR. 544  Whelan’s sources make him conclude with 
confidence that “not a single delegation believed that a violations approach 
would be appropriate for economic, social and cultural rights”.545 The Soviet 
Union argued that implementation was “a matter which solely concerns the 
domestic jurisdiction of the State, and accordingly [there is] no need for any 
international agreements on the subject”.546 The UK voted against a joint 
Danish, Egyptian, French and Lebanese resolution at the Commission on 
Human Rights because, in the opinion of the British delegation, “the 
resolution gave the impression that the only way to secure economic and 
social rights was through legally binding instruments”.547 The Netherlands 
also questioned the inclusion of ESCR in a binding treaty, considering the 
different “political, social, financial and economic conditions prevailing in 
each country”,548 and Canada showed concern about the recognition of ESCR, 
because, given their condition of “moral obligations or social goals”, it would 
be “difficult to maintain that [civil and political rights] imposed strict and 
precise obligations”.549 Nations that had recently become independent did 
not make a move in favour of the international justiciability of ESCR in the 
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form of an independent complaints procedure.550 
Post-World War diplomacy shows that UN Member States in general, and 
Western European states in particular, favoured the proclamation of ESCR in 
international law, but only as long as this recognition did not entail strong 
accountability mechanisms or a formal acknowledgment of the justiciability 
of these rights. As discussed in chapter 2, one must also bear in mind that, at 
the time, countries felt much more protected than they do now by the 
principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs (Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter). 
Regarding implementation, the ICCPR put in place three monitoring tools: a) 
periodic state reporting to an independent body, the Human Rights 
Committee (Article 40);551 b) interstate complaint procedure (Articles 41-43), 
which has never been used so far; and c) an individual complaint procedure, 
by which individuals can submit a communication directly to the Committee 
if they consider themselves to be victims of a violation. This third procedure 
is only applicable in relation to countries that have acceded to the Optional 
Protocol of the ICCPR, which was also adopted on 16 December 1966 and 
entered into force in 1976 as well. 116 countries have ratified the Optional 
Protocol to this day, including all European nations with three exceptions: 
The UK, Switzerland and Monaco. 
Initially, none of the mentioned three mechanisms was established for ESCR. 
Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR did not set up an independent monitoring body. 
Instead, it entrusted the task of monitoring state compliance to a working 
group of the ECOSOC, which is conformed by UN Member States. At first, a 
working group carried out the oversight of the implementation of the 
provisions of the ICESCR, but in 1985, the ECOSOC decided to create an 
independent body following the example of the Human Rights Committee of 
the ICCPR.552 This was the birth of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
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Cultural Rights. 
ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17, which established the Committee on ESCR, was 
passed overwhelmingly. The United States was the only country that voted 
against it, adducing reasons of cost; the other country that took the floor to 
explain the vote was the UK, whose delegate said that it was “important for 
the Covenant [the ICESCR] to be treated with due respect, seriousness, and 
diligence”, adding that, in his opinion, “the proposed changes would enhance 
the application of the Covenant and the attitude of States toward it”.553 
The marked institutional differences between ESCR and civil and political 
rights are also displayed at the regional level. In the Americas, ESCR are part 
of the 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and the 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights. States have even developed 
these rights in an ad hoc treaty: The 1988 Additional Protocol on ESCR 
(“Protocol of San Salvador”). However, the meaning of ESCR in the Inter-
American system is constrained by the language of Article 26 of the 1969 
Convention, which resembles considerably the mentioned Article 2(1) 
ICESCR.554 Furthermore, the Protocol of San Salvador only allows individual 
petitions related to the right to education and to the right of workers to 
organise trade unions (Article 19(6)). The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have somehow 
bypassed some of these limitations in their case-law,555 but it is clear that 
Latin American countries intended to set limits to the justiciability of ESCR in 
their regional system of human rights. ESCR are also recognised in the 1981 
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, but the African Commission 
in charge of monitoring the Charter has denounced several times that African 
governments inadequately protect these rights at the domestic level.556 
The separation between civil and political rights and ESCR was even more 
evident in the European case. The 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights only includes civil and political rights, and the rights to private 
property, to education and to free elections were added in 1952 (Protocol I). 
These are the only criteria by which the Strasbourg-based European Court of 
Human Rights can assess states’ performance.557 For Pierre-Henri Teitgen, 
who produced a draft for the consideration of the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in the late 1940s, if the Council of Europe was meant to impose 
sanctions for the breach of the Convention, it was necessary to retain from 
the UN list only those rights and individual freedoms deemed 
“unquestionably fundamental”.558 Clearly ESCR were not considered in that 
list. 
The European Social Charter was only adopted in 1961. The Charter set up a 
monitoring system of biennial state reports involving both the Governmental 
Social Committee and a committee of independent experts, known as the 
European Committee of Social Rights. The reporting procedure did not work 
well, because each body offered its own interpretation and evaluation of 
states’ performance.559 A new protocol was adopted in 1991 to reform the 
supervisory mechanism, clarifying the powers of the European Committee of 
Social Rights. In practice, to a large extent the work of this Committee is 
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currently based on the 1991 Protocol, but this treaty is technically not in 
force because it requires the ratification of all State Parties to the 1961 
Charter and a number of countries (among others, Germany, the UK and 
Denmark) refused to increase the powers of an independent body at the 
expense of the governmental one.560 
Another Protocol was negotiated and finally adopted in 1995 to create a 
system of collective complaints. This Protocol permits trade unions, 
employers’ organisations and some NGOs to submit communications to the 
European Committee of Social Rights. A number of Western European states 
have not ratified the 1995 Protocol (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, 
Switzerland, Spain and the UK), so it is not applicable to them. 
Finally, the European Social Charter was revised in 1996 to compile the 
rights enshrined in the previous documents (adding an explicit recognition of 
the right to housing in Article 31), and to establish the collective complaints 
procedure. All but two Members of the Council of Europe have signed the 
1996 Revised European Social Charter (those two being Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland), but not all of them have ratified it, including Denmark, 
Germany, Iceland, Spain and the UK in Western Europe. These countries are 
therefore not bound by the extended list of ESCR or by the collective 
complaint mechanism.  
The third reason to doubt that the justiciability of ESCR can truly impose 
heavy duties on public authorities lies in the necessarily limited powers at 
judges’ disposal. 
While not synonymous, the advocacy for ESCR justiciability is connected to 
the so-called “violations approach” to ESCR, proposed initially by Audrey 
Chapman.561 In a nutshell, the violations approach attempts to identify laws, 
policies and actions that have a direct causal relationship with the 
infringement of the principle of non-discrimination and the minimum core 
                                                 
560 Id, 127-131, for details of the diplomatic negotiations. 
561 Audrey Chapman, A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human Rights Quarterly, 18:1 (1996).. 
 186 
content of ESCR. Many human rights groups working on ESCR have 
subscribed to the violations approach in one form or another.562 They try to 
identify pieces of legislation or policies that result in specific and 
individualised negative effects directly attributable to public authorities. 
These are the kind of cases that can be potentially brought to justice through 
litigation. 
The violations approach is useful but it is also necessarily narrow. The 
fulfilment of ESCR requires looking at the extent to which public authorities 
are adopting all necessary measures to achieve progressively the full 
satisfaction of these rights (Article 2(1) ICESCR).563 This requires the use of 
disaggregated data to identify the impact that public policies have on 
different groups. It also demands the analysis of taxation, public debt and 
macroeconomic policy. Justiciability and the violations approach do not 
address these fundamental issues. Compared to the mere proclamation of 
rights, justiciability intensifies the burden of ESCR (P4), but it is certainly less 
burdensome than other implementation mechanisms related to taxation and 
economic policies. 
Furthermore, researchers have not yet identified a clear correlation between 
the judicial recognition of ESCR and an increase in terms of social justice.564 
“Litigation necessarily resolves relatively narrow issues; underlying 
structural factors are generally left unaddressed”.565 Judgements on ESCR 
cases do not contradict the “market friendly” and “neo-liberal” structures in 
Western societies and the international system,566 leaving unaddressed many 
“root causes” of the lack of compliance with ESCR.567 As important as 
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justiciability is for the implementation of ESCR, its effects are therefore 
insufficient, and this must make the human rights movement reflect on its 
strategic choices. 
 
6.2.3. Does the justiciability of ESCR fit with liberal principles? 
 
One particular academic debate in recent years serves a twofold objective. 
Firstly, it shows why, taken seriously, the justiciability of economic and social 
rights would go against some of the liberal assumptions engrained in 
Western legal thinking. Secondly, it also helps us introduce the contribution 
that Order-over-Justice can make to our understanding of state-promotion of 
ESCR and their justiciability. I am talking about the debate between Daniel 
Whelan and Jack Donnelly, on the one hand, and their critiques, on the other. 
By the decade prior to the Second World War, Nordic countries had elevated 
welfare state “to a core principle of their legitimacy, largely defining the idea 
of nationhood for these countries”.568 After the War, Western European 
countries followed the path with Keynesian economic policies and an 
increase in social spending. However, the Nordic model of welfare state was 
not necessarily accompanied by the support of strong accountability 
mechanisms on ESCR. Whelan’s excellent historical review shows that 
neither the countries with a socialdemocratic welfare model nor socialist 
states were willing to go all the way down in the adoption of strong 
implementation mechanisms for ESCR in international law. Whelan explains 
their decision in this way: 
“It is my conclusion that many states tried to take seriously the task of 
building on this ideal, but they also recognized how difficult it was to 
translate state duties and obligations for the promotion of human 
economic and social progress into rights. The division of the 
Covenants was clearly not about the denigration of economic and 
social rights. It was about the practical implications of taking on 
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international and national obligations and being truly accountable for 
meeting those obligations in good faith.”569  
It is Whelan’s opinion, then, that Western European states’ decision not to bet 
for strong international mechanisms to oversee ESCR had nothing to do with 
their alleged lack of conviction for these rights. It was, rather, a practical 
decision, since they were not sure whether international tools would serve 
the purpose of “being truly accountable for meeting those obligations in good 
faith”, as Whelan puts it in the very last paragraph of his outstanding book. 
Following this line of thought, Donnelly and Whelan engaged in a passionate 
discussion with Kang and with Kirkup and Evans. Donnelly and Whelan 
attempt to dismantle what they call the “myth” of Western opposition to 
ESCR. Looking at the negotiation of the UDHR, Whelan and Donnelly stress 
that “not a single Western state pressed for a Declaration without economic 
and social rights”.570 The travaux préparatoires of the ICESCR show that, 
while Western states did not believe ESCR to be justiciable, this was the 
general feeling in the rest of the world as well.571 Whelan and Donnely 
contend that the absence of an independent monitoring body for nearly ten 
years was “indeed unjustifiable”, but they blame countries from the “Third 
World, and especially African” states.572 The existence of the European Social 
Charter would be another piece of evidence of the mythical character of 
Western opposition to ESCR, because, in their opinion, this treaty “provides a 
substantively more demanding list of rights” than the ICESCR or any other 
regional system.573 Finally, in Whelan and Donnelly’s view, the incipient 
welfare state of the time clearly contradicts the claim that ESCR “are largely 
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dismissed in the West”.574 
In her response, Kang doubts whether Western welfare states could be 
accounted for as a proof of the centrality of ESCR in the West. Kang basically 
questions the assumption that statements made at diplomatic forums are 
truly indicative of the level of support and internalisation of a human rights 
norm. Kang argues that Western European states had the capacity to protect 
ESCR with stronger legal tools had they wanted to.575 Contra Donnelly and 
Whelan, for Kang the formation of the International Labor Organisation in 
1919 was not an example of the West’s internalisation of ESCR, but the 
“result of domestic political compromise, largely motivated by fears over the 
spread of communism”.576 Kang also blames Western European states for the 
artificial separation between the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which in her view 
followed the European model of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the European Social Charter.577 Kang concludes that part of the West may 
have pushed for the inclusion of ESCR in international law, as Donnelly and 
Whelan argue, but this does not mean that Western European states are 
genuine promoters of these norms, because this would have required a 
stronger commitment and acceptance of normative and practical 
implications.578 
Kirkup and Evans follow a different path to that of Kang. Their critique 
essentially questions Donnelly and Whelan’s epistemology and methodology. 
They argue that Donnelly and Whelan present a distorted or partial look of 
Western support for ESCR because they take “the global human rights regime 
at face value [and do not] question the role of politics in the regime’s 
construction and day-to-day existence”.579 Kirkup and Evans denounce the 
devastating effects that structural adjustment programmes encouraged by 
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Western European states have had in debt-ridden countries. They claim that 
neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus posed serious threats to 
human rights in general and to ESCR in particular. In sum, they criticise 
Donnelly and Whelan for their lack of acknowledgement of the fact that it is 
perfectly possible to proclaim human rights in the law and to violate them in 
practice. In their opinion, “the central role of human rights discourse in the 
post-war order was to legitimize the expansion of global markets through 
universal and inclusive claims of individual freedom”.580 
Donnelly and Whelan’s response to Kang is much more receptive than that 
for Kirkup and Evans. They start by claiming that social spending in Western 
countries has progressively risen over time, which in their view would 
confirm that ESCR are taken seriously. They somehow excuse Western 
European states for their lack of support for strong accountability 
mechanisms in the drafting process of the ICESCR, reminding that no other 
country or region supported them,581 and making the case that renouncing to 
justiciability was a sort of compromise Western Europe had to admit at the 
time in order to get ESCR formulated in international law: “Were all 
provisions to be mandatory, they would have to be watered down, often 
substantially”.582 
To the contrary, Donnelly and Whelan do not yield any ground to Kirkup and 
Evans. Part of the reason of their disagreement is that the two pairs look for 
sources of explanation in two different fields: Donnelly and Whelan explore 
the realm of international law and treaty making, while Kirkup and Evans 
seek answers in international political economy. Plus, epistemologically 
speaking, Kirkup and Evans adopt a critical approach while Donnelly and 
Whelan make a closed defence of mainstream empiricism and positivism.583 
The arguments of the academic debate between Whelan-Donnelly and their 
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critiques are full of silences and implicit assumptions. There is enough 
evidence to claim that Western European states have being active promoters 
of the institutionalisation of ESCR. The open question, though, is whether 
institutionalisation can be considered proof of a given state’s belief in or 
identification with a human rights norm. Promoting IHRL is not the same as 
promoting human rights, and promoting IHRL is not necessarily the only way 
to promote human rights. For example, in relation to ESCR, one may 
legitimately argue that adopting a strong welfare state is a strong way of 
supporting socioeconomic rights, even if this is not accompanied by judicial 
enforceability or by an official state position in favour of an international 
individual complaints mechanism. 
Based on Order-over-Justice, Western European states would be more 
inclined to promote norms that are more in line with liberal values, such as 
individual freedom, rule of law, formal equality, private property and market 
freedom (P5). 
Taking ESCR seriously would impose significant requirements on public 
policy making. At least to some degree, certain tax level or social benefits 
would not be a matter of legitimate political debate, but minimum 
requirements established in the law. In the language of the rule of law, a 
fundamental liberal tenet, the principle of justiciability means that judges 
would have the power to oversee government’s allocation of resources. From 
the classical liberal perspective, this may seem like an undue interference 
with the separation of powers. In this sense, the justiciability of ESCR 
challenges some Western liberal assumptions. Hence, as an international 
human rights norm, it would not be the most likely candidate to receive the 
endorsement of European democracies.  
 
6.2.4. Have strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs endorsed the 
justiciability of ESCR? 
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In the last decades, UN bodies, human rights advocates and scholars have 
asserted the justiciable nature of ESCR as a normative claim and a strategic 
tool in order to cut short the degrees of separation between these rights and 
the civil and political ones. 
From the early start, the CESCR issued general interpretations of the rights 
contained in the ICESCR. These papers, known as ‘General Comments’, are 
what the Committee itself deems to be authentic interpretations of the 
Covenant. The Committee has adopted 23 General Comments thus far, among 
which we can highlight 1990 General Comment No. 3, on the nature of state 
obligations and the meaning of Article 2(1) ICESCR, and 1997 General 
Comment No. 9, on the domestic application of the ICESCR. 2000 General 
Comment No. 14, on the right to health, is also noteworthy because with it 
the Committee proposed to engage in a more systematic application of 
indicators and benchmarks for the monitoring of state compliance with the 
ICESCR.584 
Even though the ICESCR does not demand the domestic recognition of ESCR 
as justiciable rights, the CESCR has expressed the opinion that, “among the 
measures which might be considered appropriate, in addition to legislation, 
is the provision of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in 
accordance with the national legal system, be considered justiciable”.585 Later 
on, the Committee insisted that making ESCR justiciable is a way of ensuring 
an effective remedy, adding that:  
“A State party seeking to justify its failure to provide any domestic 
legal remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
would need to show either that such remedies are not "appropriate 
means" within the terms of article 2, paragraph 1, of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or that, in view of 
the other means used, they are unnecessary. It will be difficult to show 
this and the Committee considers that, in many cases, the other means 
used could be rendered ineffective if they are not reinforced or 
complemented by judicial remedies. […] Whenever a Covenant right 
cannot be made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, 
                                                 
584 See also OHCHR, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation 
(New York and Geneva: UN, 2012). 
585 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 5. 
 193 
judicial remedies are necessary. […] While the respective competences 
of the various branches of government must be respected, it is 
appropriate to acknowledge that courts are generally already involved 
in a considerable range of matters which have important resource 
implications. The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social 
and cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of 
the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible with the 
principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent. It would also drastically curtail the capacity of the 
courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups in society.”586  
This is the opinion of the UN Committee on ESCR, opinion by which it 
appraises states’ compliance with the ICESCR. As we will see later (section 
6.3), however, states may not necessarily agree with the Committee’s 
interpretation of the obligations derived from the ICESCR. 
Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts (so-called Special Procedures) 
of the Human Rights Council (previously, the Commission on Human Rights), 
whose mandate is decided by Member States, have also contributed to define 
the meaning of many ESCR. Practitioners and an increasing number of 
scholars interested in this particular set of rights have also helped in this 
regard. Three contributions are especially significant: the 1987 Limburg 
Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR, the 1997 Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of ESCR, and the 2011 Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of ESCR.587 
States played no role in the adoption of any of them, beyond possible 
consultations in the drafting processes. States drafted and voluntarily chose 
to ratify the ICESCR and other human rights treaties. They also voluntarily 
agreed to set up the UN Committee on ESCR and the Special Procedures of the 
Human Rights Council. Yet, once these independent bodies were in full swing, 
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states lost control over their hermeneutical work, based on which these same 
bodies judge state performance in the implementation of the ICESCR and the 
socioeconomic rights proclaimed in the UDHR.  
The justiciability of ESCR has been gaining traction in legal regimes around 
the world for decades,588 whilst it has not reached the level of acceptance 
granted to civil and political rights. Comparative data shows that 
constitutional recognition of civil and political rights and of ESCR has 
followed a similar progression since the 1970s; most countries have 
constitutionalised ESCR; yet, at the same time, ESCR are justiciable only in 69% 
of sampled countries, and all the rights proclaimed in the ICESCR are 
justiciable in 38% of the countries.589 
On the other hand, comparative analyses show that states still tend to 
proclaim ESCR in aspirational terms at the domestic level, as divorced as 
possible from strong enforcement mechanisms.590 This suggests that, while 
states are willing to formally proclaim ESCR in their constitutions, they are 
not so eager to give judges the power to oversee compliance with those rights, 
although admittedly the tide has gone in favour of the justiciability of ESCR. 
A strong push for justiciability of ESCR came with the adoption of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in 2008. As explained earlier (subsection 
6.2.2), one of the main differences between the ICESCR and the ICCPR is that, 
while the latter (via its 1966 Optional Protocol) established an individual 
complaint mechanism for the violation of civil and political rights, the former 
did not have such a procedure. In fact, it was only in 1985 when the ECOSOC 
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created the independent mechanism to oversee state compliance with the 
ICESCR. This gap was closed with the 2008 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 
which allows individuals to lodge complaints to the United Nations following 
a procedure similar to the one applicable to civil and political rights since the 
1970s. 
The CESCR had publicly talked of the need for an optional protocol as early as 
1991. Further calls in the same direction were made at the 1993 Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights. The Committee produced its first draft 
of an optional protocol in 1997. The proposal did not get much attention 
from states until the Commission on Human Rights decided to set up an 
independent expert first (in 2001) and then a working group (2002) to 
explore the possibilities of an optional protocol and to take the temperature 
of Member States’ level of support for such a mechanism. The first meeting of 
the working group took place in early 2004, and after several sessions, finally 
states agreed to the Optional Protocol in December 2008.591 
With the exceptions of Australia and the USA, no country explicitly 
challenged the justiciability of ESCR.592 However, even thought the Optional 
Protocol only needed ten ratifications to enter into force (Article 18(1)), it 
took more than four years to hit that target: It entered into force in May 2013. 
By May 2017, the Committee had made public its views on the merits of only 
two cases, both of them concerning Spain.593 Hitherto, 22 countries have 
ratified the treaty, including Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Spain in Western Europe. The UK has not even signed it. 
By and large, when discussing the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, countries 
did not oppose the international norm of the justiciability of ESCR. However, 
as in the case of the Revised European Social Charter, many Western 
European states have not taken the necessary steps to ratify the treaty, which 
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would have entailed a more explicit endorsement of the norm. We will return 
to states’ positions in the drafting process of the Optional Protocol in section 
6.3. 
Order-over-Justice foretells that the support of norm entrepreneurs is key for 
the international recognition of human rights norms (P6). Independent 
international bodies like UN Special Procedure mandate holders and the UN 
Committee on ESCR have promoted the justiciability of ESCR. Similarly, 
lawmakers, judges and lawyers have pushed the agenda of justiciability 
forward at the domestic level, which ultimately led to concrete examples of 
judicial enforceability in the last two decades. The idea that ESCR are not 
justiciable has lost support.594 
The norm of justiciability of ESCR has settled over time. IHRL has gone from 
three degrees of separation between these rights and the civil and political 
ones (different wording, different treaties, different tools of implementation), 
to the creation of an individual complaint mechanism at the UN level and a 
collective complaints mechanism in Europe. This said, the first tool has only 
been accepted by 22 countries in the whole world, and seven Western 
European states have not subscribed to the second one yet: Denmark, 
Germany, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. The 
constitutional recognition of ESCR has also evolved upwards, and we have an 
increasing number of examples of judicial enforceability of these rights 
worldwide. Also, official diplomatic records show that Western European 
states played a significant role in the international legal recognition of ESCR. 
We can conclude that, as an international human rights norm, the 
justiciability of ESCR has reached a point of advanced stage of development. 
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6.3. Spain and the UK in the promotion of the justiciability of ESCR 
 
Order-over-Justice expects states’ support for human rights norms to evolve 
over time. Countries would be more willing to support human rights norms 
in the beginning, when the implications of the norm are less clear and the 
implementation mechanisms are weaker (P1). At the same time, they would 
show less resistance against a norm the longer it has remained in the 
international system (P2).595 
Justiciability is an implementation mechanism of ESCR that has progressively 
settled. We would expect countries to more willingly support the 
international institutionalisation of ESCR in the beginning than in more 
recent years. 
This section reinterprets the way in which Spain and the UK have promoted 
the norm of the judicial enforceability of ESCR. The analysis explores states’ 
actions and discourses at both domestic and international levels. In other 
words, I try to establish if ESCR have been granted enforceability at the 
domestic level, and whether states’ words and deeds can be interpreted as 
manifestations of international endorsement of the norm of justiciability of 
ESCR. 
In temporal terms, the analysis begins in the mid 1990s, the time when the 
UN Committee on ESCR made public its first concrete proposal for an 
international individual complaint mechanism. Subsection 6.3.1 examines 
each country’s ESCR treaty ratification scorecard, together with their 
respective positions at the drafting process of two relevant treaties adopted 
in recent years: The 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is 
binding for all EU countries since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
in 2009, and the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which was adopted in 2008 
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and entered into force in May 2013. Secondly, I look at the responses given 
by the UK and Spain to the reporting process of the UN Committee on ESCR, 
the UN Special Procedures on ESCR who visited both countries since the mid 
1990s, and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the first two reporting 
cycles (subsection 6.3.2).596 Finally, since domestication is the strongest form 
of promotion of a human rights norm (see chapter 3), subsection 6.3.3 
disentangles the extent to which ESCR are judicially enforceable in the 
domestic legislation of both Spain and the UK. 
 
6.3.1. Treaty ratification and positions expressed in drafting processes 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
All European countries, except Andorra, have ratified the 1966 ICESCR. The 
UK ratified it in 1976, the year of its entry into force, and so did Spain in 1977, 
in the middle of its transition to democracy. The UK declared its reservations 
about the admissibility of self-determination as a full-fledged right, and made 
some additional reservations regarding the applicability of some provisions 
in its then colonies, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Spain ratified the 
treaty with no reservations.597 
European Social Charter 
With the exception of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, which have signed but 
not yet ratified it, most Western European states ratified the European Social 
Charter by 1980. Belgium did so in 1990, and Finland, Portugal and 
Luxembourg, in 1991. The UK ratified the Charter in 1962, and Spain in 1980. 
Both of them issued interpretative declarations in relation to some clauses, 
but no reservations.598 
Spain ratified the 1988 Protocol in 2000 without reservations. This Protocol 
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extended the list of rights. The UK has not even signed it. In 2000, Spain also 
ratified the 1991 Protocol, which was supposed to ratchet up the powers of 
the European Committee of Social Rights. This Protocol is not yet in force 
because it requires the ratification by all State Parties, and some have not 
done so yet, the UK among them. Neither Spain nor the UK has signed or 
ratified the 1995 Protocol on collective complaints procedures. They both 
signed the 1996 Revised Social Charter (UK in 1997 and Spain in 2000), 
which also includes the collective complaints procedures, but none of them 
has ratified it. 14 Member States of the Council of Europe are not parties to 
the Revised Charter, for 33 that have acceded to it. 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
Spain and the UK adopted very different positions in the drafting process of 
the Optional Protocol. 
Spain is among the seven Western European countries that have ratified the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which gives individuals the chance to submit 
complaints to the UN Committee on ESCR. The other countries are Belgium, 
Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. Spain was in fact the first 
European country and third country in the world to ratify this treaty. The UK 
has not even signed it. 
It is important to remember that, compared to its neighbours, the UK had a 
tradition of scepticism towards the international recognition of ESCR. During 
the drafting process of the UDHR, the UK delegate made an attempt to leave 
ESCR for a later convention, arguing that these rights were not amenable to 
the same kind of treatment of civil and political rights, and expressing a dim 
view regarding their justiciability.599 During the preparation of the ECHR, the 
UK Foreign Office insisted on the policy that it should only include rights that 
were undoubtedly enforceable by courts, which excluded ESCR.600 Spain did 
not play any role in the discussion of these documents, since it had been 
excluded from the global human rights regime due to the dictatorial 
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character of its government. 
The UN Commission on Human Rights set up an open-ended working group 
in 2002 “with a view to considering options regarding the elaboration” of an 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.601 As a result of the lack of agreement 
among Commission Members, the working group was initially mandated to 
“consider options”, and not directly to write a draft,602 although that is 
precisely what it ended up doing. The group began working in 2004 and held 
one session per year until the final adoption of the Protocol in 2008. 
The annual reports and Albuquerque’s insider view show that there were a 
variety of positions among Western European states. In the first session, 
February-March 2004, some delegations argued that ESCR lacked the 
necessary clarity to make them justiciable, while others referred to the case-
law in their own countries to make the counter-argument.603  
In the second session, January 2005, Spain was among the countries that 
supported an optional protocol, which were the majority and included other 
Western European states, like Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and 
Portugal. Spain expressed interest about the possible interpretation of the 
word “family” in the treaty,604 and insisted on the general rule of exhaustion 
of domestic remedies prior to bringing a case to an international body. The 
UK expressed the concern that an individual complaint mechanism would 
allow the Committee to examine domestic policies; together with other 
countries, it argued that international cooperation was “an important moral 
obligation but not a legal entitlement”; it “noted that some domestic remedies 
would be political in nature”; and called for clear and careful criteria on 
standing and jurisdiction. According to the report, “while the United Kingdom 
was still sceptical of the need to elaborate an optional protocol, its 
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representative noted that the deliberations in the working group had been 
helpful and it was willing to continue dialogue in a constructive manner”. 
Five countries “had yet to be convinced” about the need for an optional 
protocol: Australia, Canada, Japan, Poland and the USA.605 
The third session, February 2006, circulated around a working paper drafted 
by Albuquerque based on the mandate given by the working group one year 
earlier. 606  This session “marked a significant turning point” in the 
negotiations, because many countries expressed their support for an optional 
protocol.607 The Latin American and Caribbean states and the African states 
made their endorsement explicit, and so did some European countries, Spain 
among them. Australia, Japan, India, South Korea and the USA remained 
unconvinced. The UK expressed an opinion in favour of an à la carte 
approach, as opposed to the comprehensive inclusion of all the rights 
enshrined in the ICESCR. It also suggested the Committee should focus only 
on minimum core obligations, and defended a wide margin of appreciation 
for states.608 However, the UK did not seem to be among the sceptical 
countries anymore. 
The fourth session, July 2007, followed one of the first resolutions of the 
newly created Human Rights Council, which, acknowledging the work of the 
open-ended working group thus far, directly called for the development of a 
draft, thereby giving a decisive impetus to the process.609 Albuquerque 
submitted a draft for the consideration of the working group.610 African, Latin 
American and Caribbean states, together with some European ones, including 
                                                 
605 Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an 
optional protocol to the ICESCR on its 2nd session, 10 February 2005, UN doc: E/CN.4/2005/52, 
para. 101, 62, 92, 63, 76, 92, 94 and 103. 
606 Id, para. 109. Elements for an optional protocol to the ICESCR, Analytical paper by the 
Chairperson-Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque, UN doc: E/CN.4/2006/WG.23/2, 30 
November 2005. 
607 Albuquerque, Chronicle of an Announced Birth, 163. 
608 Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an 
optional protocol to the ICESCR on its 3rd session, 14 March 2006, UN doc: E/CN.4/2006/47, 
para. 6, 7, 10, 11, 124, 29, 84 and 92. 
609 Human Rights Council, Resolution 1/3: Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol 
to the ICESCR, 29 June 2006. 
610 1st draft: UN doc: A/HRC/6/WG.4/2, 23 April 2007. 
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Spain, defended a comprehensive approach against the hierarchy between 
rights that an à la carte approach would impose. The UK, on the contrary, 
opposed a comprehensive approach.611 
Based on the input of the fourth session, Albuquerque shared a second draft 
with the working group weeks before its fifth and final session, February and 
April 2008.612 Spain expressed a position favourable to the draft, making a 
statement that was summarised as follows: 
“Spain would have liked a higher threshold for protection of Covenant rights, 
but recognized that the text reflected a consensus and was a significant step 
towards the effective protection of these rights. It addressed an historic 
inequality between artificially created categories of rights”.613 
To the contrary, the UK made specific linguistic suggestions to limit the scope 
of the optional protocol, not all of which were included in the final version. In 
its final statement: 
“[T]he United Kingdom reserved its position on the draft. It remained 
sceptical about the practical benefits of the protocol, considering that 
economic, social and cultural rights did not lend themselves to 
adjudication in the same way as civil and political rights. It favoured 
an à la carte approach, and questioned whether the comprehensive 
approach was the best way to ensure an effective mechanism which 
would be ratified by the widest number of States”.614  
The right to self-determination, which is recognised in the ICESCR, was 
included at the last minute in the Optional Protocol. The Human Rights 
Council adopted the text in May 2008 without a vote,615 and the General 
Assembly confirmed it December 2008.616 
The detail of the drafting process shows a progressive trend towards the 
                                                 
611 Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an 
optional protocol to the ICESCR on its 4th session, 30 August 2007, UN doc: A/HRC/6/8, para. 33 
and 36-38. 
612 2nd draft: UN doc: A/HRC/8/WG.4/3, 25 March 2008. 
613 Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an 
optional protocol to the ICESCR on its 5th session, 6 May 2008, UN doc: A/HRC/8/7, para. 227, 
35, 59, 61, 71, 91 and 246. 
614 Id. 
615 Human Rights Council, Resolution 8/2: Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 18 June 2008. 
616 General Assembly, Resolution 63/117. 
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acceptance of the international justiciability of ESCR. The number of outliers 
was small, and most Western European states, and clearly Spain among them, 
leaned towards the group of norm promoters. However, the UK adopted a 
much more sceptical approach, which explains the fact that it has neither 
signed nor ratified the treaty, and there are no prospects that it would do it in 
the foreseeable future. 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Together with the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, the second international 
document that is relevant for our discussion is the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The EU Charter was drafted over 18 months between 
Cologne (European Council summit in June 1999) and Nice (European 
Council summit in December 2000). A convention was established with 
Member States, the European Parliament and the European Commission as 
drafters, and other EU institutions as observers. The then Spanish 
conservative MEP Iñigo Méndez de Vigo chaired the delegation of the 
European Parliament. 
The quick and relatively fluid drafting process was only somewhat disturbed 
by the UK. Valuable testimony by Lord Goldsmith, who was the UK 
representative at the convention, sheds light over the two key goals of his 
Government at the time: making fundamental rights “more visible” in the EU, 
but avoiding the “creation” of “new rights”, in reference to ESCR.617 The 
problem was that the European Council had already established in Cologne 
that economic and social rights had to be part of the future Charter. 
Interestingly, Goldsmith says that prior to the beginning of the drafting 
process, he believed the Charter was going to be a “political declaration”, not 
a legally binding instrument.618 However, it was soon made clear to him that 
the future Charter was going to unfold legal effects. Lord Goldsmith had the 
mandate of the British Government to do his best so the Charter did not 
“make economic and social rights justiciable where they are not already 
                                                 
617 Lord Goldsmith, A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles, Common Market Law Review, 
38:5 (2001), 1207. 
618 Id, 1215. 
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justiciable”.619 In Goldsmith’s view, this was achieved by the distinction 
between rights and principles, ESCR belonging to this second group.620 In 
other words, the UK was going to accept the inclusion of ESCR in the Charter 
as long as they were not given the same status of civil and political rights. 
Article 52(5) of the Charter makes clear that for principles to be 
implemented, they require legislative and executive acts, and that principles 
may be justiciable only in the interpretation of such acts. Two additional 
safeguards were established just in case the distinction between rights and 
principles was not sufficiently clear. First, the proclamation of ESCR in 
several provisions of the Charter was nuanced by the words “under the 
conditions established by national laws and practices” (or similar jargon) to 
ensure that ESCR are not treated as justiciable by judges when states clearly 
did not intend them to be justiciable.621 And secondly, the UK and Poland 
demanded (and the rest of Member States accepted) the attachment of a 
protocol (No. 30) about the application of the Charter to them. Protocol No. 
30 confirms that ESCR will not be justiciable in the UK and Poland unless 
these rights have been recognised as such by their national laws and 
practices. 
All EU Member States formally signed the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights at the Nice European Council in December 2000. The Charter has “the 
same legal value as the Treaties”, since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009 (Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union).622 
Furthermore, bearing in mind the standing case-law of the European Court of 
                                                 
619 European Scrutiny Committee, The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the 
UK: a state of confusion (London: House of Commons, 2014), para. 29. 
620 Id, para. 41-42. 
621 It is the case of Articles 27 (workers’ right to information and participation), 28 (collective 
bargaining), 30 (protection in case of unjustified dismissal), 34 (social security) and 35 (health). 
No such specification was deemed necessary for civil and political rights, or for the right to private 
property (Article 17). 
622 Another example of the different treatment of ESCR and civil and political rights is that while 
the Treaty of Lisbon established that the EU had to ratify the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Article 6(2)), it did not establish an equivalent mandate in relation to the European Social 
Charter. (Find an appeal for EU’s ratification of the European Social Charter in Olivier de Schutter, 
L'adhésion de l'Union européenne à la Charte sociale européenne, Brussels: Université 
Catholique de Louvain, 2014[2004]). 
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Justice before and after the adoption of the Charter, it is clear that the Charter 
is directly effective in the UK, with supremacy over national legislation, in 
relation to all areas that fall within the scope of EU law. Protocol No. 30 is 
therefore not an “opt-out” from the Charter, and the UK Government did 
admit its binding nature when British authorities act within the scope of EU 
law.623 
 
6.3.2. Interaction with international human rights mechanisms on ESCR  
 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Since 1996, both Spain and the UK have been examined three times by the UN 
Committee on ESCR. This kind of examinations is supposed to happen every 
five years. However, governments often incur in delays in the submission of 
their reports. 
In the case of the UK, the issue of justiciability came up right from the 
beginning. Pushed by one Committee member, in the dialogue between the 
UK delegation and the Committee in 1997, the UK expressed its position on 
the matter as follows: 
“The rights enshrined in the Covenant [the ICESCR] were not applied 
in the United Kingdom by incorporating the Covenant as it stood into 
domestic law. Although the Government accepted the obligations 
contained therein, the British preference was for hard law on specific 
issues rather than for law setting out general principles, with the 
result that the principles and programmes contained in the Covenant 
were given effect by a large body of existing law dealing with many 
social, economic and, less frequently, cultural, issues. […] The United 
Kingdom had already seen how the Convention [the European 
Convention on Human Rights] operated in practice, through its 
experience of the individual petition procedure since 1968, and had 
concluded that its provisions were capable of incorporation into 
domestic law, unlike the Covenant, where the wording of some articles 
did not readily lend themselves to passage into such law.”624 
                                                 
623 European Scrutiny Committee, The application of the EU Charter, para. 112. 
624 CESCR, Summary record: E/C.12/1997/SR.36, 27 November 1997, para. 45-46. See other 
summary records in E/C.12/1997/SR.37 and E/C.12/1997/SR.38. Country report: E/C.12/4/Add.8, 
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With these words, the UK was making clear that it believed ESCR to be 
ontologically different from civil and political rights, and that difference 
explained that while the latter group of rights could benefit from judicial 
enforceability, the former cannot, inasmuch as “their wording does not 
readily lend themselves to passage into such law”. In its final report, the 
Committee on ESCR praised the British Government for the then Human 
Rights Bill, which was going to be limited to civil and political rights, “which 
constitutes a considerable departure from the traditional approach not to 
incorporate international human rights treaties”. However, the Committee 
also said to be “disturbed” by the mentioned UK position “that provisions of 
the Covenant, with certain minor exceptions, constitute principles and 
programmatic objectives rather than legal obligations, and that consequently 
the provisions of the Covenant cannot be given legislative effect”.625  
This concern was reiterated in 2002.626 In its dialogue with the Committee, 
the UK delegation insisted on its position:  
“[The] Government was determined to comply with its obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, but considered that the rights enshrined therein were not 
justiciable and that it was not for British judges to interpret the 
provisions of the Covenant. Unlike the European Convention on 
Human Rights, whose provisions were very specific, the Covenant was 
primarily concerned with more general commitments.”627  
Naturally, justiciability also came up in the 2009 Concluding Observations, 
regretting that the UK saw ESCR as “mere principles and values”.628 The UK 
responded to the Committee’s report as follows:  
“How to ensure compliance with the Covenant is a matter for each 
State, as confirmed by general comment No. 9. There is no provision in 
the Covenant obligating its comprehensive incorporation or requiring 
it to be accorded any specific type of status in national law. We 
consider that the United Kingdom’s method of implementation 
                                                                                                                                     
28 February 2001. 
625 CESCR, Concluding Observations: E/C.12/1/Add.19, 12 December 1997, para. 4.b and 10. 
626 CESCR, Concluding Observations: E/C.12/1/Add.79, 5 June 2002, para. 11. 
627 Summary record: E/C.12/2002/SR.11, para. 21. Other Summary record: E/C.12/2002/SR.12 
and E/C.12/2002/SR.13. 
628 CESCR, Concluding Observations: E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, 12 June 2009, para. 13. 
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ensures the fulfilment of the obligations under the Covenant.”629 
In its 2014 report to the Committee, the UK insisted that the ICESCR does not 
require states to incorporate the treaty into domestic legislation, and 
consequently felt confident its method of implementation satisfied the 
requirements of the ICESCR.630 This is something the CESCR voiced regret 
about in its 2016 Concluding Observations, because it “may restrict access to 
effective legal remedies for violations of Covenant rights”.631 
While justiciability has been part of the on-going discussion between the UK 
and the Committee for a number of years, it did not come up for Spain until 
2012. 
In its Concluding Observations of 1996, the Committee did not address the 
issue of justiciability, and the summary records show that no Committee 
member raised it in front of the Spanish delegation. 632  In the 2004 
Concluding Observations, the Committee reiterated some of the concerns 
expressed in previous reports (on unemployment, equality between men and 
women, migrants’ living conditions, discrimination against Roma 
population…), and raised new ones (related to housing or foreign aid, for 
example), but did not mention justiciability, which was not included in the 
written list of issues sent to the delegation in advance or in the Government’s 
report.633 
In its latest Concluding Observations, the Committee congratulated Spain for 
the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, and for the first time, it 
expressed concerns about the lack of justiciability of ESCR in the country: 
“The Committee is concerned that, with the exception of the right to 
education, which is one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Constitution, economic, social and cultural rights are considered by 
                                                 
629 Comments by the UK on the concluding observations, E/C.12/GBR/CO/5/Add.1, 23 July 2009, 
2. The point had been made in the country report: E/C.12/GBR/5, 31 January 2008, para. 73-74. 
630 Country report: E/C.12/GBR/6, 25 September 2014, para. 11. 
631 CESCR, Concluding Observations: UK, UN doc. E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016, para. 5-6. 
632 CESCR, Concluding Observations: E/C.12/1/Add.2, 28 May 1996. Meeting Summary record: 
E/C.12/1996/SR.3, E/C.12/1996/SR.5, E/C.12/1996/SR.6 and E/C.12/1996/SR.7. 
633 CESCR, Concluding Observations: E/C.12/1/Add.99, 7 June 2004. List of issues: 
E/C.12/Q/ESP/2, 24 June 2003. Summary record: E/C.12/2004/SR.12, E/C.12/2004/SR.13 and 
E/C.12/2004/SR.14. Country report: E/C.12/4/Add.11, 14 January 2003. 
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the State party only as “guiding principles” of social and economic 
policy, legislation and judicial practice. The Committee is also 
concerned that the provisions of the Covenant have rarely been 
invoked or applied in the courts of the State party. 
The Committee urges the State party, in light of the indivisibility, 
universality and interdependence of human rights, to take the 
necessary legislative measures to ensure that economic, social and 
cultural rights enjoy the same level of protection as civil and political 
rights. The Committee also recommends that the State party take 
appropriate measures to ensure that the provisions of the Covenant 
are fully justiciable and applicable by domestic courts.”634 
Justiciability does not appear in the list of issues submitted by the Committee 
to the Spanish Government in advance, or in the summary records of the 
discussion between the Committee and state delegates.635 The issue had only 
been raised by Amnesty International and by a coalition of 19 national civil 
society organisations in their shadow reports.636 Most likely, the Committee 
finally expressed concerns about the lack of justiciability of ESCR in Spain as 
a result of the advocacy work of the NGOs.  
The next review will take place in late 2017 or in 2018 In its list of issues 
prior to the state’s report, the CESCR has requested the Spanish Government 
to “explain how [Spain] ensures access to effective remedies in cases of 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights”, and to provide specific 
examples from domestic courts.637 
UN Special Procedures 
Three ESCR-related Special Procedure mandate holders have visited the UK 
in the last few years: the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 
Jorge Bustamante, in 2009,638 the Working Group of Experts on People of 
                                                 
634 CESCR, Concluding Observations: E/C.12/ESP/CO/5, 6 June 2012, para. 4 and 6. 
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Economic and Social Rights et al, Informe Conjunto al Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales 
y Culturales con motivo del examen del quinto informe periódico de España (Madrid: CESR et al, 
2012). 
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African Descent, in 2012,639 and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, 
Raquel Rolnik, in 2013.640 None of these reports makes explicit references to 
the justiciability of ESCR. 
Although not directly related to justiciability, the UK has quarrelled with UN 
Special Procedures in relation to ESCR in particular. The UK Government 
responded with unusual starkness to Rolnik’s report, because it believed that 
the report contained “a number of inaccuracies and omissions”. 641 
Beforehand, the then Chairman of the Conservative Party had sent a letter to 
the UN Secretary General accusing Rolnik of “political bias”.642 
A more recent report of a treaty-body was also received with a harsh tone. In 
November 2016, the Government “disagreed strongly” with the conclusions 
of the inquiry procedure of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, the first one of its kind by this Committee.643 The UN’s report 
required the Government’s approval to be published. The report was leaked 
to The Daily Mail only a couple of days before this authorisation; the 
newspaper deemed the report “controversial” and suggested, by echoing 
words of a Conservative MP, that the Committee was concerned with the sex 
life of persons with disabilities, and access to sex work in particular, 
something the UN’s report did not talk about.644  
Since the mid 1990s, two UN Special Procedure mandate holders on ESCR-
related issued visited Spain: the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, 
Miloon Kothari, in 2006, and the Working Group on Discrimination Against 
Women in Law and in Practice, in 2014. This second Working Group did not 
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issue recommendations related to justiciability,645 but the Special Rapporteur 
on Housing did: 
“The Special Rapporteur believes that the State should ensure 
justiciability of the right to adequate housing contained in the Spanish 
Constitution and relevant international instruments, through 
accessible complaint mechanisms available to all. A timely 
implementation of the recommendations of treaty bodies and Special 
Rapporteurs is necessary.”646  
The Spanish Government responded to Kothari at the 7th session of the 
Human Rights Council (March 2008) politely appreciating his report, subtly 
complaining about the late submission, and presenting a list of measures 
implemented since the Special Rapporteur’s visit to the country.647 The 
official response did not touch on the point about justiciability of ESCR. 
Universal Periodic Review 
Both the UK and Spain made and received ESCR-related recommendations in 
the two reporting cycles until 2016 at the Universal Periodic Review of the 
Human Rights Council.648 For comparative purposes, the UK’s third periodic 
review, which took place on 4 May 2017, has not been considered in the 
analysis. 
Altogether, the UK received 172 recommendations in 2008 and 2012. In the 
latest review, Spain recommended the ratification of the Optional Protocol,649 
but the UK government rejected this recommendation because it “remains 
unclear about the practical benefits of the right to individual petition to the 
UN”.650 The government used similar words when the issue was raised by the 
CESCR in June 2016.651 The UK mysteriously accepted a recommendation 
from Qatar to “continue to ensure that human rights principles are integrated 
                                                 
645 Working Group report on Spain: A/HRC/29/40/Add.3, 17 June 2015. 
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in domestic law”, but in its explanation the UK only referred to the Human 
Rights Act, which shows that the country delegates in Geneva had only civil 
and political rights in mind when they read the expression “human rights 
principles”. The UK made 979 recommendations by January 2017, only ten of 
which are general ESCR-related, targeted essentially at small countries that 
have not yet ratified the ICESCR.652 
Spain received a total of 229 recommendations in both cycles, in 2010 and 
2015. In the first cycle, it accepted two recommendations from Afghanistan 
and Portugal to ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which, as we know, 
it did that year itself (and ironically Afghanistan has not done yet), and it 
“noted” (a diplomatic euphemism for “rejected”) a recommendation from 
Uruguay calling to “ensure that all migrants have effective access to services 
related to ESCR, irrespective of their migration status”. In the second cycle, 
Spain heard recommendations from ten countries in relation to the negative 
impact of austerity-led policies on ESCR, particularly a 2012 healthcare 
reform that had restricted access to healthcare for migrants in an irregular 
situation.653 With the exception of Norway, no European country was among 
those making ESCR-related recommendations. Spain accepted all these 
recommendations, even though civil society organisations would probably 
not agree that Spain has already reversed the retrogressive measures on the 
right to health and other socioeconomic rights. Spain is one of the most 
proactive countries at the UPR process. It made 1515 recommendations by 
January 2017, 116 of which are about ESCR in general, including the 
ratification of the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol. 
 
6.3.3. Justiciability of ESCR in domestic legal regimes 
 
United Kingdom 
                                                 
652 Find relevant UPR statistics at: https://www.upr-info.org/database/statistics/  
653 Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Macedonia, Moldova, Nicaragua, Norway, Thailand and Uruguay. 
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As is well known, the UK does not have a written constitution. The 
constitution derives from legislation, case law and customary practice. As 
noted in the common core document submitted by the UK Government to all 
UN human rights bodies,654 the two main principles underpinning the UK 
constitution are the rule of law and parliamentary supremacy, which means 
that “an Act of Parliament cannot be overridden by other bodies”. This is a 
subtle way of warning any international body that may feel the temptation to 
oppose a domestic law to its own interpretation of a given treaty. The core 
document also states that “the UK implements its international human rights 
obligations through appropriate legislation and administrative measures. 
International instruments do not, however, apply directly in UK law”.655  
The traditional dualist separation between international and national laws is 
no longer that clear-cut in the opinion of some members of the highest 
judicial authority of the land. In R (SG & Ors) v. Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2015], a case related to the indirectly discriminatory impact of 
austerity-led welfare cuts, Lord Reed admitted that the welfare reform might 
infringe the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but since this Convention 
has not been domesticated, it would be “inappropriate for the courts to 
purport to decide whether or not the Executive has correctly understood an 
unincorporated treaty obligation”. 656  Lord Carnwath reached a similar 
conclusion: He was ready to “declare” that the regulation was not 
“compatible” with the Convention of the Rights of the Child, but “it is in the 
political, rather than the legal arena, that the consequences of that must be 
played out”.657 But other Justices saw it differently. Lady Hale expressed the 
view that the UK’s international obligations “have the potential to illuminate 
our approach to both discrimination and justification”.658 Lord Kerr added 
that, “despite the seemingly comprehensive ban on the use by the courts of 
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unincorporated international treaties to recognise rights on the domestic law 
plane, there are three possible ways which have been considered by the 
courts in which such treaties may have an impact on national law – (i) as an 
aid to statutory interpretation; (ii) as an aid to development of the common 
law; and (iii) as a basis for legitimate proposition” that authorities will take 
ratified human rights treaties into account in the exercise of their powers; 
therefore, at least some treaties should be “directly enforceable in UK 
domestic law” regardless of the lack of an Act of Parliament.659 
The Human Rights Act 1998 made the rights contained in the European 
Convention of Human Rights directly enforceable by UK courts. However, this 
Convention only includes civil and political rights. As denounced by the UN 
Committee on ESCR in several occasions (see subsection 6.3.2), ESCR are not 
justiciable in the UK. 
In 2009, the UK Government opened up a process of revision of the Human 
Rights Act. The framing document of the consultation made clear that the 
Government did not intend to make ESCR justiciable in a possible new Bill of 
Rights: 
“Decision-making in economic, social and cultural matters usually 
involves politically sensitive resource allocation and if the courts were 
to make these decisions, this would be likely to impinge on the 
principles of democratic accountability as well as the separation of 
powers between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive which 
underpins our constitutional arrangements. 
In drawing up a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, the Government 
would not seek to create new and individually enforceable legal rights 
in addition to the array of legal protections already available. However, 
it welcomes discussion on whether there could be advantages in 
articulating constitutional principles, which can be drawn from 
existing welfare provisions. It might be possible to distil the values 
which frame our welfare system in order to reflect, in one coherent 
document, certain social and economic guarantees and the 
responsibilities and conduct expected of individuals.”660 
A year earlier, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights had 
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advised the improvement of the Human Rights Act to incorporate the duty of 
progressive realisation of ESCR with a limited judicial role.661 And as far as 
2004 the Joint Committee had actually recommended the use of the ICESCR 
as a framework for government policy development, including a discussion of 
the compatibility of each Bill with the rights contained in the Covenant.662 
None of these suggestions was taken any further. 
The reform of the Human Rights Act was eventually called off by the coalition 
Government (2010-2015), but a Conservative Government might reopen the 
discussion about its replacement by a “British Bill of Rights”.663 Whatever a 
new text might bring, it is unlikely to see a significant change in a policy that 
has consistently treated ESCR as non-justiciable rights. 
 
Spain  
ESCR are essentially not justiciable in Spain. Article 53 of the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution makes a hierarchy within the constitutional bill of rights. 
According to that provision, civil and political rights recognised in Chapter 
Two of Title One “are binding for all public authorities”, and may only be 
regulated by law, which shall respect their essential content. Some among 
them (Articles 14-29 and part of Article 30) are enforceable in a preferential 
and summary judicial procedure, and are even protected by individual appeal 
to the Constitutional Court (“recurso de amparo”). The right to education and 
the right to form and to join a trade union are the only socioeconomic rights 
in this list (Articles 27 and 28).664 All other ESCR are included in Chapter 
Three of Title One, on “governing principles of economic and social policy”.665 
                                                 
661 Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK? Twenty–ninth Report of 
Session 2007–08 (London: House of Commons, 2008), p. 53. 
662 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Twenty–first Report of Session 2003–04 (London: House of Commons, 2004), pp. 
30 and 32. 
663 Financial Times, “PM plots British Bill of Rights ahead of EU referendum”, 24 July 2015. 
664 Unionisation and education are also the only socioeconomic rights the European Court was 
given jurisdiction over, via Article 11 in the first case and via Protocol I in the second one. The 
right to private property is also included in this Protocol but it is conventionally considered a civil 
right. 
665 Chapter Three of Title One deals with protection of family and children (Article 39), right to 
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Article 53(3) of the Constitution makes clear that the rights included in that 
Chapter “may only be invoked in the ordinary courts in the context of the 
legal provisions by which they are developed”. In other words, the 
Constitution does not establish the justiciability of ESCR, but it does so for 
civil and political rights. 
The Spanish constitutional and legal regime follows the path paved by 
Articles 22 UDHR and 2(1) ICESCR, and treats ESCR as second-class rights. 
The Constitution leaves the recognition of judicial enforceability to future 
legal development, but in general neither federal nor regional legislation 
guarantees a minimum core content of ESCR or has established their 
justiciability.666  
Article 10(2) of the Constitution says that the bill of rights must be 
interpreted in accordance with international human rights law, and 
especially the UDHR. However, this is only an interpretive tool and the 
Constitutional Court has established that IHRL does not give constitutional 
status to human rights, unless they are already included in the Constitution 
itself.667 With the partial exception of the judgements of the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Spanish judiciary does not consider the decisions of 
international bodies to be legally binding. 668  This will most certainly 
constrain the impact of future decisions of the UN Committee on ESCR on 
individual complaints in application of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. 
In spite of the general lack of justiciability of ESCR in the Spanish 
                                                                                                                                     
work and rights at work (Articles 40 and 42), social security (Article 41), right to health (Article 
43), protection of culture and heritage (Articles 44 and 46), protection of the environment (Article 
45), right to housing (Article 47), youth participation (Article 48), rights of people with disabilities 
(Article 49), protection of the elderly (Article 50), consumers’ rights (Article 51) and professional 
organisations (Article 52). 
666 AI, Información para el Comité DESC de la ONU. An exception would be the new Housing 
Law of the Basque Country (Law 3/2015), adopted on 18 June 2015, which explicitly establishes 
the justiciability of this right. However, the Spanish Government appealed this Law to the 
Constitutional Court, which suspended its application until a final ruling.  
667 For example, Constitutional Court Judgements 36/1991, 14 February, 64/1991, 22 March, 
372/1993, 13 December, 199/1996, 3 December, and 41/2002, 25 February. 
668 Constitutional Court Judgements 70/2002, 3 April, 240/2005, 10 October; Supreme Court 
Judgements 953/2011, 9 March, and 330/2015, 19 May; Council of State of Spain, Ruling 
318/2015, 11 June 2015, 9, in relation to the following case heard by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: González Carreño v. Spain, Communication 
47/2012, UN doc: CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012, 15 August 2014. 
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constitutional and legal framework, and the non self-executing nature of 
international human rights treaties, the Constitutional Court has sometimes 
contributed to the legal protection of ESCR. Three cases stand out. In 2007, 
the Court established that all foreigners, regardless of their administrative 
status, are entitled to some of the rights recognised in the Constitution, 
including socioeconomic rights like the right to education and the right to 
join unions.669 And in 2012 and 2014, the Constitutional Court noted the 
close connection between the social right to health and the civil rights to life 
and to physical and moral integrity, allowing the Basque Country and 
Navarre to ensure healthcare protection for migrants in an irregular 
administrative situation, in spite of a recent federal reform that had 
restricted the right to health for them.670 However, in 2016 the Constitutional 
Court concluded, with three dissenting votes out of 12, that the Spanish 




Order-over-Justice presages that Western European states will be ready to 
support human rights norms whose meaning is relatively blurry, whose 
implications are relatively light, whose liberal foundations are well 
established, and whose supporters include strong and resourceful norm 
entrepreneurs. 
Justiciability of ESCR is only a partially suitable candidate from this 
perspective. Justiciability is an easily understandable implementation 
mechanism (P3) that has been strongly advocated by social rights groups and 
independent international bodies for more than two decades now (P6). On 
the other hand, the analysis in relation to burden (P4) and liberalism (P5) 
leads to more nuanced conclusions. 
                                                 
669 Constitutional Court Judgement 236/2007, 7 November. 
670 Constitutional Court Decisions (“Autos”) 239/2012, 12 December, and 114/2014, 8 April. 
671 Constitutional Court Judgement 139/2016, 21 July. 
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Order-over-Justice essentially downplays the differences between Western 
European countries. However, in relation to this norm, there is clearly no 
single policy among these states with regard to ESCR treaty ratification. They 
all have ratified the main global treaty, the ICESCR, but have adopted 
different positions in relation to the European ones. The UK and Spain are 
among the least willing states when it comes to international implementation 
commitments at the European level. However, surprisingly, Spain was one of 
the first countries to ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. It is difficult 
to explain why Spain was so quick to accept individual complaints at the UN 
level, but still unwilling to do the same thing with collective complaints at the 
Council of Europe. Spain and the UK expressed very different views on the 
justiciability of ESCR in the drafting process of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR, and the UK made clear that it did not want justiciable ESCR in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Even though the justiciability of ESCR has reached an advanced degree of 
settlement in international law and politics, our two countries have a poor 
record in the domestication of this norm, even if Spain has been more 
proactive than the UK in its promotion globally. While Spain appears to 
follow an internationalist agenda, the UK is a zealous protector of its national 
sovereignty. 
Order-over-Justice does not grant much importance to internal political and 
democratic changes. This remains a valid proposition as regards the two 
countries examined here. Since ESCR are closely connected to welfare state, 
one could expect state practice to be somehow shaped by changes in 
government. Yet, there is no compelling reason to believe that this influenced 
the approach to ESCR justiciability in Spain or in the UK. In the last two 
decades, a conservative party has ruled Spain for 12 years and a social-
democratic party, for eight. In the case of the UK, (New) Labour was in power 
for 13 years, a Liberal Democrat–Conservative coalition, for five, and now 
Conservatives are back in power on their own. During this time, Spain 
endorsed the justiciability of ESCR at the UN, but not at the Council of Europe, 
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and clearly not internally, while the UK has been consistent in not promoting 
the norm at any level. In any case, even if the UK clearly does not support the 
norm, aware of its progressive settlement, it has not opposed its 
international recognition either.  
Justice influenced-actors like domestic courts, NGOs and international human 
rights bodies have played a significant role in the progressive recognition of 
the justiciability of ESCR. However, ESCR-related Special Procedures did not 
raise the issue in their recent missions to Spain and the UK, with the 
exception of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing in Spain. 
Justiciability has been a recurrent concern in the last four reporting cycles of 
the UN Committee on ESCR on the UK, and in the latest report on Spain, 
precisely when two NGO alternative reports brought the issue to the 
Committee’s attention. 
As said in the first paragraph of these conclusions, there are reasons to 
believe that justiciability is a liberal norm that imposes a burdensome 
requirement, but only to some degree. On the one hand, justiciability could 
give judges the power to assess the executive allocation of resources to fulfil 
ESCR. On the other hand, as an implementation mechanism, justiciability 
leaves unattended systemic and structural conditioning factors for the 
fulfilment of ESCR. As proclaimed in Article 2(1) ICESCR, the progressive 
realisation of ESCR requires the adoption of all the necessary measures to the 
maximum of available resources. This probably means the adoption of fiscal 
and economic policies that may be at odds with certain trends experienced in 
Western Europe in the last decades, particularly austerity-led policies since 
2008. Inasmuch as it deals with individual cases, compared with binding 
monetary, fiscal or socioeconomic guidelines, justiciability is likely to be one 
of the least burdensome of the necessary mechanisms to implement ESCR. 
In sum, since the adoption of the UDHR, Western European states have 
promoted ESCR. However, Western European states tried to keep control 
over the meaning of these rights by refusing to establish strong 
accountability mechanisms. As time went by, justiciability became an integral 
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part of ESCR as a result of the advocacy and hermeneutics of non-state and 
justice-motivated actors. Western European states reluctantly accepted this 
normative change by endorsing the norm but mostly in its poorest form, that 
is, with weak international accountability mechanisms as opposed to giving 






7. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 
 “The notion that because a régime is detestable foreign intervention is justified 
and forcible overthrow is legitimate is extremely dangerous. That could 
ultimately jeopardize the very maintenance of international law and order and 
make the continued existence of various régimes dependent on the judgement 
of their neighbours.” 
French Ambassador to the UN in response to Vietnam’s intervention in 
Cambodia, 12 January 1979.672 
 
Focusing on the third pillar, which potentially covers military action, this 
chapter starts by introducing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an 
evolved and sophisticated version of humanitarian intervention (section 7.1). 
The chapter continues with the propositions on clarity, burden, liberal 
principles and the role of norm entrepreneurs (7.2). Thirdly, it observes the 
practice (action and discourse) of the UK and Spain between 2005 and 2016. 
It does so by looking at states’ general position on R2P as declared at the 
Security Council, General Assembly and other statements, and the position 
adopted in relation to Sudan (Darfur), Sri Lanka, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Syria (7.3). The information in this third section is principally nourished by 
the UK case due to the availability of sources.  
 
7.1. From the right to intervene to the responsibility to protect? 
 
Developed at the dawn of the millennium, R2P is a call to protect civilian 
populations from gross violations of human rights. It is often understood to 
be comprised of three pillars: firstly, it recalls governments’ responsibility to 
protect their own people; secondly, it calls on them to cooperate to build 
                                                 
672 UN Security Council, Official record of the 2109th meeting, of 12 January 1979, UN doc: 
S/PV.2109, para. 36. 
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capacities to protect the population in all countries; and thirdly, and most 
controversially, it establishes that the international community should take 
collective action, even with military means if necessary, to protect civilians if 
a national government is manifestly failing to take care of its people. 
R2P was coined in December 2001 by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was functionally 
independent albeit sponsored by the Canadian government. The ICISS report 
attempted to “shift the terms of the debate” from the right to intervene to the 
responsibility to protect.673 More than 400 pages of supplementary and 
valuable research, bibliography and background information on morality, 
international law and the history of humanitarian interventions accompanied 
the report.674 
Based on the idea that sovereignty entails responsibility, ICISS advocated that 
the state holds the “primary responsibility” to protect its people, but “where 
a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to 
halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect”.675 Thus, the responsibility to protect would not 
only behove national authorities, but the international community as a whole. 
This opens the question about who in the international community should 
decide about an intervention. Controversially, the ICISS report recommends 
that other options must be explored “when the Security Council fails to act”: 
the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure (used for 
Korea in 1950), regional organisations like NATO or the African Union, or 
even so-called coalitions of the willing as last resort.676 In other words, ICISS 
endorsed the idea that legality and legitimacy are two different things: A 
humanitarian intervention manu militari may be legitimate even when it 
                                                 
673 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
2001), 16-18.  
674 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
675 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, xi. 
676 Id, 53-55. 
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does not follow the legally established procedure of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. 
Throughout history, a number of military interventions have been presented, 
perceived and sometimes disguised as humanitarian in nature. In the 19th 
century, Russia and Western powers intervened in Greece and Eastern 
Europe to protect Christians from the Ottoman Empire. 677  Frequently 
mentioned examples from the 20th century are India’s intervention in East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Vietnam in Cambodia and Tanzania in Uganda, 
all of them in the 1970s.678  
Albeit the interventions in East Pakistan, Cambodia and Uganda were not 
formulated in humanitarian terms, but as self-defence, the literature 
regularly categorises them as such. On the contrary, the Cuban intervention 
against the illegal679 South African occupation of Angola in the 1970s and 80s 
normally does not feature as an example of humanitarianism, even though it 
contributed to break “the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressors” 
according to Nelson Mandela.680  
The end of the Cold War paved the way for an expansionist interpretation of 
the mandate of the Security Council in relation to international peace and 
security.681 By doing so, over the last quarter of a century the Security 
                                                 
677 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Katzenstein, Peter 
(ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1996); Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 46; Gareth Evans, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 19. 
678 Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”; Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 
ch. 2, 3 and 4; ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, ch. 4; 
Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 23-25. 
679 According to the ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971. 
680 Nelson Mandela’s speech on the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the start of the Cuban 
revolution, 26 July 1991. The only time the ICISS mentioned Cuba in the 400-page report was to 
say that “interventions during the Cold War were far more likely to be undertaken by a single state 
(for example, the United States [US] in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and South 
Africa and Cuba in Angola), whether directly or by proxy, than they were to be multilateral” (The 
Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, 18). Considering that the Cuban 
intervention in Angola is coupled with that of South Africa, and with the wars in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan, I assume the ICISS did not deem Cuba’s motivations sufficiently humanitarian. 
681 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, ch. 5; Bruce Cronin 
and Ian Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (London: 
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Council has appeared much more willing to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of a number of countries where serious violations of human rights were 
taking place. In the 1990s, this happened in Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia 
(1991), Liberia (1992), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993), Haiti (1994), Sierra 
Leone (1997) and Timor-Leste (1999). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 
Security Council endorsed the interventions of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in hindsight.  
These interventions were unable to prevent some of the most serious human 
rights violations. Even more, UN troops were accused of committing human 
rights violations of their own, a good number of which went unpunished.682 
Shortcomings, inconsistencies and serious missteps aside, the message from 
the 1990s was that the international community could not sit on the fence 
while people were being slaughtered. 
The aforementioned cases were examples of Security Council action, but two 
cases of inaction in that decade stand out for the purposes of explaining 
normative development. First, Rwanda in 1994, when the world stayed put 
while genocide killed 800,000 people in three months. Second, Kosovo in 
1998, where the Serbian government was reportedly targeting the Kosovar 
population, but the Security Council failed to agree on any sort of action 
because of the Russian pledge to veto. NATO forces intervened in spite of the 
lack of endorsement of the Security Council. This intervention was, at least 
procedurally, illegal.683 Nonetheless, for those who argue that legality and 
                                                                                                                                     
Routledge, 2008); Aidan Hehir, Natasha Kuhrt and Andrew Mumford (eds.), International Law, 
Security and Ethics: Policy Challenges in the post-9/11 World (London: Routledge, 2011); Carrie 
Walling, Human Rights Norms, State Sovereignty, and Humanitarian Intervention, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 37:2 (2015).  
682 This grave concern was raised by the two panels on UN Peace Operations established so far: 
the “Brahimi Report” of 2000 (UN doc: A/55/305-S/2000/809), and the High-level Independent 
Panel of 2015 (UN doc: A/70/95-S/2015/446). 
683 Nigel Rodley and Basak Çali, Kosovo Revisited: Humanitarian Intervention on the Fault Lines 
of International Law, Human Rights Law Review, 7:2 (2007). Soon after India’s incursion in 
Bangladesh in the early 1970s, Franck and Rodley expressed their profound scepticism about the 
notion of humanitarian intervention: “Nothing would be a more foolish footnote to man’s demise 
than that his final destruction was occasioned by a war to ensure human rights”; “a usable general 
definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’ would be extremely difficult to formulate and virtually 
impossible to apply rigorously; […] the kind of unilateral military intervention which has occurred 
in the past is usually not to be encouraged, that those kinds of intervention which it would be 
desirable to encourage have for reasons of self-interest almost never occurred in the past and that 
 224 
legitimacy are not necessarily the same thing in international affairs,684 the 
alleged humanitarianism legitimised the intervention and put it in line with 
the spirit or the “ideology” of international law,685 although not with its letter 
per se.  
In April 2000, in the aftermath of the intervention in Kosovo, the G-77, which 
brings together about 130 countries from the Global South, met in Havana 
and stated firmly its opposition to what they believed was an imposition of 
Western powers: “We reject the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, 
which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general 
principles of international law.”686 Russia was therefore not alone in its 
opposition to NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
However, while they met in Cuba with other delegates from the Global South, 
African countries were negotiating the Constitutive Act of the new African 
Union, which was finally adopted in July 2000. Article 4 of the Constitutive 
Act, on the principles of the African Union, mentions peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and the prohibition of use of force; yet, a novelty was included in 
letter (h), proclaiming “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. This “norm of 
non-indifference”687 would, in Acharya’s opinion, provide evidence of the 
African roots of R2P.688  
Still in 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who had been the head of UN 
                                                                                                                                     
this pattern is unlikely to be altered by a change in the law” (After Bangladesh: The Law of 
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684 Like Richard Falk, “Introduction: Legality and Legitimacy”, in Falk, Richard, Juergensmeyer, 
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peacekeeping operations during the Rwandan genocide, posed this question: 
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica –to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?”.689  
The ICISS took up Annan’s gauntlet. Recalling Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Somalia, the ICISS report observed that “for some, [these interventions] 
herald a new world in which human rights trump state sovereignty; for 
others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the 
smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human 
rights”.690 R2P was a sort of middle ground “solution” to this confrontation.691 
Considering its immediate past, one may say that, in 2001, R2P was a norm 
whose time had come. Considering its immediate future, on the other hand, 
timing could not have been worse. 
The ICISS report was published just three months after 9/11, the beginning 
of a an era defined by governments’ obstinacy with the threat of global 
terrorism, and by the ensuing human rights retrogression worldwide (see 
chapter 4 on the prohibition of torture). It was also the time of the US-led war 
in Iraq bypassing the Security Council. Some ardent R2P supporters justified 
this intervention on humanitarian grounds,692 but most saw it as a great 
disservice to R2P. Recalling the 1991 intervention to protect the Kurds in the 
north of the country, Foley insinuates that “it all started in Iraq and perhaps it 
finished in Iraq as well”.693 
Evans admits that the ICISS report “seemed likely to disappear without a 
trace”, and if that did not happen it was greatly thanks to Kofi Annan.694 In 
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2004, Annan appointed his first Special Adviser to the Secretary General on 
the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, who upon Ban Ki-moon’s arrival to 
the UN Secretariat in 2007 would be replaced by Francis Deng, credited with 
coining “sovereignty as responsibility”.695 In 2003, Annan commissioned a 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, of which Gareth Evans 
was one of its members. In their report, this group of eminent individuals 
endorsed R2P as an “emerging norm” that must be exercised by the Security 
Council as a last resort. 696  Note that the ICISS had considered the 
involvement of the Security Council desirable, but not a necessary 
requirement for the application of R2P. In a more moderate fashion, in his 
preparatory report for the 2005 World Summit, the Secretary General urged 
Member States to “embrace the responsibility to protect” following the report 
of the High-level Panel.697 
R2P supporters argue that the World Summit of September 2005 was a key 
milestone, the moment when R2P was institutionalised in international 
affairs. The World Summit Outcome Document highlighted three points in 
relation to R2P. Firstly, it stressed the idea that primary responsibility lies on 
the authorities of the country where gross human rights violations are taking 
place; states would be supposed to assist each other in capacity building; and 
if the authorities fail in their responsibility, the international will have to be 
“prepared to take collective action”.698 Secondly, the Outcome Document 
circumscribed what must be understood as gross human rights violations: 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Thirdly, 
                                                 
695 See Deng’s End of Assignment Note of 31 July 2012: 
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depend on the specific circumstances”. (Letter by Ambassador John Bolton of 30 August 2005) 
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world leaders agreed at the Summit that R2P does not give a carte blanche to 
one country to intervene in another for humanitarian purposes. Unlike the 
ICISS, the Outcome Document only recognises the Security Council as the 
legitimate body to authorise the use of force. The Outcome Document 
outlawed unilateral humanitarian intervention. This is why for Weiss, the 
world leaders agreed upon was not really R2P, but “R2P-lite”.699 
In Resolution 1674 (2006), the Security Council reaffirmed these paragraphs. 
This Resolution has been recalled several times ever since. That said, one 
thing is to establish a general principle in a diplomatic statement in New York, 
and a very different thing is to apply this principle in a real case scenario, 
with imperfect information, conflicting national interests and a rapidly 
growing death toll of innocent civilians. As noted by the Special Adviser to the 
Secretary General on the Responsibility to Protect, “those who ultimately 
gave their stamp of approval to Articles [sic] 138 and 139 were playing a very 
different role from that which would be assumed by representatives of states 
in the Security Council, or the political leaders in key states, when faced with 
subsequent humanitarian crises”.700  
Since 2005, the Security Council has used the words “responsibility to protect” 
in the justificatory paragraphs of resolutions in relation to the Central African 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes 
Region, Libya, Mali, Sudan (including Darfur), South Sudan, Somalia, Syria 
and Yemen.701  
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700 Jennifer Welsh, Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect, Global Responsibility to 
Protect, 5:4 (2013), 381. 
701 The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 
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7.2. What does Order-over-Justice mean for R2P? Clarity, burden, 
liberalism and norm entrepreneurs 
 
7.2.1. Is the meaning of R2P clear? 
 
Order-over-Justice expects Western European states to give more support to 
norms defined in unclear terms (P3). This is the case of R2P. Because of its 
lack of clarity, it is difficult to ascertain if states comply with the norm or not. 
This may explain why, as shown in subsection 7.2.4, some authors believe 
there is a broad “consensus” in support of this “emerging norm”,702 while 
others claim that R2P is still disputed among states and commentators.703 
Lack of clarity also complicates the assessment of whether R2P is even being 
implemented in a particular scenario. Bellamy only finds one example in 
which the international community failed to react to gross human rights 
violations against civilians: Sri Lanka in 2008-2009.704 Again, however, this is 
a matter of interpretation, and one may legitimately wonder if there cannot 
have been other cases since 2005, cases where the application of R2P might 
have been the most appropriate response: Gaza, North Korea, Bahrain, Syria, 
etc.705 In any case, due to its lack of clarity, it is relatively easy to disguise 
pure national interests with humanitarian arguments, as was done in the USA 
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and the UK in relation to Iraq (2003), and by Russia in Georgia (2008) and in 
Ukraine (2014).706 
The very notion of R2P has different meanings, insofar as the R2P endorsed 
by the General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit differs from the one 
proposed by ICISS in 2001. Furthermore, in its 2005 UN formulation, R2P 
would be applicable to respond specifically to “ethnic cleansings”, but the 
meaning of this term remains unclear in international criminal law. The 
reference to “ethnic cleansings” in paragraph 138 is not at all self-evident. It 
is difficult to imagine what may amount to ethnic cleansing but not to 
genocide or to a crime against humanity, depending on the perpetrator’s 
intent to destruct the group.707 Moreover, the World Summit Outcome 
Document gives an undefined mandate to the “international community [to] 
take collective action […] through the Security Council”. By diffusing 
responsibility in such an indeterminate way, the General Assembly accepted 
a responsibility nobody could really be held accountable for. 
Even R2P supporters admit to the lack of clarity of R2P. As noted by the 
Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, “R2P is particularly susceptible 
to contestation, given its inherently indeterminate nature, and the erroneous 
tendency to measure its impact in terms of whether or not military 
intervention occurs in particular cases”.708 This indeterminacy poses a 
methodological challenge when attempting to distinguish between behaviour 
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that is compliant with R2P and behaviour that is not.709 
In sum, R2P is a particularly unclear norm. Its level of obscurity is only 
comparable to that of ecocide (chapter 5), given the fact that both norms 
have been interpreted in both wide and restricted senses: Ecocide-lite and 
R2P-lite. In light of Order-over-Justice, considering its lack of clarity, Western 
European states are likely to support R2P. 
 
7.2.2. Is the idea of R2P burdensome? 
 
Order-over-Justice expects that Western European states will give more 
support to less onerous norms (P4). It might seem that R2P is a very 
demanding norm, because it requires states to be ready to send troops to 
protect civilians far away from their borders. However, in its 2005 
formulation, R2P is not really burdensome. States do not want to be “legally 
bound to save strangers”,710 as shown by the downgrade from the more 
ambitious ideas of the ICISS in 2001 to the more manageable terms of the 
General Assembly in 2005. 
This may also explain why the UN Secretary General felt the need to make 
clear in his first report on the subject that R2P “does not alter, indeed it 
reinforces, the legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the use of 
force except in conformity with the Charter”.711 Three years later, he insisted: 
“the protection of civilians is a legal concept based on international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, while the responsibility to 
protect is a political concept”.712 
In other words, R2P does not create new legal obligations. It is not a material 
norm in human rights terms; it is not a new right. One might see R2P as a rule 
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of implementation of norms that have existed for decades, i.e., the ones that 
prohibit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
Be that as it may, I argue that R2P does not even implement anything new 
either. The first pillar (national responsibility to protect) is the very point of 
existence of international humanitarian law and of the international human 
rights regime as a whole. In fact, with IHRL states accept the mandate to 
protect people under their jurisdiction from any human rights abuse, not 
only from the most serious ones. The second pillar (cooperation and 
capacity-building between states) is not revolutionary either: Interstate 
cooperation is the very reason why the United Nations and other 
international organisations were created in the first place. And the third 
pillar (global commitment to intervene even militarily) is at most a guideline 
to the Security Council, the only international body that can legitimately 
authorise the use of force.713 
Evans argued some years ago that R2P has “the potential to evolve further 
into a full-fledged rule of customary international law”,714 but for the reasons 
just given, R2P does not have that potential. As we will see later (subsection 
7.3.2), with the exception of Libya, R2P has been framed in Security Council 
debates in terms of state responsibility (first pillar), and not humanitarian 
intervention (third pillar). The Security Council has only reiterated the basic 
IHRL principle that states must protect people within their jurisdiction. And 
it has done so in line with primary institutions of international law, not the 
least non-use of force and respect for territorial integrity. 
R2P brings limited, if any, legal consequences. More importantly, it is highly 
unlikely that the national sovereignty of a Western country would ever be 
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affected by it. R2P is a norm for the rest of the world; endorsing R2P does not 
compromise the European fortress. Moreover, nobody can seriously expect a 
country to intervene militarily in another one only for humanitarian 
purposes against its national interests.715 R2P is not a burdensome norm, and 
as a consequence, for a Western European state, R2P is an easy norm to agree 
with. 
 
7.2.3. Does R2P fit with liberal principles? 
 
Order-over-Justice expects Western European states to support human rights 
norms that are in line with liberal principles (P5). R2P does not challenge the 
classical Western notion of an ordered international society based on 
national sovereignty. Furthermore, the idea of humanitarian intervention 
R2P stems from has historically lied right in the middle of the discursive 
confrontation between state-centric and cosmopolitan liberals. 
Since 1948 international law has proclaimed human rights without 
renouncing to the principle of national sovereignty. In fact, IHRL is a 
collection of institutions and documents negotiated by governments in 
exercise of their sovereignty. It would seem that these two constructs, 
international human rights and national sovereignty, are doomed to 
understand each other. 
The UN is not supposed to interfere with the internal affairs of its Member 
States (Art. 2(7) UN Charter), who must refrain from threatening to use force 
against each other (Art. 2(4)), except in self-defence, or whenever the 
Security Council determines the existence of a threat to peace and security 
(Chapter VII). The principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
were later restated by the General Assembly in Resolutions 1514/XV and 
2625/XXV, respectively in 1960 and 1970, of capital importance in the 
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process of decolonisation. In 1981, the General Assembly solemnly declared 
that “no State or group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any 
form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of 
other States” (Resolution 36/103). 
Yet, as shown in previous chapters, the principle of non-interference with 
domestic affairs had to give way to flexible interpretations as the 
international human rights regime gained weight over time. Influenced by 
international organisations and NGOs, states agreed to a set of human rights 
treaties and monitoring bodies at the regional level and at the UN. From the 
very beginning, international law moved to prohibit the worst imaginable 
forms of aggression to human beings: genocide (with a specific convention 
adopted on 9 December 1948), crimes against humanity and war crimes (in 
treaty-based and customary international humanitarian law). The underlying 
idea is that, together, these three crimes shock the conscience of humanity; 
nowadays, all three of them constitute the sphere of action of the 
International Criminal Court (Articles 6-8 of the 1998 Rome Statute). 
The kind of criminal investigations the ICC could conduct might have a 
deterrent effect, but by definition prosecutions take place ex post facto, when 
thousands of lives have been spared irremediably. R2P was born out of the 
urge to do whatever necessary to stop gross violations of human rights before 
it is too late; whatever necessary, even allowing an outsider to use military 
force against the consent of the de jure authorities unwilling or unable to 
protect the civilian population. 
Even though historically national sovereignty never constituted a fortress 
from external interference,716 for Gareth Evans, former Australian minister of 
Foreign Affairs and one of the co-chairs of the ICISS, R2P was meant to 
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challenge the way in which sovereignty had been understood “for an insanely 
long time”, i.e., as “a licence to kill”.717 
R2P was coined at the turn of the century, but its roots can be traced much 
further back in history. Western liberalism is proud of its defence of both 
state autonomy and human rights. When it comes to humanitarian 
interventions, liberals have faced a profound internal debate.  
On the one hand, some liberal thinkers extended the domestic analogy to 
suggest that states, like individuals, hold the right to be respected in their 
autonomy, as awful and self-destructive as their behaviour may be. 
Following the principle of natural equality of sovereign entities, in the 17th 
century Locke became a robust champion of limited use of force, ideally 
constrained to self-defence and punishment of aggression.718 In the 18th 
century, Vattel articulated a legal defence of the rule of non-intervention in 
his Law of Nations,719 and Kant was sceptical about interventions as well.720 
In the 20th century, in the absence of a common morality and a shared idea of 
justice in the world, Bull found humanitarian interventions problematic for 
the maintenance of order in international society.721 
On the other hand, we have the group that we may call liberal cosmopolitans, 
united by a belief in equal deservedness of all human beings and in the moral 
unity of humankind as a whole.722 For them, morality cannot be contained or 
separated by national boundaries, and therefore, at least when fundamental 
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liberal principles (like life and liberty) are seriously under attack, all other 
considerations must give way, including territorial integrity. 
In the 17th century, Grotius, considered by many the intellectual forefather of 
the solidarist branch of the English School, defended the right to use force to 
stop a tyrant from tormenting his subjects.723 In the 19th century, John Stuart 
Mill made a famous plea for non-intervention but only between “civilised” 
Western nations; the others, the “uncivilised” or “barbarians”, are not entitled 
to that protection, and therefore intervention can be justified to prevent 
aggression or lingering civil wars in those countries.724 Beitz and later Rawls 
would make similar distinctions in the 20th century. For Beitz, a state that is 
“neither just nor likely to become just if left to its own devices” is not entitled 
to the right of non-intervention;725 and for Rawls, “outlawed” states are not 
fit to join the “society of peoples”, and liberal states are allowed to intervene 
“in severe cases to protect human rights”.726 
Michael Walzer also belongs to the group of 20th century liberal 
cosmopolitans. His starting principle is that, in light of grave and systematic 
attacks on innocent people, that who can do something about it, should try, 
even if unilaterally.727 “Just wars are limited wars”;728 in other words, the 
intervening army must have one goal, and one goal only: to stop the killing. 
For Walzer, humanitarian intervention is a political goal, not a matter of 
international law: “intervention is a political and military process, not a legal 
one, and it is subject to the compromises and tactical shifts that politics and 
                                                 
723 Grotius granted the right of other sovereigns to intervene, but he did not believe the subjects 
had the right to revolt against the oppressor (Vincent, “Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention”, 
245). In spite of his human rights convictions, in the late 1980s and early 90s Vincent did not 
believe the international society was “as solidarist as” to “issue a general license for intervention” 
(Human Rights and International Relations, 152; “Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention”, 255-
256). 
724 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXI – Essays on Equality, 
Law, and Education, Robson, John M. (ed.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984[1859]), 
109-124. 
725 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999[1979]), 92. 
726 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge (USA): Harvard University Press, 1999), 5 and 49. 
727 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New 
York: Basic Books, 2015[1977]), ch. 6. 
728 Id, 122. 
 236 
war require”.729 Given that national interests are also at stake, for Walzer 
consistency is desirable, but not a requirement per se; for him, “that a rule 
has been selectively applied may cause us to question a particular decision, 
but it does not invalidate the rule itself”.730  
R2P is tightly defined within the confines of liberal principles, which is 
another reason why European states may sympathise more with it. R2P 
promoters share a profound conviction on the universal supremacy of the 
right to life and liberty, and on the basic notion that sovereignty entails 
responsibility and that whoever is in a position to protect civilians from gross 
violations of human rights, must do something about it. Promoting and 
protecting human rights even with the use of force would be part of the 
European “mission civilisatrice”.731 Although some authors have made a 
remarkable effort to stress the non-Western roots of R2P,732 and so did the 
ICISS itself, as understood in the UN dialect, R2P fits well in the liberal agenda 
of the West.733  
In its 2005 formulation, which is much more sensitive to national sovereignty 
and the legal rules of the international society, R2P is very much in line with 
liberalism. As a consequence, we must expect Western European states to be 
ready and willing to promote R2P internationally. 
 
7.2.4. Have strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs endorsed the idea of 
R2P? 
 
Order-over-Justice expects that Western European states will be more 
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inclined to endorse norms promoted by strong norm entrepreneurs (P6). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the French Bernard Kouchner, one of the founders of 
Médecins Sans Frontières and Médecins du Monde, socialist minister of 
Health in the 1990s and conservative minister of Foreign Affairs between 
2007 and 2010, proactively defended the right to intervene and interfere in 
domestic affairs when humanitarian concerns are at stake.734 In 1999, the 
British premier Tony Blair announced a “doctrine” based on five principles 
derived from “just war values”.735 A few years earlier, Francis Deng, a 
Sudanese (now South Sudanese) diplomat working in New York, developed 
the notion of “sovereignty as responsibility”, which ICISS admitted to be 
inspired by.736 One of the co-chairs of the ICISS, Gareth Evans, had been 
Australian Foreign Minister in the early 1990s. Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon 
made a key difference, starting with the creation in 2004 of Special Advisory 
positions to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide and on 
R2P. The ICJ 2007 Ruling on the Bosnian Genocide was also interpreted by 
some as a push for the cause of R2P, among others by Louise Arbour, who at 
the time was the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.737 There are two 
resourceful advocacy groups explicitly dedicated to the cause of promoting 
R2P: the International Coalition for R2P and the Global Centre for R2P. 
Human Rights Watch is a member of the first one, and a founding member of 
the second one.738 
R2P also receives considerable attention in academic circles, with 
substantially funded research projects, one academic journal dedicated 
entirely to R2P (Global Responsibility to Protect, launched in 2009), special 
issues in other journals, and two major handbooks published by Routledge 
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and by Oxford University Press.739  
A strong epistemic community of donors, think-tanks, academic institutions 
and the UN has pushed the normative agenda of R2P forward.740 Considering 
the role of norm entrepreneurs, it is reasonable to expect that Western 
European states would support R2P. 
Nonetheless, commentators have hitherto been unable to agree on whether 
there is a sort of R2P consensus in international society. 
In Bellamy’s opinion, “if the first ten years of [R2P] were primarily about 
establishing the norm, the next ten should be about its implementation”.741 
Thanks partly to R2P, international society is now more focused on civilian 
protection, a number of states are acting as norm entrepreneurs, and the 
Security Council and regional organizations have repeatedly proven willing 
to use force to protect civilians.742 Alex Bellamy is not alone in being 
optimistic about the status reached by R2P in just over a decade.743 
Other analysts, however, still question R2P on normative, epistemological or 
systemic grounds. For the first group, there is something morally wrong 
about R2P. For the second group, either R2P has not yet been applied or, 
because of the way the norm is built, it is not possible to establish whether it 
has ever been applied. Finally, those in the third group call attention to the 
fact that R2P is constrained by the existing international society, with rules 
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and hegemonies that cannot be fundamentally altered. Understanding these 
critiques helps positioning Order-over-Justice in the R2P literature. 
On normative grounds, critics regret the militaristic nature of R2P, “the 
legalisation of modern warfare”.744 Peace is the best environment for human 
rights to flourish and R2P walks away from peace.745 R2P puts the blame on 
the countries that suffer directly the gross human rights violations, while the 
West is “divested” of the responsibility to promote financial and economic 
justice to favour the Global South.746 Others denounce the imperialistic 
legacies of liberal internationalism,747 as well as the neo-colonial scent of 
humanitarian interventions carried out by a masculine, heroic and 
paternalistic North that arrogates to itself the mission to rescue abandoned 
victims savaged by ruthless rulers of the South. 748  They echo the 
correspondence between international peacekeeping missions and the old 
imperial belief that European powers had a “mission civilisatrice” towards 
their colonies.749 In a nutshell, for this group of critics, “humanitarian 
intervention is not an antidote to international power relations, but its latest 
product”;750 “might makes right – precisely the condition which law is 
supposed to curtail”.751  
The second group of critics exploit a weakness that R2P supporters do not 
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mind to admit: That the general agreement on the threshold of a norm “does 
not guarantee agreement on whether the thresholds have been breached or 
on what is the most appropriate response in actual cases”.752 For R2P 
supporters, this level of generality is a sign of virtue insofar as it allows for 
the progressive construction of identities and interests around the norm; for 
critics, on the other hand, regardless of good intentions, the lack of clarity 
makes it impossible to infer the causal relationship between the norm and 
states’ behaviour.753 This is the reason why it is possible to read entirely 
contradictory appraisals of the normative power of R2P. While Bellamy 
firmly believes that “in a remarkably short space of time R2P has been 
transformed from the catchphrase of an international commission into an 
international principle unanimously endorsed by the world’s governments 
and usefully employed in more than a dozen practical situations”,754 for 
Chandler R2P is doomed to fall into the “gap between promise and reality”.755 
Was regime change in Libya a distortion of R2P? Or was it just necessary in 
order to protect civilians effectively? Have Syrians, whose uprising began the 
same week the Security Council decided to intervene in Libya, “paid the price 
of NATO excesses in Libya”?756 Or was military intervention never to be 
considered for Syria? Counterfactuals are a persistent problem of R2P, 
because the costs of intervening are much clearer than the benefits,757 and 
therefore it is impossible to get a defined picture of what would have 
happened if the circumstances had been different. The response to these and 
other questions are a matter of judgement and interpretation, not of lab-style 
value-free analysis. This poses fundamental empirical and epistemological 
problems when judging the normative power of R2P. 
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The third group of critics examine R2P from a systemic approach. Following a 
neo-Marxist perspective, so-called humanitarian interventions would have 
more to do with imperialism than with universal morality. In this sense, R2P 
would be a Western reaction to a growing Southern counter-hegemonic 
discourse ironically based on international institutions that Northern 
countries had created when they suited them, like the principle of non-
interference, but now were ready to disdain.758 From a non-Marxist but still 
structuralist approach, R2P could also be a reflection of the failure of the 
West to foster global consensus over new international norms; as such, R2P 
would be a sign of weakness of the West.759 
Still within the group of systemic critics, other scholars make a call for 
pragmatism. This could be because R2P would set the bar too low in allowing 
the use of force in international affairs,760 or because R2P may be accidentally 
detrimental to the cause of humanitarian intervention, since now states must 
take into account that their behaviour can be interpreted as support or 
opposition to an abstract norm.761 Others make an anti-cosmopolitan call to 
bring politics back to provide concrete responses to specific political 
problems with a mixture of realist politics and liberal principles.762 
A third type of systemic critics are those who vivisection R2P from the 
perspective of the role of law in an ordered international society. It is difficult 
to make humanitarian interventions compatible with the pluralist and order-
based rules of the existing international society.763 From this perspective, an 
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international norm cannot really challenge the fundamental tenets of the 
system. This systemic deconstruction suggests that, in spite of the multiple 
times the Security Council has mentioned R2P and states have reaffirmed 
their commitment to it, it would not be possible to consider R2P a success 
story, as it would be very difficult to imagine how state behaviour would be 
any different as a result of the emergence of R2P.764 R2P has limited or no 
influence on international law. The intervention in Libya would not prove the 
normative status of R2P; it would only be another example of Security 
Council inconsistency.765 In sum, 
“It is difficult to conceive how the contemporary variant of R2P 
endorsed in 2005 and reasserted in 2009 can possibly achieve [the 
goal of preventing future Rwandas] given that, in effect, it does not 
alter the existing structure of international law regarding sovereign 
responsibility, the authority to use force or the thresholds for 
intervention, and is ultimately based on a highly idealistic belief in the 
capacity of moral pressure to alter the disposition of world’s states.”766 
Order-over-Justice draws from many of the critical insights of the literature 
just presented, particularly from the third group of systemic critics, and 
especially its third subgroup, the one focussing on international law and the 
nature of international society. I do not doubt the good intentions of the vast 
majority of supporters of R2P and humanitarian interventions, who are truly 
committed to do whatever necessary to protect people from gross human 
rights violations. However, to the extent that R2P does not and cannot modify 
the fundamental principles of international law and the structure of 
international society, for the purposes of full disclosure, I agree with Ayoob, 
Hehir and others in questioning the normative power of R2P. 
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7.3. Spain and the UK: How much do they promote R2P? 
 
This section presents what we expect to see in Western European states’ 
behaviour in relation to R2P from the viewpoint of Order-over-Justice. Prior 
to that, it is important to recall the epistemological concerns presented 
earlier (see subsection on clarity 7.2.1 and critique in 7.2.4). It is particularly 
difficult to evaluate the extent to which states behave in accordance with R2P. 
A critical reinterpretation of state practice (discourse and action) is therefore 
required. 
Considering the importance of the passage of time in Western European 
states’ endorsement of human rights norms, as with previous chapters, we 
would expect stronger language and tools in the beginning (P1), and less 
resistance in challenging the norm in later years (P2). This would mean that 
states were particularly willing to support R2P when it was formulated in 
general and abstract terms at the 2005 World Summit. It would also mean 
that they did not resist the framing of R2P when dealing with specific 
conflicts since 2006, in Darfur (Sudan), Sri Lanka, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire or Syria. 
As in other chapters, this section looks at the way Spain and the UK, as case 
studies taken from Western Europe, have promoted R2P internationally.  
The analysis, which sets 2016 as deadline, pays attention both to states’ 
declared position on R2P in general (7.3.1), and to the positions adopted in 
relation to specific cases (7.3.2). The first subsection is based on 
“programmatic implementation”, 767  relying on statements made at the 
Security Council (discussion of Resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009)) 
and the General Assembly (2005 World Summit and informal interactive 
debate of 2009), as well as other foreign policy documents. It is easier to 
agree on a general principle formulated in vague terms than on its 
application in specific cases. This is why the second subsection examines the 
positions adopted in relation to Darfur (2006), Sri Lanka (2008-2009), Libya 
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(2011), Côte d’Ivoire (2011) and Syria (2012-2016).  
While the UK is a Permanent Member of the Security Council, since 2001 
Spain has only been a non-Permanent Member in 2003-2004 and 2015-2016. 
Therefore, this second subsection is necessarily skewed towards the analysis 
of the UK’s discourse and action. This is a research limitation that must be 
acknowledged. 
 
7.3.1. Support for R2P in general 
 
The UN General Assembly adopted the World Summit Outcome, whose 
paragraphs 138 and 139 were devoted to R2P, on 16 September 2005 in 
what was going to become Resolution 60/1. In his address to the General 
Assembly, Prime Minister Blair spoke of the global fight against terrorism, 
the need for stronger cooperation to tackle extreme poverty, the policy of 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, international development, and the 
newly created Human Rights Council, but not of the idea of R2P. Neither did 
the Spanish King Juan Carlos I, nor Prime Minister Rodríguez-Zapatero in 
their addresses. Upon the formal passing of the Resolution, which was 
adopted unanimously, only three countries took the floor to explain their 
partly critical positions on the Outcome Document as a whole: the USA, Cuba 
and Belarus. It is true that R2P was formally included in the World Summit 
Outcome Document, even if watered down from the initial idea of the ICISS in 
2001. However, only 12 of the then 192 UN Member States singled it out in 
their statements. Half of them were Western European, but the UK and Spain 
were not in this group.768 
On 28 April 2006, the UN Security Council endorsed paragraphs 138 and 139 
in Resolution 1674 (2006). The meeting lasted five minutes, and no 
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statements were made on that occasion.769 However, in December, the 
Security Council held one of its regular meetings on the protection of civilians 
in armed conflict. All countries spoke about Resolution 1674 (2006), with a 
particular insistence on the fact that primary responsibility lies on the 
government where gross human rights violations are taking place. The 
Chinese and the Russian Ambassadors made clear that R2P could not be used 
to undermine territorial integrity and that Resolution 1674 (2006) had only 
restated a general principle established by the General Assembly in 2005. 
Strangely enough, the British delegate was one of the only three 
Ambassadors that forgot to mention Resolution 1674 (2006) in his speech.770 
Spain was not a member of the Security Council in 2006. 
In July 2009, the General Assembly held its first informal interactive debate 
on R2P. 92 Member States intervened with statements that mostly 
subscribed to the idea of R2P as written in the World Summit Outcome 
Document.771 The British delegate used highly favourable words: “As an 
achievement, it was nothing short of groundbreaking and one of which we 
should be rightly proud. And we should give thanks to our African colleagues 
for showing us the way with their own commitment to the principle of non-
indifference, as enshrined in the African Union Constitutive Act”. Spain did 
not express an opinion on the matter.772 
On 14 September 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 
63/308, the first one devoted to R2P. Both Spain and the UK sponsored it, 
together with 65 other states. The resolution was carried with no need for a 
vote. Venezuela, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Ecuador and Nicaragua expressed 
their fears that R2P could be manipulated to disguise the imperialist whim of 
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some countries. Bolivia adopted a subtler attitude, stressing the importance 
of the General Assembly in the determination of whether a particular 
scenario required an international response in application of R2P. Rwanda 
was the only country that spoke in favour of R2P straight out. No European 
country took the floor.773 
Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009), on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, was adopted unanimously on 11 November, reaffirming again 
the principle of R2P contained in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document. The UK was one of the sponsoring countries of this resolution. 
Other sponsoring Western European states were Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Spain was not in this list, and it was not a 
member of the Security Council either. Although it passed without dissent, 
official records show that most countries insisted on the principle that 
primary responsibility lies on the state where human rights violations are 
taking place. Furthermore, delegates chose to focus on the responsibility of 
peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians, rather than on the principle 
of humanitarian intervention. 
Of the 62 countries present in the deliberations (15 members of the Security 
Council plus 47 invited countries), only seven made explicit reference to R2P 
as proclaimed in the World Summit Outcome and Resolution 1674 (2006): 
Japan, Croatia, France, Burkina Faso, Sweden (speaking on behalf of the EU), 
Italy and, ironically, Libya. The Libyan Ambassador actually regretted that, 
“in spite of the substantial progress achieved in the sphere of the codification 
of international humanitarian law and in spite of the endorsement of the 
general principles of the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the tangible 
results in terms of implementation have not yet reached the target”.774 Only 
one and a half years later Libya would host the first military intervention in 
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application of the third pillar of R2P. The UK representative did not mention 
UN-type R2P in her statement, and Spain was not present in the room. 
The UK has often supported humanitarian interventions, even without the 
mandate of the UN Security Council, as in the case of Kosovo.775 In fact, in 
1998, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office distributed a legal memo to 
other NATO countries making the argument that “force can also be justified 
on the ground of overwhelming humanitarian necessity without” a UN 
Security Council resolution. 776  In 1999, Tony Blair made a “liberal 
interventionist” speech in Chicago, and PM Brown subsequently followed his 
approach. Parliamentary library research shows that, “in practice, the UK has 
been a strong supporter of the Responsibility to Protect within the UN”, a 
position shared by Conservatives, Labourites (before Corbyn) and Liberal 
Democrats.777 For example, at the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, 
the British representative at the United Nations admitted that Rwanda had 
been “one of several instances in which the Security Council has failed to act”, 
but he felt confident the international community had got better at taking 
collective responsibility for the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and 
he mentioned Resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009).778 However, R2P 
was missing in the 2010 National Security Strategy and in the integrated 
strategy on crisis response,779 and the 2015 National Security Strategy only 
makes the vague promise that the UK “will use UN mechanisms such as the 
Responsibility to Protect”.780 The 2016 Chilcot Report after the Inquiry on the 
UK’s military intervention in Iraq did not give legal credit to PM Blair’s 
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attempts to bypass the Security Council, but made no reference to R2P in the 
analysis.781 
Spain has been less prone to the use of military force abroad, even for 
humanitarian purposes. Spanish delegates have made statements in support 
of R2P in diplomatic forums at least since 2011.782 However, the current 
National Defence Strategy does not mention R2P in any of its 68 pages,783 and 
the Foreign Action Strategy only makes an ambiguous call “to develop the 
concept of Responsibility to Protect”.784 That said, during its non-permanent 
membership of the Security Council in the biennium 2015-2016, Spain 
adopted a slightly more proactive approach. The fifth meeting of the Global 
Network of R2P focal points took place in Madrid in June 2015,785 and 
“bolstering the effective application of [R2P] in all three of its pillars” was one 
of Spain’s priorities for the 2015 session of the General Assembly.786 
 
7.3.2. Support for R2P in relation to specific cases 
 
The Security Council said that governments have “a primary responsibility to 
protect their population” for the first time on 27 January 2006 when it 
adopted Resolution 1653 (2006), on the Great Lakes region and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. However, Resolution 1706 (2006), of 31 
August, was the first one to extend the language of the World Summit 
Outcome and of Resolution 1674 (2006), passed only four months earlier, to 
a country-specific situation. The Council did so in relation to Darfur, which 
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expanded the mandate of the UN mission in that Sudanese region. Not all 
Members of the Security Council did accept this reference to R2P. China, 
Qatar and Russia expressed reservations and abstained. Spain was not a 
member of the Security Council. The British representative supported R2P in 
his address: 
“Almost one year ago, the heads of State of the countries members of 
the Council signed the World Summit Outcome document, noting the 
responsibility of each United Nations Member State to protect its 
citizens and the international community’s responsibility to assist in 
this if the State could not provide for such protection alone. The 
United Kingdom was at the forefront of efforts to secure this. We are 
very pleased that this is the first Security Council resolution 
mandating a United Nations peacekeeping operation to make an 
explicit reference to this responsibility. It has always been, and it 
remains, the primary responsibility of the Government of the Sudan to 
ensure the security of its own citizens. Over the past few years, it 
manifestly has not done so.”787  
Between mid 2008 and mid 2009, tens of thousands of civilians were killed in 
the last year of a bloody civil war that had shredded Sri Lanka since 1983. 
According to the Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary General, most of 
these deaths were caused by the government, not by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), 
whose defeat was merely a matter of time by then.788 “During the crisis itself, 
the Security Council steadfastly refused to place the issue on its agenda and 
rejected all but informal briefings on the humanitarian situation”.789 The 
Council’s only press statement, issued in May 2009, expressed “grave concern 
over the worsening humanitarian crisis”, called “for urgent action by all 
parties to ensure the safety of civilians”, “strongly” condemned the Tamil 
Tigers, and acknowledged “the legitimate right of the Government of Sri 
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Lanka to combat terrorism”.790 
That month itself, the Human Rights Council held a special session at the end 
of which it adopted the infamous Resolution S-11/1, of 27 May, on Assistance 
to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human rights. The text 
congratulated the Sri Lankan government and ignored the fact that precisely 
the government was behind most of the human rights violations. It passed by 
29 votes to 12; all Western European states that were members of the UN 
Human Rights Council rejected the text: France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.791 Their negative vote at the Human 
Rights Council suggests that Western European states probably did not 
pursue the inaction of the Security Council. Yet, even though the Council was 
briefed several times in the early months of 2009,792 Western European 
members of the Security Council did not see fit to print the language of R2P in 
blue (colour of draft resolutions in final stage), perhaps because they 
expected it to be vetoed by China. 
As opposed to Sri Lanka, where it failed to take action confronted by one year 
of gross human rights violations perpetrated mostly by the government, in 
the case of Libya the Security Council responded promptly. Revolts began 
early in 2011, and on 26 February, the Security Council adopted unanimously 
Resolution 1970 (2011), the first one to refer expressly to the R2P 
framework in four and a half years, since Darfur. Resolution 1970 (2011) 
imposed an arms embargo as well as some personal restrictions on Gaddafi, 
his family and members of his government. As in the case of Darfur, the 
Security Council also referred the situation to the International Criminal 
Court, even though some of the members of the Council had not (and have 
not yet) ratified the ICC Statute. Resolution 1970 (2011) was formally 
submitted by a number of countries,793 but reportedly the initiative was led 
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by the UK.794  
The Security Council met regularly in the following days to be briefed about 
the implementation of Resolution 1970 (2011). The Council felt that the non-
military measures authorised by the Resolution were not taking effect, and 
on 17 March the Council adopted Resolution 1973 (2011), also under 
Chapter VII. This one was sponsored by France, the UK, Lebanon and the USA. 
Resolution 1973 (2011) reiterated the principle of R2P, established a no-fly 
zone and authorised Member States to take “all necessary measures […] to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat […] while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of the Libyan 
territory”. No country voted against Resolution 1973 (2011), but even before 
knowing how the intervention was going to turn out, Brazil, China, Germany, 
India and Russia abstained in the vote.795 The UK delegate did not take the 
floor in the session, but the countries that did, starting with France, explicitly 
mentioned R2P in support of their position; this was done even by those 
abstaining.796 PM Cameron told Parliament one day after the adoption of 
Resolution 1973 (2011): “Now that the UN Security Council has reached its 
decision there is a responsibility on its members to respond, and that is what 
Britain, with others, will now do”.797 
Libya was the greatest leap for R2P, although it is not yet clear if it was a leap 
forward or a free fall. According to Bellamy and Williams, “consensus on the 
use of force against Libya was enabled by several exceptional factors, in 
particular a putative regional consensus and the poor international standing 
of Qadhafi’s regime, as well as the clarity of the threat and short timeframe 
for action”.798 As is well known, the intervention in Libya led to the 
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overthrow of Gaddafi and the demise of his regime, whose replacement has 
not yet been settled to this day. Soon after the adoption of Resolution 1973 
(2011), Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy announced that 
regime change was the ultimate goal of NATO operation in Libya (2011), 
exceeding the mandate given by the Security Council.799 This is a decision 
that Obama at least has admitted to regret.800 After a detailed inquiry, the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reached damning conclusions: 
The UK’s decision had been informed by inaccurate intelligence, the 
Government had been driven into action by the French President, 
alternatives to military force had not been explored, and the threat to the 
civilian population had been overstated.801 
NATO’s overstretch in Libya and the supposedly unintended consequences of 
the application of R2P outraged the foreign offices of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa and others.802 Russia and South Africa explicitly referred 
to Libya when voting against a military intervention in Syria,803 and Brazil 
announced the idea of “Responsibility While Protecting” in November 2011, 
partly as a response to the Libyan experience.804 The Brazilian proposal 
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stressed prevention over the use of force, asked for a case-by-case decision-
making model and called for an on-going accountability mechanism to ensure 
that the intervening force complies with the mandate given by the Security 
Council. 
Another major crisis unravelled in March 2011, this time in Côte d’Ivoire, 
after the incumbent President Gbagbo refused to acknowledge his defeat to 
the challenger Ouattara. Armed clashes between supporters of both sides 
soon snowballed into a humanitarian crisis with hundreds of civilians killed. 
After several attempts, the Security Council finally agreed on Resolution 1975 
(2011) on 30 March, less than two weeks after the adoption of the Libyan 
text.805 Resolution 1975 (2011) recognised Ouattara as the legitimate winner 
of the election, adopted targeted measures against Gbagbo and his acolytes, 
and warned that the attacks against civilians could constitute crimes against 
humanity.806 The resolution was submitted by France and Nigeria, and was 
carried unanimously. As others, the UK delegate made a short statement in 
support of the text in line with the principle of R2P.807 
One could feel tempted to reach the conclusion that Resolution 1975 (2011) 
reinforced the Security Council’s commitment to R2P expressed in Libyan 
Resolution 1973 (2011), particularly when it had been adopted unanimously, 
unlike the Libyan one. However, we must bear two important points in mind. 
Firstly, the resolution on Côte d’Ivoire only gave authorisation to the UN 
mission UNOCI to “use all necessary means” to protect civilians. The Security 
Council did not authorise Member States per se, unlike in Libya. France sent 
troops to the country, but a Chapter VII resolution was not necessary because 
Ouattara, proclaimed President in Resolution 1975 (2011), had requested 
                                                                                                                                     
Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc: A/66/551–S/2011/701. 
805 See Security Council Report, “Monthly April Forecast” (New York: Security Council Report, 
2011), 3-5. 
806 Unlike in the Libyan case, referral to the ICC was not required in this case because Côte 
d’Ivoire had formally accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in the territory, even when it would only 
ratify the Statute in 2013 (Open Society Foundations, “The Trial of Laurent Gbagbo and Charles 
Blé Goudé at the ICC”, New York: Open Society Foundations, 2016).  
807 UN Security Council, Official record of the 6508th meeting, of 30 March 2011, UN doc: 
S/PV.6508. 
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French support. And secondly, the campaign for regime change in Libya had 
not been made explicit yet. Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy only published 
their letter in several major papers on 14 April, two weeks after the adoption 
of Resolution 1975 (2011). 
The impact of Libya is more visible in Syria. Protests in the country also 
began in March 2011. Between then and December 2016, the Security 
Council loosely mentioned R2P in relation to Syria at least four times: 
Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2254 (2015), which endorses the 
political roadmap for the peace talks, and 2258 (2015). However, in spite of 
the unstoppable death toll and the fact that about one in two people are 
either internally displaced or seeking refuge elsewhere, the Security Council 
failed to agree on any text comparable to those on Libya and Côte d’Ivoire to 
respond to the crimes committed by al-Assad’s forces.808 Russia vetoed 
resolutions on Syria six times between 2011 and 2016, all of which except the 
one of October 2016 were also vetoed by China.809 
The UK has been particularly proactive in attempting to mobilise the Security 
Council in relation to Syria. In August 2013, PM Cameron even tabled a 
motion to get the approval of Parliament to intervene militarily in Syria after 
al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons. As in the case of Kosovo 15 years before, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a legal position arguing that 
military force for humanitarian purposes is allowed by international law 
even when not authorised by the Security Council.810 The Government’s 
                                                 
808 Russia began bombing so-called Islamic State in Syria in September 2015, followed by France, 
USA, UK, Canada and some Arab states since November. This intervention might be considered 
humanitarian insofar as the Islamic State is being accused of serious human rights violations in the 
territories under its control. Yet, one must take into account that the Islamic State fights against al-
Assad, that Russia is al-Assad’s most powerful ally, and that the Islamic State killed more than 
130 people in Paris in November 2015. Rather than humanitarianism, the intervention against the 
so-called Islamic State is generally framed in the language of collective self-defence due to the 
inability or unwillingness of the national government/s to deal successfully with the threat posed 
by terrorism (UK Attorney General, “Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies: 
The modern law of self-defence”, 11 January 2017). 
809 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “R2P Monitor: issue 24” (New York: GCR2P, 
2015), 3. UN Security Council, Official record of the 7785th meeting, of 8 October 2016, UN doc: 
S/PV.7785; Official record of the 7825th meeting, of 5 December 2016, UN doc: S/PV.7825. 
810 Government of the UK, “Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime – UK Government Legal 
Position” (London: FCO, 2013). 
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motion failed with 272 ayes and 285 noes.811 After Parliament’s rejection, the 
UK kept pursuing the R2P agenda at the Security Council, but the military 
option was off the table. After their fourth veto in May 2014, the British 
Ambassador to the UN said in an unusually tough English that “Russia and 
China will have to justify their behaviour to the Syrian people, who continue 
to suffer under Assad’s brutal regime”.812 Immediately after the fifth veto in 
October 2016, the British Ambassador kept a hard tone, presenting the 
Russian attitude as “a cynical abuse of the privileges and responsibilities of 
permanent membership”, deeming Russian commitment to the Syrian 
conflict resolution process as “hollow” and “a sham”, and concluding like this: 
“Thanks to your actions today, Syrians will continue to lose their lives in 
Aleppo and beyond to Russian and Syrian bombing. Please stop now.”813 
Spain was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2015-2016. In 
relation to Syria, Spain voted for the two resolutions mentioning R2P in 2015, 
and was among the 11 countries that sponsored the second one. The Spanish 
Ambassador at the UN did not mention R2P in the session where the first one 
was discussed (no other country delegate did either, although the text 
mentions R2P), and did not even take the floor on the second occasion.814 
Spain tabled one draft resolution in October 2016 together with France, 
calling for an end to all military flights over Aleppo, but this text was vetoed 
by Russia. On this occasion, the French Ambassador referred indirectly to the 
responsibility to protect, but Spain’s representative did not.815 Less than two 
months later, on 5 December, Spain tabled another resolution, this time 
together with Egypt and New Zealand. It was vetoed by Russia and China, 
which referred to the three proponents as a “humanitarian troika […] 
                                                 
811 House of Commons, Hansard, 29 August 2013, column 1551. 
812 Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Lyall Grant of the UK Mission to the UN, to the Security 
Council meeting on Syria (speech), 22 May 2014. The speech is available on the UK 
Government’s website (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russia-and-china-will-have-to-
justify-their-behaviour-to-the-syrian-people-who-continue-to-suffer-under-assads-brutal-regime), 
but does not appear in the official record of the 7180th meeting of the Security Council of that day 
(UN doc: S/PV.7180). 
813 UN Security Council, Official record of the 7785th meeting, 6-7. 
814 UN Security Council, Official records of the 7588th and 7595th meetings, of 18 and 22 
December 2015, UN doc: S/PV.7588 and S/PV.7595. 
815 UN Security Council, Official record of the 7785th meeting, 2-4. 
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shamelessly pressured” by the USA, the UK and France. In his intervention, 
the French ambassador talked about the “responsibility […] to save lives”. 
Albeit formally one of the fathers of the frustrated resolution, the Spanish 




All six propositions of Order-over-Justice indicate that Western European 
states would promote a norm that is as light, unclear, liberal and 
resourcefully defended by stakeholders as R2P. As a general point, we can 
conclude that Western European states have indeed programmatically 
endorsed the idea of R2P of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Others have 
reached similar conclusions before.817 
Order-over-Justice also expects that Western European states would have 
been more inclined to promote R2P in abstract terms in the beginning, and 
less resistant to its development in later years. The analysis of the British and 
Spanish programmatic promotion of R2P does not give enough support to 
such conclusion. Both countries have made abstract references to R2P in a 
number of statements, but so far R2P is not that prominent in diplomatic 
speeches or in foreign policy documents. This is more so the case for Spain, 
whose foreign office started to make more statements on R2P in 2015-2016, 
the biennium when Spain was a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council. It can be said that the UK was an advocate of the R2P-framing in 
Libya in 2011 and in Syria in 2013-2014, where the government was even 
ready to intervene without the approval of the Security Council. The UK and 
other Western European states were not behind the lack of action in Sri 
Lanka, but they did not submit a draft resolution on the matter either, 
                                                 
816 UN Security Council, Official record of the 7825th meeting. 
817 Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz and Julian Junk, Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe 
and a responsibility to protect, Conflict, Security & Development, 14:4 (2014); Franco, Meyer and 
Smith, ‘Living by Example?’; Franco and Rodt, Is a European Practice of Mass Atrocity 
Prevention Emerging? 
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resolution that could have been vetoed in any case. 
Nevertheless, there does not seem to be enough support to argue that 
Western European states were more willing to promote R2P when it 
remained an abstract principle, and less willing to resist it over time. There 
may be several reasons for this. Firstly, not enough time has passed since the 
UN General Assembly endorsed R2P in 2005. Secondly, proclamation in 
abstract terms has been contemporary with application in specific cases: 
Darfur (2006) and Sri Lanka (2008-2009) approximately coincided in time 
with the World Summit Outcome (2005) and with the two main Security 
Council resolutions, 1674 (2005) and 1894 (2009). And thirdly, as I have 
argued in this chapter, R2P is not and cannot be a norm per se. It does not 
create new obligations for states, lack of compliance does not lead to 
significant consequences, and insofar as it requires the Security Council’s 
authorisation, it is not even possible to establish independently whether a 
given country is complying with it or not. 
Unlike the prohibition of torture or the idea of justiciability of ESCR, states 
have kept tight control over the meaning of R2P. Human rights norms start 
from a conventional and limited reach and grow over time when states lose 
control over their meaning. However, this has not happened in the case of 
R2P. The idea of R2P endorsed by the General Assembly and the Security 
Council watered down the ambitions of early proponents, like the ICISS. And 
debates at the United Nations have leaned heavily towards its first pillar 
(responsibility of the state) rather than the third one (responsibility of the 
international community), thereby shadowing even more the burden 
imposed beyond borders. 
With its systemic approach, Order-over-Justice disregards differences 
between Western European countries, treating these differences as more or 
less irrelevant in the broad scheme of things. However, the empirical analysis 
of the practice of Spain and the UK shows that differences between countries, 
even within Western Europe, are significant. The UK has much more 
proactively promoted R2P than Spain, reaching the point of arguing that 
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humanitarian interventions are accepted in international law even without a 
Security Council resolution. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office made 
such an argument in relation to Kosovo in 1998 and to Syria in 2013. Spain, 
on the other hand, has been much quieter in relation to R2P and (with the 
exception of Prime Minister Aznar, who actively supported the war in Iraq in 
2003) Spanish senior officials have not ventured to go beyond the UN Charter. 
Official records of Security Council meetings suggest that France has a policy 
similar to the one of the UK, and Germany would be more like Spain in this 
regard.818 Both the UK and France are permanent members of the Security 
Council and have a far wider reach in the international political arena, while a 
military dictator ruled Spain until forty years ago, and Germany still holds the 
darkest recollections of military expansionism. These factors may partly 
explain this difference between Western European states, which in any case 
exists and is greater than for the other human rights norms studied in this 
thesis. 
Promoting R2P is relatively easy for Western European states. R2P does not 
alter the features of international society. Since 2005, it has repeatedly been 
formulated in line with the existing procedural requirements of the UN 
Charter. R2P is primarily focused on state responsibility in relation to gross 
violations of human rights that are unlikely to occur in Western Europe. And 
speaking of R2P and raising humanitarian concerns in public is a bit easier 
when there are good reasons to believe that Russia and/or China might veto 
the resolution. 
R2P does not have much normative power of its own, but it may have 
contributed to the emergence of some initiatives since 2013 calling the five 
permanent states not to veto or threaten to use the veto in crises in which 
mass atrocities are being committed.819 Whatever the future of normative 
                                                 
818 See also Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk, Emerging norm and rhetorical tool. 
819 Security Council Report, “The Veto” (New York: Security Council Report, 2015). Amnesty 
International, an organisation that, unlike Human Rights Watch and other groups, does not endorse 
R2P, has urged the five permanent countries not to use veto power in cases of genocide, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity (Amnesty International, Report 2014/2015: The State of the 
World’s Human Rights, London: AI, 2015). 
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development may bring, the idea of the ‘Responsibility not to veto’ is 
articulated better than R2P because it is built upon the recognition of one 
important characteristic of the international society: that some countries are 
more powerful than others, and that some among them are entitled to veto 
power at the Security Council.  
Wheeler is right to stress that humanitarian interventions pose “the conflict 
between order and justice in international relations in its starkest form”.820 I 
would extend this clash to R2P as well. However, as argued in this chapter, 
Western Europeans’ programmatic promotion of R2P does not suggest that a 
justice-based conception of human rights shapes Western foreign policy, or 
that the world is any less order-based or any more justice-oriented than it 
was decades ago. Western European states do not endorse R2P as a matter of 
global justice, they do so as a matter of international order, in line with 
existing rules of international law, in application of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter (on threats to international peace and stability), and in relation to the 
type of gross human rights violations that not many expect to see in Western 
Europe again. 
Dunne recently asked a very pertinent question: “Did the invention of R2P 
mark a shift from a pluralist conception of international society to a solidarist 
one that put the security of peoples ahead of the procedural concerns that 
protected the rights of sovereign governments?”.821 As a consequence of all of 
the above, my answer to Dunne’s question is that it did not.  
                                                 
820 Wheeler, Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society, 463. Similar language is 
used by Reus-Smit: “The degree to which legitimate force may be used internationally to constrain 
illegitimate force domestically lies at the heart of the problematic relationship between order and 
justice in world politics.” (Christian Reus-Smit, Liberal hierarchy and the licence to use force, 
Review of International Studies, 31.S-1, 2005, 71). 
821 Timothy Dunne, “The English School and Humanitarian Intervention”, in Robert W. Murray 
(ed.), System, Society and the World Exploring the English School of International Relations 








Human rights have been part of international law for nearly seven decades. 
The international recognition of human rights raised the profile of the 
individual in global politics, created mechanisms to monitor and promote 
human rights worldwide, and provided a discourse and a platform for 
international, national and local advocacy. These changes are positive, and 
they would not have happened if states had not agreed in the first place. 
History shows that Western European countries played a significant role in 
promoting international human rights law. But this does not mean that they 
did so because they believed it was the right thing to do for global justice. 
In essence, that is the argument defended in this thesis. The contemporary 
international legal system stems from the expansion of a Eurocentric 
international society that emerged in the 19th century. Considering the 
features and the constraints of international law, I have argued that IHRL has 
evolved as a result of a political fight between two poles: On the one hand, a 
state-centric and order-based European notion of international society with a 
minimalist conception of human rights; on the other hand, a broader 
conception of human rights, inspired by global justice and advocated by civil 
society and independent bodies under the umbrella of the UN and other 
international organisations. While all actors spoke the same language, they 
contested the meaning of each other’s words. 
Human rights are the fruit of tension, not the fruit of passion, tension in the 
political space of legitimacy, not between those who believe in human rights 
                                                 
822 Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, From My Life: Campaign in France 1792-Siege of Mains 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994[1793]), 770. 
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and those who do not, but between those who believe in human rights as a 
matter of order and those who believe in them as a matter of justice. 
In the remainder of this thesis, I will summarise the lessons and the 
limitations of the application of the six propositions derived from the 
argument of Order-over-Justice to our four human rights norms (8.1). The 
overall thesis and the empirical analysis will give way to some final 
reflections of theoretical nature (8.2), as well as a few ideas about what 
Order-over-Justice may mean for the future of human rights in world politics, 
and for human rights advocacy in particular (8.3). 
 
8.1. Comparative exercise: The six propositions and the four human 
rights norms 
 
Chapters 4-7 have given us the chance to explore the six propositions made 
by Order-over-Justice in relation to four norms at different stages of 
development: The prohibition of torture, Ecocide, Justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights, and Responsibility to Protect. 
The prohibition of torture is a globally settled norm that human rights bodies 
and human rights defenders see as a peremptory norm of the international 
human rights legal system. Ecocide is the international crime that never 
reached the point of international recognition. In spite of efforts between the 
early 1970s and mid 1990s, ecocide evaporated from the international legal 
stage; hence, in our categorisation, ecocide would be a failed norm. 
Recognised in international law from the beginning, in the last two decades 
economic, social and cultural rights have received growing support as 
judicially enforceable rights. As an implementation mechanism, their 
justiciability has reached an advanced level of development. Finally, the 
global responsibility to protect civilians from gross violations of human 
rights emerged with remarkable strength in the early 21st century, but both 
the internal features and recent experiences in countries like Libya and Syria 
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suggest that it is too early to assert that R2P is anything more than an a norm 
still at an early stage of development. 
Order-over-Justice foresees that Western European states would make use of 
the strongest normative tools in the early years of the norm (P1), and would 
be less likely to challenge a norm the longer it has been part of the human 
rights regime (P2). 
The two time-dependent propositions (P1 and P2) are confirmed in the case 
of torture. Western European states were crucial players in the initial 
decision that torture should be outlawed internationally. The principle was 
established in the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, and Western 
European countries were also proactive in the negotiation of the Convention 
Against Torture in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Doing this was easier in 
the beginning, in spite of relatively poor domestic human rights records, 
when countries retained more control over the meaning of the norm. Some 
states, the UK among them, initially harboured doubts about the strength 
with which torture ought to be defined in international law, but their 
opposition would smooth out as time went by, as observed in the drafting 
process and ulterior ratification of both the Convention Against Torture in 
the 1980s and its Optional Protocol in the 1990s and early 2000s. This was 
particularly visible with the Optional Protocol, since this treaty elevated to 
the global level a compliance mechanism of prevention of torture that had 
been in place in Europe since the early 1990s. All this confirms P2, which 
expects less resistance from states the longer the norm has been part of the 
international system. 
Ecocide, the international duty to criminalise the deliberate destruction of 
the environment either in peacetime or at war, only convinced a handful of 
relatively weak norm entrepreneurs between the 1970s and 1990s, and no 
country, in Western Europe or beyond, ever championed the cause of ecocide 
as a distinct international crime. Some were even clearly against it, including 
the UK. The soft version of ecocide, the one that intends to protect the natural 
environment in international armed conflicts, was much more successful. The 
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evidence does not suggest that Western European countries were any more 
proactive than others in this regard, but despite some possible doubts at 
earlier stages, Western European states did not resist this normative 
development and. By the 1990s, by and large, they seemed ready to accept 
that the deliberate destruction of the natural environment, at least in 
international conflicts, is a form of war crime. This confirms the expectations 
of the time-dependent propositions of Order-over-Justice. 
Since the Universal Declaration of 1948, Western European states have 
promoted ESCR in IHRL. However, they tried to control the meaning of these 
rights in the 1960s and 70s by avoiding the establishment of strong 
accountability and monitoring mechanisms. By the 1990s and 2000s, several, 
while not all, Western European states came to accept that ESCR might be 
justiciable, and some of them even ratified international treaties that are 
based explicitly on this premise, namely the 1996 Revised European Social 
Charter and the 2008 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
At a programmatic level, Western European states have promoted the idea of 
R2P in the international system. However, there does not seem to be enough 
evidence to conclude that Western European states were any more willing to 
promote R2P while it was framed in abstract and general terms, and less 
willing to resist it when it was referred to in relation to specific conflict 
situations. Unlike for the other three norms, it would be heedless to assert 
that the time-dependent propositions confirm our expectations in relation to 
R2P. 
Order-over-Justice expects that Western European states would not be prone 
to support human rights norms whose meaning is too clear (P3) or whose 
implications are too burdensome (P4). 
From the perspective of these two propositions, the prohibition of torture 
would not be a likely candidate to be supported by Western European 
countries, because it is formulated in clear and absolute terms in 
international law. However, as said above, Western European countries have 
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supported the international prohibition of torture at a programmatic level.  
On the other hand, the analysis specifically of Spain and the UK shows that 
both countries maintained an attitude of frontal opposition against 
independent human rights bodies in relation to most sensitive issues: 
specifically, the fight against terrorism, compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement (non devolution of foreigners to countries where their human 
rights may be at risk), and, in the case of Spain, accountability for crimes 
committed during Franco´s regime. In addition, as with most other human 
rights treaties, the UK has not accepted the jurisdiction of the UN Committee 
Against Torture on individual complaints. 
Based on the analysis of the global prohibition of torture, it would seem that 
clarity and burden are less important than other factors considered in Order-
over-Justice, but may still help to explain marginal behaviour, that is, 
resistance to clear and burdensome human rights norms when they affect 
sensitive areas, like national security. 
The expectations of P3 and P4 seem tricky in the case of ecocide. On the one 
hand, the analysis showed that ecocide lacked clarity from the very beginning, 
and in fact the same term has been used at least with two different meanings: 
an international crime on its own, and the attempt to protect the 
environment in international armed conflicts. Both of these interpretations, 
nonetheless, would impose potentially burdensome obligations on states, but 
the first one failed to be recognised in international law, precisely because no 
country seemed ready to endorse it, and the second one has not yet been 
enforced in national or international courts. 
In a non-binary system, one must polish the ascertainment of the level of 
clarity and burden of ESCR justiciability. The chapter devoted to the 
justiciability of ESCR showed that there are several degrees of separation 
between those rights and the civil and political ones. The different treatment 
of IHRL is observable in the terms used in key legal provisions (Articles 22 
UDHR and 2(1) ICESCR, particularly), as well as the fact that international 
mechanisms on ESCR are generally weaker and were set up years after those 
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for civil and political rights. On the other hand, these rights are now seen by 
many as justiciable, and the meaning of the justiciability of ESCR is relatively 
clear and operational, at least not less so than for civil and political rights. 
Compared to the mere proclamation of rights, justiciability intensifies the 
burden of ESCR, but as argued in the chapter, as a policy to implement ESCR, 
justiciability would demand less from states than the adoption of certain tax 
regimes, social policies or budget decisions that may constitute more radical 
forms of fulfilment of ESCR. Hence, by themselves, the propositions on clarity 
and burden (P3 and P4) do not help us understand whether the justiciability 
of ESCR is a likely candidate to be endorsed by Western European states. 
From the perspective of clarity and burden, out of the four norms, R2P is the 
most likely candidate to be endorsed by Western European countries. Its 
level of obscurity is only comparable to that of ecocide. As shown in chapters 
5 and 7, the confusion about meaning was such that both ecocide and R2P 
have been interpreted in two different ways, ecocide and ecocide-lite, and 
R2P and R2P-lite. 
At least within the confines of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (so-called R2P-
lite), promoting R2P is also relatively easy for Western European states, 
considering that at least in some cases they can safely assume there will be a 
veto from Russia or China. This R2P is primarily focused on state 
responsibility in relation to the worst kinds of human rights abuse, the type 
of violations that one does not expect to see in Western Europe again in the 
conceivable future. Furthermore, apart from being a weak implementation 
mechanism, R2P does not add substance to the rights recognised and crimes 
prohibited in international law.  
Order-over-Justice also anticipates that norms that resonate better with 
liberal principles, such as individual freedoms, rule of law and free market, 
would have more chances to be promoted by Western European states (P5), 
particularly when strong and resourceful norm entrepreneurs are pushing 
behind them (P6). 
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These two propositions are clearly confirmed in the case of torture. The 
prohibition of torture is rooted in liberal Enlightenment, and significant 
entrepreneurs were in the forefront of the prohibition of torture worldwide. 
Apart from large international NGOs established in the Global North, 
independent human rights bodies set up in the UN, the Council of Europe, and 
other regional human rights systems progressively expanded the meaning of 
the prohibition of torture to encompass areas initially not foreseen to be 
under its remit, such as abortion rights or the rights of persons with 
disabilities. Guided by order, norms tend to be minimalist at first but, once 
established in international law, they evolve and their scope expands. 
Because states are less likely to oppose a human right norm the longer this 
norm has been part of the international system (P2), countries by and large 
did not challenge this expansionist view, unless, as said earlier, it clashed 
with sensitive areas related to terrorism or the use of military force abroad. 
As a separate international crime, it would be difficult to match ecocide with 
the primary institution of national sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction, or 
with the liberal principle of the individual rights-holder. On top of that, 
ecocide never enjoyed the support of strong and resourceful norm 
entrepreneurs. 
Ecocide meets one of the four non-temporal propositions, the one that 
expects Western European countries to shy away from clearly defined norms 
(P3), but certainly did not meet two other, the liberal fitness (P5) and the role 
of norm entrepreneurs (P6), and was ambiguous in relation to the last one, 
favouring non-burdensome norms (P4). It cannot surprise anyone that 
ecocide never enjoyed the support of Western European states. And with no 
European support, at least until now, human rights norms have not settled in 
international law. 
As time went by, resourceful civil society groups, both internationally and 
nationally, judges and lawyers, and international human rights bodies, 
including the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
advocated the judicial enforceability of ESCR relatively successfully. Because 
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Western European states are more inclined to support norms advocated by 
strong norm entrepreneurs (P6), this would suggest that Western European 
states could promote the judicial enforceability of ESCR internationally.  
On the other hand, just as with clarity and burden, there are reasons to 
believe that the justiciability of ESCR fits well in the liberal European human 
rights legal mentality, but only to some extent. While framed in the language 
of the rule of law, a cornerstone of liberalism, if taken too expansively, 
making ESCR justiciable could potentially give judges the power to decide 
over the allocation of resources spent on social policies, and some see this as 
an undue interference with the separation of powers between judiciary, 
legislative and executive. In all, fitness with liberalism (P5) and the role of 
norm entrepreneurs (P6) help explain the partial support given by Western 
European states to the justiciability of ESCR. 
As in the case of ecocide, the degree of R2P’s fitness with liberalism depends 
on the type of R2P one has in mind: The one advocated by the ICISS in 2001, 
ready to bypass the Security Council when necessary, or the one endorsed by 
the UN General Assembly in 2005, which did not ignore the limits of the UN 
Charter. The 2005 version is largely respectful of national sovereignty and 
more so with the existing legal rules of the international society. Relatively 
powerful norm entrepreneurs, including influential former government 
officials, actors within the UN Secretariat and a large number of academics, 
have pushed for the recognition of R2P in the international system. This is a 
reason to believe that Western European states would jump on the 
bandwagon. Overall, fitness with liberalism (P5) and the role of norm 
entrepreneurs (P6) provide valid insight to explain both Western European 
states’ programmatic promotion of the 2005 R2P (R2P-lite), and lack thereof 
in relation to the 2001 initial proposal of the ICISS. 
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Table 2: Does reality meet the expectations of Order-over-Justice? 
 TORTURE ECOCIDE JUST-ESCR R2P 
P1 (promotion)* 
P2 (resistance)* 
Yes Yes Yes No 
P3 (clarity) 
P4 (burden) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* In relation to the examples of Spain and the UK 
The comparative exercise shows that, from a systemic analysis of the IHRL in 
the existing international society, the six propositions of Order-over-Justice 
in general help us understand better what norms are more likely to be 
promoted by Western European states. 
Four partial exceptions, clarifications or qualifications are required, though. 
The level of clarity and burden of the prohibition of torture (P3 and P4) 
would suggest that Western European states would be wary of it. However, 
the prohibition of torture is globally settled in the IHRL system, and it has 
enjoyed support from Western European states. The other four propositions 
seem to be accurate in their predictions. That said, we could also see that 
both Spain and the UK have opposed not only factual assessments but also 
normative interpretations by international human rights bodies when they 
touched on most delicate issues, particularly, terrorism, the military and 
crimes of the past. This might correspond to the initially mentioned 
propositions, but whether this is at all connected to the level of clarity and 
burden of the norm would require more careful scrutiny. 
Based on a systemic level of analysis, for the sake of parsimony, Order-over-
Justice soft pedals differences between countries. However, the justiciability 
of ESCR showed that at least sometimes these differences are significant. 
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Spain followed a rather ambivalent and confusing policy towards the 
justiciability of ESCR. On the one hand, it was one of the first countries to 
ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, but on the other hand, it has not 
shown the same commitment with the Revised European Social Charter, and 
ESCR remain largely non-justiciable in the national legislation. As for the 
other case, the UK has not supported this implementation mechanism either 
internationally or nationally, although over time it came to let others 
subscribe to it, as shown in the negotiation of the Optional Protocol in the 
2000s. Considering its vocal opposition to ESCR in general, and to their 
justiciability in particular, the UK may be an outlier. This point encourages 
further research on this particular case study.  
Another caveat is necessary in relation to this norm, at least in its 
international form. Spain has been internationalist and accepts the 
jurisdiction of a number of international bodies in relation to individual 
complaints. The UK, on the other hand, has been reluctant to do so, not only 
in relation to ESCR, but other rights as well. As we saw in chapter 4, the UK 
has not accepted the jurisdiction of the UN Committee Against Torture. 
Unlike 116 countries, it has not accepted the jurisdiction of the Human Rights 
Committee either, which deals only with civil and political rights. Other 
factors must therefore be considered in this respect, such as the degree of 
national pride and the suspicion towards external interference with domestic 
affairs. 
Finally, R2P also shows important differences between our two countries, but 
a superficial look at their neighbours suggests that the plurality of 
approaches to R2P goes wider than that. I offered four possible explanations 
in the preliminary conclusions of section 7.4. Firstly, created in 2001 and 
elevated to the UN level in 2005, R2P is the youngest norm out of the four 
examined in this thesis. Not enough time has passed for an accurate 
assessment, while recent and on-going experiences in Libya and Syria are 
likely to have a decisive impact on the future of R2P. Secondly, the 
programmatic proclamation of R2P (ICISS in 2001, General Assembly in 2005, 
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Security Council in 2006 and 2009) and its alleged application in concrete 
cases (Darfur in 2006, Sri Lanka in 2008-2009) happened more or less at the 
same time, which alters the evaluation of the importance of the passing of 
time on states’ understanding of the norm. Thirdly, compared with the other 
three norms, R2P does not meet the necessary requirements of a norm in its 
own right. It does not create new obligations for states, lack of compliance 
does not lead to legal or significant political consequences, and due to the 
way in which it is formulated in the UN lexicon, it is not even possible to 
establish independently whether a country is complying with the norm or not. 
In my opinion, the fourth explanation is the essential one: Order-over-Justice 
is based on the idea that countries progressively lose control over the 
meaning of human rights norms once they get incorporated into the 
international human rights regime. As seen in the other chapters, the 
evolution of the meaning of the prohibition of torture and the justiciability of 
ESCR, and also ecocide while it lasted, depended on the hermeneutics of 
independent bodies. This is not the case with R2P, whose application is 
entrusted to the most political body of the UN structure, the Security Council, 
where two Western European countries, France and the UK, have seats since 
the UN opened its doors. Unlike other norms, R2P largely remains what 
states make of it. 
 
8.2. Limitations and theoretical lessons from Order-over-Justice 
 
This thesis has offered a critical reinterpretation of the features of four 
human rights norms and the discourse and action of Western European 
states, particularly Spain and the UK. In opposition to both normative 
cosmopolitanism and realist disbelief (see literature in section 2.1), the 
hermeneutical exercise gives us reasons to conclude that order trumps 
justice when it comes to explaining why Western European countries 
promote international human rights norms. This, however, does not mean 
that IHRL represents Western Europeans’ interests or even a Western 
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European idea of international order. Other actors advocate the same norms 
for different reasons. Borrowing from the literature of the English School of 
International Relations, IHRL would be the result of the politics of contention 
between two forces, international order and global justice, that pull 
normative standards of adequate behaviour in different directions. 
We should recall that the argument is built on certain assumptions that were 
acknowledged in chapters 2 and 3. This interpretive exercise of the politics of 
international law is based on a systemic analysis of the international society 
and the human rights regime within it. Order-over-Justice also assumes that 
it is possible to infer motivation from behaviour expressed in state action and 
discourse. Causal relationships are treated as complex phenomena that 
require a great deal of critical interpretation from the researcher. Part of this 
interpretive exercise is whether states’ behaviour fits within the normative 
standard established in IHRL. Admittedly, I expect a great deal from 
governments before concluding that they meet international requirements in 
the field of human rights, but my decision to set the bar at a certain height is 
no more aprioristic than any other. Finally, the research is based on legal 
analysis, mostly international law and diplomatic statements and other 
positions that may constitute opinio juris.  
A different level of analysis, epistemology, method or selection of sources 
could take the researcher to different conclusions. I have treated the state as 
a unitary actor and I have examined sources that could carry legal weight in 
the ascertainment of opinio juris: national legislation, ratification of relevant 
treaties, positions expressed in treaty drafting processes, engagement with 
international independent bodies, and voting patterns at the UN. A large-N 
study of Western European states coding for their positions in relation to the 
four norms could deliver valuable information too,823 but this sort of study 
would require a different epistemological approach to the critical 
interpretivism adopted by this researcher (as explained in section 3.1). Even 
                                                 
823 Related to this, see the annual Foreign Policy Scorecard concerning the EU and its Members 
States of the European Council of Foreign Relations: http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard  
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within critical realist epistemological parameters that acknowledge the 
inevitable subjectivism of the researcher, the study could have examined 
other sources, such as in-depth interviews (with UN or government officials, 
political parties and NGOs) or media discourse analysis. For the sake of 
research feasibility, and due to international law’s assumption of the unitary 
character of the state, my choice was limited to the mentioned inputs, but the 
research would have benefited from wider sources, which could have 
enlightened the expectations that were not confirmed in the observations 
(see section 8.1).  
More importantly, part of the analysis of the time-dependent expectations 
(P1 and P2) in the cases of ecocide and R2P (sections 5.3 and 7.3) was 
nourished by the UK with less content from Spain. The reason is that the 
available sources provided more insight about the evolving position of the UK 
and not so much about Spain. In the case of ecocide, this was due to the fact 
that the Spanish position was not made known or was not reported in the 
official travaux préparatoires of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, or in the 
reports of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities and of the International Law Commission. As regards 
R2P, the sources for the analysis of the country positions vis-à-vis specific 
conflict situations were official records of UN Security Council sessions, of 
which Spain was only a member in 2015-2016. Even though this different 
treatment can be explained with the given reasons, it does constitute a 
limitation of the research. 
The English School has proven its richness as a theoretical framework to 
explain Western European states’ reasons to promote international human 
rights legal standards. The tension between order and justice was never 
relieved by the literature, and of course the conundrum has not been solved 
with this thesis. That said, hopefully this project has provided grounds to 
believe that the fact that we now have internationally recognised human 
rights does not mean that order and justice are on equal footing in 
international society. 
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Hurrell wrote in 2008 that the “solidarist consciousness” had impregnated 
the English School, and that globalisation, global governance challenges in 
relation to the natural environment, and transnational action networks made 
the retreat to pluralism impossible.824 More recently, however, he conceded 
that concerns with national security, mistaken approaches in military 
conflicts and rising nationalism were likely to revive pluralism, which might 
even be “virtuous” after all.825 For Williams, the English School took for 
granted the “solidarist normative agenda”.826 Later on, he developed his 
views about the “ethical contribution” of pluralism, which in his opinion is 
more “progressive” and “liberal” than its solidarist alternative because it 
embraces diversity and fosters tolerance.827 
Several authors have written that the Westphalian idea of a world of 
functionally equal nation-states with predetermined interests was never 
materialised in the real world.828 This notwithstanding, in line with the 
prognosis of the most recent Hurrell and with Williams, Hopgood has argued 
that we are entering into a new Westphalian era where nation-states plan to 
take back control from supranational institutions, and this will affect the 
future of human rights in international politics.829 
As should be unsurprising at this point, this thesis is overall sympathetic to 
the arguments lately put forward by Hurrell, Williams and also Hopgood. 
However, while a retreat to order and pluralism may be happening in front of 
our eyes (in fact, I would say we never truly left order and pluralism), the 
sort of state-centric international society that Bull and his acolytes had in 
mind is gone. While there is no guarantee that human rights institutions and 
values will shape the future of international politics, technology and 
                                                 
824 Hurrell, On Global Order, 11-12 and 292. 
825 Andrew Hurrell, Power Transitions, Global Justice, and the Virtues of Pluralism, Ethics & 
International Affairs, 27:2 (2013). 
826 John Williams, Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School 
Theory, International Relations, 19:1 (2005), 19. 
827 John Williams, Ethics, Diversity, and World Politics: Saving Pluralism from Itself? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015). 
828 Krasner, Sovereignty; Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, ch. 5; Glanville, Sovereignty and 
the Responsibility to Protect, 2014. 
829 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights. 
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communications have reduced the size of the world significantly. Identities 
are also increasingly fluid, and so are allegiances. From an international 
political perspective, individuals should no longer be seen as mere citizens of 
one country or another. That simplification would make us reach the wrong 
conclusions. Second-wave solidarist scholars rushed to conclude that 
pluralism was over, but they were right to step up from the international to 
the world society. States remain powerful, but they are not alone any more. 
In a nutshell, we still need to return to Hedley Bull’s thinking to explain 
international politics in the 21st century, but we no longer live in an 
international society but in a world society. We have IHRL first and foremost 
because states let us have it. But this does not mean that IHRL is necessarily a 
victory for justice. IHRL is what we see when order enters in conflict with 
justice. And this thesis has argued that Western European states are driven 
by order, while other actors favour justice in the international arena. Going 
back to the English School dichotomies, order and pluralism are compatible 
with world society. 
The second theoretical lesson of this thesis is that there is room for mutual 
enhancement between Critical Theory and the English School. A critical 
approach to IHRL is in fact necessary in order to make sense of the conflict 
between order and justice. Others have seen this connection before,830 and I 
agree with Dunne when he observes that: 
“Cox and Bull are closer than many contemporary IR scholars would 
admit. Putting it crudely, Cox saw world order as the meeting point of 
social forces, interstate relations and the hegemony of global 
capitalism; Bull saw world order in terms of a hierarchy in which 
institutions and regimes were in part constituted by world order 
values – the degree of convergence between the levels required 
detailed empirical and institutional research. What is not in doubt is 
that both Cox and Bull believed that world order could not be 
bracketed from normative evaluation – the claim that it is a neutral 
concept would be an anathema to both theorists. This is well 
understood as a feature of Cox’s work in light of his association with 
critical theory; yet it is an under-appreciated dimension of Bull’s 
                                                 
830 Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics; Linklater and Suganami, The English 
School of International Relations; Clark, Hegemony in International Society. 
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work.”831 
Critique and self-critique are particularly necessary to understand the 
emergence and evolution of the international human rights legal regime. As 
reviewed in chapters 1 and 2.1, a sizeable sector of the literature has taken 
for granted the authenticity of the humanitarian project expressed in human 
rights treaties and other documents. However, this thesis has shown how 
IHRL began as a conservative project intended to preserve an international 
society of states and delimited by Western European instrumental and 
ideological preferences, favouring civil and political rights over economic and 
social rights. Critique must also make us aware of the Eurocentric nature of 
IHRL, at least of its origins.832 The mere fact that human rights were 
embedded in an international regime set up by states constrains the potential 
of human rights as an emancipatory project: “By establishing and consenting 
to human rights limitations on their own sovereignty, states actually define, 
delimit and contain those rights, thereby domesticating their use and 
affirming the authority of the state as the source from which rights spring”.833 
In this thesis I have followed the tale of IHRL as narrated with great talent by 
Samuel Moyn in The Last Utopia. The plot of the story is that human rights 
became an international political idea two or three decades after they 
entered the realm of international law. Human rights started to resonate in 
global affairs with the emergence of new social movements in the 1970s and 
after the progressive decline of left-leaning ideological projects in the 1980s 
and 1990s. By the end of the century, human rights reached a point in 
political discourse and legal architecture that hardly anyone could have 
envisioned in the 1940s. 
IHRL as we know it is therefore not the linear consequence of a project that 
began six to seven decades ago. It is rather the result of a political turn that 
                                                 
831 Timothy Dunne, “The Responsibility to Protect and World Order”, in Ramesh Thakur and 
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833 Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, Harvard International Law Journal, 32:2 (1991), 
406. 
 276 
gave birth to the so-called international human rights community. Since then, 
IHRL is a matter of political contention within certain institutional confines. 
This takes us to the uncomfortable dilemma posed by Hopgood.834 The labour 
movement was united by common interests against the capitalists, and 
nationalist movements were glued together by a shared identity from a 
constructed idea of the nation. What are the common interests or the shared 
identities for human rights advocates? And if we cannot identify any, what 
should the human rights community do? This thesis will conclude with a 
tentative answer to this question. 
 
8.3. Practical lessons: What does Order-over-Justice mean for human 
rights advocacy in the outside world? 
 
Western Europe was instrumental in the recognition and promotion of 
international human rights norms. IHRL emerged and evolved in an era of 
Western hegemony in which Western European states remained 
economically prosperous and ideologically influential. The global human 
rights community spread out in this historical time and geographical context.  
However, for more than one decade, we are witnessing the progressive 
decline of the North and the West, with stagnant economies and scapegoating 
nationalism, and the rise of some of the South and East, with growing 
populations and gross domestic products. 
Rising powers from the Global South have not yet articulated a cohesive and 
homogenous alternative to the Western liberal international society. In fact, 
there are no significant indications that they will risk some of their leverage 
and reputation in killing off the global human rights regime. For example, 
both the 2015 Ufa and 2016 Goa Declarations of BRICS countries make 
                                                 
834 Stephen Hopgood, Moral Authority, Modernity and the Politics of the Sacred, European 
Journal of International Relations, 15:2 (2009), 229-240. 
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references to human rights within the UN framework.835 
Having said that, human rights law and practice have seen better times. A 
series of African countries recently announced their desire to withdraw from 
the ICC, the UK Government has threatened to denounce the ECHR, several 
countries are trying to restrict NGO participation in international human 
rights forums,836 and local civil society groups and human rights defenders 
are being targeted by governments all over the world.837 
This thesis would not be palatable to realists. To state the obvious, firstly 
because realists tend to be sceptical about international law in general and 
about human rights in particular. Secondly, because institutions matter 
dearly, not only the international ones but also the domestic ones that 
enhance the democratic fabric and allow civil society to flourish and advocate 
human rights as a matter of justice. And thirdly, because the idea of order 
adopted in this thesis is not synonymous with security and balance of power, 
as realists would have it, but with stability and predictability, where pacta 
sunt servanda is a core principle. 
“Periods in which power relations are fluid and interests and strategies are 
unclear or lack consensus generate demands for new ideas”.838 Human rights 
are as necessary today as they ever were in the last six to seven decades. How 
can we ensure that human rights underpin law and policy in future global 
politics? 
This has been a critique of the human rights regime from within. Those of us 
who believe in essentially universal values for all people must come up with 
intelligent strategies to make the most of the tools at our disposal. This 
requires, first and foremost, managing expectations about what human rights 
are capable of bringing about in real international politics. Carr put it nicely 
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long before anybody cared about human rights in the then incipient 
International Relations literature: “Rationalism can create a utopia, but 
cannot make it real”.839 
The meaning and power of human rights is limited by institutional settings 
but, without muscle, without mobilisation, international human rights risk 
perpetuating a conservative and Eurocentric idea of international order, 
neither accurately descriptive of the future to come, nor fit for the purpose of 
empowering people. 
The defence of human rights can no longer be built exclusively or even 
principally on some immaterial, universal and superior principles. Human 
rights advocates must not fool themselves assuming that human rights are an 
idea whose time has come. Political opportunities only exist when mobilising 
structures exploit framing processes to generate the change they want to see. 
In light of invigorated states, I will not say, as Schmitt did, and Proudhon 
before him, that “whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat”.840 But I will 
defend that we must bring politics back to the table. The human rights 
community, at least in the Global North, would benefit from greater 
interaction with other sectors. It could open up to others, even if this means 
lowering the pre-eminence of international law in the discourse. The human 
rights community could pay more attention to local identities and listen more 
to people’s values and fears, opening up to new ways of constructing the 
ideas of human rights. The future of advocacy could lie more on the issues 
(the human rights with lower-case) than with the NGO logos or with the 
institutionalised forms of rights (Human Rights with capital letters).841 The 
human rights community could merge into other forces, other movements. In 
other words, human rights people could move from the realm of law to the 
realm of politics. 
A more explicitly political approach to human rights means, perhaps 
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ironically, that we should take the pacta sunt servanda seriously again.842 
States matter because, without their consent, there would not be 
international human rights law in the first place. States are not alone in world 
society and broadly defined justice-driven activists are right to push order-
driven states to ratify and promote human rights in international law. They 
must also fight to stop them from withdrawing from the human rights regime 
once states are part of it.  
But there is another reason why states are critically important. States are 
crucial not only to get rights proclaimed in the international system, but also 
to get them respected, protected and fulfilled domestically. The protection of 
human rights is only as strong as the state that is meant to protect them. This 
is another reason why human rights advocates must master the game of 
politics. Human rights advocates should not bypass states. They ought to 
embrace them, campaign to change them and take control. The challenge for 
human rights does not lie in their ethical justification or in their international 
legalisation, but in the articulation of tools to protect them most effectively at 
the national and local levels.  
In a nutshell, get real, get political and get local. The result, nonetheless, will 
not be satisfactory. After all, and I promise this will be my last quote from 
Koskenniemi, “human rights are like love, both necessary and impossible. We 
cannot live without them, but we cannot have them, either”.843 
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http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Documentation.aspx 
Universal Periodic Review 
http://www.upr-info.org/ UPR Info NGO 
http://www.civicus.org/ Civicus, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation  
http://www.ishr.ch/ International Service for Human Rights 
http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard European Council of Foreign Relations, 
Foreign Policy Scorecard 
Torture 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Inquiries.aspx 
Confidential inquiries under Article 20 of the Convention Against Torture 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/historical-background.htm Historical 
background of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states/gbr.htm Reports on the UK by the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states/esp.htm Reports on Spain by the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
http://www.nationalpreventivemechanism.org.uk UK torture prevention 
mechanism 
https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/mnp/mecanismo-nacional-de-
prevencion-de-la-tortura/ Spanish torture prevention mechanism 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/prime-time-web/2014/0604/ Irish TV 
programme on UK’s withholding of relevant information from the European 
Court of Human Rights regarding the application of torture in Northern 
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Ireland in the 1970s 
Ecocide 
http://eradicatingecocide.com/ Campaign to eradicate ecocide  
http://www.un.org/en/events/motherearthday/documents.shtml and 
http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/documents.html UN Reports, 
documents and resolutions on Mother Earth Day 
http://eradicatingecocide.com/the-law/ecocide-directive/ Draft EU directive 
on ecocide 
www.endecocide.eu Campaign website on an EU directive on ecocide 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/obsolete/details/2013/000002 EU citizens’ 
initiative in relation to ecocide 
http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/icc-1998/icc-1998.html Official 
records of the ICC Statute negotiations 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_N
ORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=470 Ratifications, reservations and 
declarations on relevant International Humanitarian Law documents 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home ICRC 
Customary International Humanitarian Law database  
https://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html Aarhus Convention 
Economic, social and cultural rights 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter CoE information 
about the European Social Charter 
http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw Case-law database on economic and social 
rights 
http://blindatusderechos.org/ Campaign for reform of the constitutional bill 
of rights by Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Oxfam in Spain 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/debating-economic-and-
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social-rights Debate between academics and practitioners on economic and 
social rights advocacy 
http://tiesr.org/ Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights  
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ Comparative Constitutions 
Project 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/OEWG/Pages/OpenEndedWGIndex
.aspx Official documents of the drafting process of the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR 
Responsibility to Protect 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect 
http://www.globalr2p.org/ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect  
 
 
 
 
 
